What is morality?

[mknorman]

The current (?) fad for the discussion of the objectivity or subjectivity of morality has, in my view, stalled based on a lack of agreement of what morality could even be.

1) Is morality authoritative? That is, are we saying that an action is good because one 'ought' to do it solely because a moral law says so? Or, are we merely saying that an action is good because it helps achieve some desirable end?

2) If morality is not authoritative, what differentiates it from a mere collection of recommendations? In other words, what can lay claim to being the source of 'moral weight' in the absence of the authority of an interested agent?

3) If morality is authoritative, what is the source of that authority? What is it that makes an action 'right or wrong' when it either comports with or does not comport with a given moral code?

Let me just come out and say that I'm a moral skeptic because of what I think are the most reasonable answers to the above questions. Those answers are motivated by the following understanding of the relevant notions. First, the concept of 'morality' rests on the concept of 'values', and that concept implies a 'valuer.' Basically, "Good or bad for whom?," is always a pertinent question. Thus, and second, the question, "Is this action good?," always has the implied ending, "...for (some specific) valuing agent?" That is, judgments about goodness or badness are always tied to the perspective of a valuer. Third, an objective and therefore disembodied (but somehow authoritative) morality is a contradiction in terms, because there can be no privileged valuer at the intersection of the affairs of two people. (Not between them nor outside of them.) And, finally, I'd have to add that a 'personal objective morality' is also a contradiction in terms, because 'personal' in this instance means 'subjective'.

If you're going to argue that there is such a thing as morality, please answer either 1 & 2 or 1 & 3 from above, and also convincingly and coherently point out the flaw(s) in the previous paragraph.

Also, note the following handy shorthand for my argument: I'm saying that it is improper to use the term 'morality' because it cannot be coherently differentiated from a non-authoritative list of behavioral suggestions.

I'll create another topic on the psychology of moral belief, and what it does or does not have in common with the psychology of religious belief.

 

[Ozymandyus]

I believe there is such a thing as morality, and will agree that it requires an authority or else it has no real meaning (I would certainly agree that there was a subjective morality, but it would have no real meaning because whenever two subjective moralities met it would result in no suggested course of action). An action is good based on it achieving some desirable end - and that 'desirable end' needs to be something objective for those involved in the moral act (something that is a desirable end for all the actors and those affected by them) for that to have any meaning.

As I have argued before, I think science is the ultimate objective valuer in these sorts of cases. It can determine the inherent values of the actors(what they believe), the roots of those values(some common to all parties involved, some not), the implications of the values in terms of consequences, and the probable consequences of the possible actions for all that will be affected. This knowledge can lead directly to an implied course of action.

As to your paragraph: The valuer problem is answered by using the stand in 'All of humanity' as the valuer (and using the near objectivity of the scientific method to determine and refine what the human race values on the whole). This is still subjective to a small degree (i.e. a chimp wouldn't like it very much)... I am not certain how much of a problem this is, but we could change the scientific valuation to take the standpoint as 'all life on earth' also and compare the differences. Choosing this frame of reference would be an aesthetic and not a scientific judgement. HOWEVER, I believe that the question at hand being about a specifically Human morality/code of conduct' implies the former frame of reference rather than the latter (though consideration of all life on earth may indeed be in humanities' best interest too). Any more specific frame than that would invalidate it as a code of action for all humans to take.

In any case, scientific investigation of human natures CAN play the part of a privileged 'disembodied' valuer, would be my argument. The values themselves will imply overarching goals for humanity - the problem will arise when those goals conflict. We may find that humans nearly uniformly want a life of comfort and ease, but also strongly value the sense of accomplishment that only comes with working hard, for example. Trying to match up such inherent contradictions will be somewhat an aesthetic judgment, which will require subjective human input. However, I would suggest that our slight plasticity(our ability to convince ourselves that we want something more or less than we would by nature) will allow for such judgments to self-resolve and come to a near equilibrium.

 

[philebus]

Well, I agree that there is often confusion over just what we mean by morality - it is common to use the words moral and ethical interchangeably but I think that it is worth drawing a distinction between the two.

So, Ethics is that part of philosophy that tries to answer the ethical question: "how should I live?"

Broadly, there are two types of answer. The first and historically the earliest, is Virtue, which is characterised by being agent centred. The second is Morality, which is characterised by being patient centred.

The subjects of morality can, I suspect, only meaningfully be subjects of experience - which may or may not mean persons (I'll continue on this assumption). I am not convinced that morality can be objective in the platonic sense (although I'm not ruling out that kind of realism here, just moral realism). So, morality must be subjective but I think that you are right to be suspect because it cannot be relative - that would rob moral statements of the 'ought', without which they are in no way special. Therefore, morality must be subjective but absolute. We are then looking for a way to value persons such that obligates us to them but does not involve any arbitrary elements, and is coherent (which is a grounds upon which I find fault with many moral theories).

I do think that we can draw something from Kant, I think that he is correct to describe persons as ends in themselves and I find that think that the best answer to the problem is that to value morally is to value persons as this, ends in themselves and to value them absolutely and unconditionally. This treats persons as they actually are and doesn't introduce any prejudice or arbitrary quantities such as pleasures. It is not what most people want from morality, they tend to want a convenient guide to what they should or should not do, be it from a list or rules or a handy formula. But that's just too bad. It also means that sometimes we will be faced with choices between bad options, where there is no best or right choice - in which case we must choose and accept responsibility for that choice.

So, yes, there is moral authority, but we are the source of that authority. Of course, it is meaningless to suggest that there could be an ought to be moral - we either value morally or we do not.

It is difficult to summarise a moral position in a forum post but this is at least the gist of it.

 

[Aught3]

1)

are we saying that an action is good because one 'ought' to do it solely because a moral law says so? Or, are we merely saying that an action is good because it helps achieve some desirable end?

Definitely, yes for the second question. I think the whole point of moral questions is to make a decision that achieves a desired goal. As for the first question, I'm less sure but I think my answer would be no. My problem with it is moral laws don't tell you to take actions, so I other information would have to feed into the moral decision (e.g., the current environment or context).

2)

If morality is not authoritative, what differentiates it from a mere collection of recommendations? In other words, what can lay claim to being the source of 'moral weight' in the absence of the authority of an interested agent?

The facts (scientific and social) that objective morality rest on differentiate it from a list of recommendations. Those facts give morality its moral weight.

3) I think I would claim that morality is not authoritative unless you extend authority to include objective scientific and social facts.

Where I differ from you in your paragraph is the concept of the valuer. I don't think there needs to be a privileged valuer at the intersection of the affairs of two people. It depends on who is making the moral judgment at the particular moment as to who the valuer is. It's not personal objective morality that they have but personal evaluation of the facts and consequences from their point of view.

 

[mknorman]

Hey Oz,

I think you've inadvertently pointed out a couple of possible ambiguities in my formulation.

First, it is not the fact that an agent can arrive at a value that makes him/her a 'valuer' in the moral sense, but rather that the agent has an interest in obtaining that value. I fail to see how science as a disembodied 'valuer' in the Ozymandyus sense is going to lay claim to an authority for action. E.g., relating to legislating sexual morality, no outside party has a legitimate, non-prurient interest in the sexual behavior of two consenting adults, therefore they lack the authority to make claims about what those two should do*. This, I think, is a confusion on somebody's part about the verb 'value.'** It doesn't mean merely, 'to rate,' but rather means 'to rate as desirable to the valuer, or as furthering the valuer's ends.' It is this self-referential nature of the verb 'value' that precludes an objective morality by removing the possibility of outside authority.

You can probably then see why we can't accept 'science' as the objective valuer, because science lacks the personhood necessary to talk coherently about this sense of the verb 'value.' It can't talk of it's ends or it's desires. It may also now be obvious to you why we can't accept some plurality as that valuer, because the action is always undertaken by individuals. Each of them can decide to cooperate or not, but they bear only the scorn of each other, and not the condemnation of a universal moral law.

In the context of our ongoing discussions on the topic, I think a full understanding of this post will also make clear why I think there really is a type jump from a scientific investigation to any consequent morality. (Well, that there would be if the destination of the jump were coherent.)


* The Internet notwithstanding.
** It may be me, but I think this is the common philosophical meaning of the verb 'value.'

 

[Ozymandyus]

I was shorthanding 'science' to stand in for 'a scientific investigation that seeks to discover a shared set of values for X' (x being all humans in the formulation above).

As I stated, the valuer would be the human race, and science is the method for obtaining the valuations of the human race (as we can not directly obtain the values of the human race by asking). This is something science does well, it can look at a complex situations and eliminate the variables, determining the fundamental similarities that result in the overarching patterns. I'm not resorting to science as an outside authority, I'm using science to determine the values of the overarching shared internal authority.

If that makes sense.

Edit: As to the sexual claim, the human race as a whole may indeed have an interest in the sexuality of those two individuals, whether it may result in a child, or may make the individuals satisfied and happier and increase their positivity towards the rest of society, etc. And as those individuals are a subset of the whole, they certainly have an interest.

 

[mknorman]

Hi, philebus!

Can you clarify "The subjects of morality can, I suspect, only meaningfully be subjects of experience - which may or may not mean persons (I'll continue on this assumption)."? My close reading of this seems to indicate that you are saying that moral codes can only be about how we relate to other sentient beings (or possible persons). Is this correct?

Also, I'd tend to be suspicious of the Kantian suggestion to value others as ends in themselves, precisely because it is circular if we are using it to establish morality. It doesn't seem like the thing that creates morality can itself be a moral recommendation, which is what 'value others as ends in themselves' sounds like. For example, it seems as if I could just say, "I won't value others as ends in themselves," and then be done with it.

Finally, I actually do "rob moral statements of 'ought'" for the reasons I gave in the opener. From another thread, http://forums.leagueofreason.co.uk/viewtopic.php?p=4514#p4514, I put it this way:

Pragmatism is not a kind of morality, but a replacement for morality. Furthermore, even if we've been under the illusion that we've been guided by an objective moral law, we have been always practicing pragmatism in lieu of morality. For example, we're statistically less likely to act contrary to moral law when we think someone is watching, and more likely to do so when we feel we can get away with it. That is to say, we subjugate our moral feelings and disregard moral law when we perceive that it is truly in our best interests to do so. This has always been happening, and it has not resulted in a world any more disastrous than the one to which we have already become accustomed.

I rob them of "'ought' in itself," and instead force them to be, "'ought' if you want the attendant value." I think that most of the consequences we want to avoid by appealing to morality are actually avoided by pragmatic concerns. For the remaining consequence, the inability to frame our enemies as 'evil,' I am definitely Nietzschean in this regard. I view moralizing as a kind of 'ethical sour grapes,' Nietzsche's resentment.

 

[mknorman]

I was shorthanding 'science' to stand in for 'a scientific investigation that seeks to discover a shared set of values for X' (x being all humans in the formulation above).

As I stated, the valuer would be the human race, and science is the method for obtaining the valuations of the human race (as we can not directly obtain the values of the human race by asking). This is something science does well, it can look at a complex situations and eliminate the variables, determining the fundamental similarities that result in the overarching patterns. I'm not resorting to science as an outside authority, I'm using science to determine the values of the overarching shared internal authority.

If that makes sense.

Edit: As to the sexual claim, the human race as a whole may indeed have an interest in the sexuality of those two individuals, whether it may result in a child, or may make the individuals satisfied and happier and increase their positivity towards the rest of society, etc. And as those individuals are a subset of the whole, they certainly have an interest.

We've hit another equivocation. An 'interest' in the philosophical sense has to be restricted to the actor involved, otherwise we get right back to where we started. For example, one can't have an 'interest', in the moral sense, in a given blonde's desire to have intercourse with one, while one may very well have an 'interest' in the colloquial sense, namely 'desire.' (To paraphrase the bard, "One wants her to want one.") To equivocate these two senses is to beg the question of a particularly base and mean morality, namely that everybody's desires are elevated to moral claims. (For example, does the recalcitrant blonde have an interest in the diminution of her erstwhile suitor's libido? Is it elevated to a moral claim? We would surely not fault her for forcibly rebuffing an assault so motivated, but then we would be left to explain why we privilege her low libido over his high one.)

I don't think it's too brazen to claim that this is exactly the equivocation you've been making, and with exactly this disastrous result. (This gets into philebus's raising of the Kantian exhortation to treat others as ends in themselves, incidentally. This is the Kantian brake on this sort of conundrum. But it is an arbitrary brake.) Basically, the realm of the authority for the actions that my interests inspire has to be the realm of my actions, or else we immediately run into contradictions of this nature. I can make no claim on your actions from my interests. We can join Kant in multiplying entities, but I think it is more robust to admit the obvious moral consequence of metaphysical nihilism and realize the benefits of pragmatism outside of morality.

 

[Ozymandyus]

I disagree that I am making that sort of equivocation... if you look closely at my claim it was an investigation of the Shared values of the entire set of humanity. The actors, as members of the set, would also share those values. Some may not KNOW they share the values; perhaps they were taught something different about themselves, or they just haven't been introspective about that aspect of themselves, or can't foresee the consequences of their actions and how that might cause a conflict with their other values, but they would still share those values. So the 'interest' is precisely that of the actors, and only their SHARED desires are elevated to moral claims, not their individual values.

Though I admit that I liked expounding the idea of how the society might also be interested in such an action, the real interest in the action would be the actors, as a common set of underlying values that both actors share. Sorry if that little bit of playful banter confused the situation, completely my fault for going outside of my own definitions.

 

[mknorman]

There has been a misunderstanding but, for subtle reasons, I think my point still stands. Let me give this another try.

Values that are held by more than one person are not shared in a morally meaningful way. Every 'value' is situated in a 'valuer'. This 'valuer' must meet certain criteria. It must be conscious. Humanity, as a whole, is not conscious. It must be able to think. Humanity, as a whole, does not think. It must be able to act. Humanity, as a whole, does not act. We can say, "Humanity thinks," or, "Humanity acts," only in a metaphorical sense, or as a matter of grammatical expediency. We don't even try to say, "Humanity is conscious." Individuals act. Individuals think. Individuals are in a position to value and have interests. Humanity, as a whole, is not in a position to value or have interests because it does not really think nor really have interests. Only it's constituents do.

While we might reasonably talk about a 'right' or 'wrong' action for an individual (even if we contextualize that 'ought' with an end chosen by that individual), but to do so for Humanity as a whole, which is what you'd have to do to get to an objective morality that is anything other than an arbitrary code,--that is, one with an actual authority over actual individuals--stretches the metaphor (or the expediency) too far.

I think what I'm asking you to admit is that you're not talking about 'morality', but something like 'health education'. And then to admit that this removes what people do--in light of this education--from the realm of 'right and wrong' and places it in the realm of 'healthy and unhealthy,' to speak loosely. It's then that we can see that we need an additional step for any agent or agency to moralize that health code. It's this step that has to be shown, not just posited. And it's this step that I think is going to give us real trouble.

For example, one could opt out of this health code, or portions of it, and not receive condemnation, but rather a matter of fact acknowledgment, by various members, like, "I feel that X is doing something unhealthy. I certainly would not do that," and have that be the end of it. Now, a legal matter enters if X wants to practically opt out of a prohibition against murder, for example. Then, a human artifice, the law, enters in and takes matters into it's own hands. But it does so in a legal way, indifferent to morality, but in keeping with this general 'health code'. (People generally want to live in a stable society, without fear of being slain, ergo...) But it is never said that the murderer is 'evil' or 'wrong'. He's still hanged, or humiliated, or housed, but this is done apart from a morality (as is indeed done today). The key point is that the hangman, tomato-thrower, or jailer are not praised as 'good' nor condemned as 'evil' either. Everyone may be acting toward common aims, but without the illusion that they have a 'right' to hang murderers. Instead, they say that they will hang murderers.

As a parting shot, I think you're equivocating between descriptive laws and normative laws if you don't admit what I've asked above. :lol:

 

[Weirdtopia]

Wikipedia defines morality as
"In its first, descriptive usage, morality means a code of conduct which is held to be authoritative in matters of right and wrong. Morals are created by and define society, philosophy, religion, or individual conscience"

Note the word "society", in that the society can make morality, i does not need a concious since it is developed from the concious of many indivisuals.

Values that are held by more than one person are not shared in a morally meaningful way

Why can't it, there are many people who volunteering and it a meanningful moral act of caring, the moral concept of volunteering is right. Volunteers feel more happy about volunteering when they are with other people who volunteer too and that makes it meaningful because of the connect and support.

having a value giver is like saying that we need an icecream giver to tell us what type of ice cream we have to eat.

We can make that decision ourselves, of course there is a group of people who say that they like chocolate and there's a group that say that they like vanillia. The people that like vanillia can still have tolerance for those who like chocolate.

Every 'value' is situated in a 'valuer'

Just like Aught3 argued in the last forum (which now i think of writing a response is now wasted because the discussion just hopes to another discussion then to another and the questions and responses are not look at anymore and we come back to the beginning.) that wouldn't the valuer be the people, why can't the people be the valuer, why does the valuer must be one person. Tribes have elders that make up the morality of the tribe and it's more than one person.

Humanity, as a whole, does not think

Everyone thinks
If the collective is everyone
then the collective thinks
even if they don't think the same
they no-else think
A collecitve does not have to be the borg to think as a whole. People in a society think one midset and when they eneter another society they think in a differn't midest then the first society has.

The indivisuals have intrests and they do have values and when indivisuals meet with other people with the same values and intrests then they do develop morality as a collective, they might disagree on little things but they agree for the most part then, they have a collective morality.

 

[mknorman]

Wikipedia defines morality as
"In its first, descriptive usage, morality means a code of conduct which is held to be authoritative in matters of right and wrong. Morals are created by and define society, philosophy, religion, or individual conscience"

...

Everyone thinks
If the collective is everyone
then the collective thinks
even if they don't think the same
they no-else think
A collecitve does not have to be the borg to think as a whole. People in a society think one midset and when they eneter another society they think in a differn't midest then the first society has.

Please note that we are talking about the very assumptions upon which the wikipedia article that you cited rests. To cite that article in this discussion is to reason circularly. What can be done is to cite the article pertaining to the fallacy of composition, which you have explicitly committed in your "Everyone thinks..." & following remarks quoted above: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition. Humanity is not monolithic. It does not have one brain. If I take an antipsychotic medication, you do not experience a lapse in symptoms. I have a brain. You have a brain. 'We' does not have a brain. We have two brains. 'We' does not have a thinking process. We have separate thinking processes. Properties that are held by the constituent parts of a whole are not necessarily held by the whole.

Please try to understand the following not as a personal attack, but rather as a vehement criticism of your ideas and their presentation. Your writing is ungrammatical and barely comprehensible. Your reading skills are lamentable. Where your analyses are not fallacious, they are shallow; where they are not shallow, they are fallacious. Please try to address these issues, in private. Until you do so, you are going to have real difficulty adding to this or any other conversation.

 

[Weirdtopia]

'We' does not have a brain

Never stated that "We" has a brain, you assumed that i said that "We has a brain", i stated that an individual thinks, everyone has a brain. I never stated that "we" have has a thinking process but every individual does, individuals make up the "we" since "we" consist of more than one person. I did state that "they" which would represent the individuals in question don't think the same, so in logic they don't act the same nor do they have the same morals. But each individual does think, you said it yourself, i have a brain and you have a brain. "We" make up the whole. If every individuals thinks with there brain, then in general the whole thinks, again not on the something but people do think no-else. Philosophy is about the words and the meanings, if you don't understand what I'm saying or understand how I'm using a word or phrase then ask rather then instantly criticize.

You state that your not making a personal attack but yet you use words like "lamentable" and "Shallow". You tell then that my style of method to communicate is incorrect then you use it to mock me, which is a personal attack.

I live in a different country, let alone a different continent then most of everyone one here, which means that my grammar is different than yours, my style of communication is different than yours. And you want to me to think that your not doing a personal attack with negative words like comprehensible and shallow.

Then judging me by my grammar and reading, you assume that I'm unintelligible and stating that i will have "real difficulty adding to this or any other conversation" but yet i haven't really.

 

[mknorman]

Never stated that "We" has a brain, you assumed that i said that "We has a brain", i stated that an individual thinks, everyone has a brain.

I never stated nor assumed that you stated that 'we' had a brain. I asserted that a brain or thinking mechanism is necessary for a thing to have something called a 'thought' or 'thinking process'. Because a crowd does not have one brain, it cannot 'think' in a meaningful sense of the word. What I have done is shown that a prior condition for your assertion is not met, and that your statement is therefore incoherent. Furthermore, you are still explicitly committing the Fallacy of Composition:

If every individuals thinks with there brain, then in general the whole thinks, again not on the something but people do think no-else.

At least as far as I can tell. Everything after "...the whole thinks" is not even intelligible.

Note, significantly, that your arguments, grammar, and logic that you offered were attacked, not you personally. I did not say that you were shallow. I said that your arguments were shallow. I even did you the compliment of suggesting that you were capable of learning to put forth cogent, grammatical, meaningful, and sound arguments by recommending that you learn to do so. How can anyone who makes the recommendation, "Educate yourself!," be accused of not believing that the person so directed is capable of being educated!

This is what I meant about your 'lamentable' reading skills. You have just demonstrated objectively that you are not currently capable of extracting the author's intended meaning from well-written English prose. This is absolutely a predicate for meaningful debate. It has nothing to do with your person nor your character, but merely your current set of skills. Furthermore, any impatience conveyed in my critique--and there was quite a bit--was impatience with the vacuity of your prose, not any inherent vacuity in yourself. People can voice frustration with your behavior without that frustration by definition amounting to a personal attack.

...again not on the something but people do think no-else. Philosophy is about the words and the meanings, if you don't understand what I'm saying or understand how I'm using a word or phrase then ask rather then instantly criticize.

I'm tempted to accuse you of trolling. The trouble is not that I have misunderstood you, but that you don't understand the meanings of the words that you are using. This is exactly where you are obligated to educate yourself about logical fallacies and the English language, and exactly where none of your intended readers are obligated to ask you what you mean. You have simply not met the requirements for rational debate, because what is rational is, by definition, required to be intelligible. It is up to you not to befuddle, not up to us to clarify.

And you want to me to think that your not doing a personal attack with negative words like comprehensible and shallow.

You are conflating 'negative words' with 'personal attack'. Let me demonstrate the difference by directing some prose at a much less sensitive subject. Here are some negative words: "Ozymandyus fails to understand the difference between scientific pragmatism and moral pragmatism. If the history of Ozy's posts are any indicator, I don't think he ever will." (Apologies to Ozy are not necessary, because Ozy understands the rules of open and free debate.) Here is a personal attack: "Ozymandyus is motivated by a base desire to inflict his so-called morality on others. He is a confirmed liar, and this is due partly to his nationality, partly to the fact that his mother wears combat boots, but mostly due to the thick black oily substance that courses through his veins!" (Apologies, Ozy. Your mother looks great in those combat boots. I told her so in the back seat of my Chevy last Friday night. :lol: )

As a final confusion, I'm going to make what sounds like a personal attack on you, but is really an exhortation to a course of behavior that you will need to adopt if you wish to meaningfully participate in debate:

Stop being such a baby.

 

[Ozymandyus]

I think you are repeatedly failing to understand the distinction I am trying to make. I'm no longer really certain what it is you are trying to do here - are you just trying to define morality in such a way that no objective claim could be asserted? I thought we had other words for such things, like cultural norms, or tastes.

My goal is to narrow the application of 'objective' so that it can be applied to morality, but you seem to keep making efforts to narrow what can be considered moral until there is no way that the word objective could apply. If, by your definitions, values that are held by multiple people can't be morally meaningful, and that the valuer that points to such a morality must be conscious, then you may be starting from premises about morality that completely ends this conversation before it can possibly begin. I will most certainly agree that an objective morality cannot be defined under this sort of definition - but I'm not sure if this is a proper definition.

Taken solely on its own terms, morality is about actions informed by value judgments. Presupposing that such value judgments must be completely acknowledged and willed by the actor does make the only meaning of morality subjective. If you DON'T presuppose that, and I see no reason why we must, then we can try to establish an objective grounds for value judgments.

I suppose I could simply make a new definition for code of action based on shared human nature, that is determined by the external and impartial view of science, and I'll call it something else. I think I will name it moreality. Moreality (sometimes pronounced more - ality or mo reality) is an informed code of action that takes into account the shared needs and values of every human actor and suggests a course of action that will best fill those needs. It starts by investigating the shared values underlying all human actions, beliefs and cultures, which would be things like; survival, eating, drinking, healthiness, knowledge, feeling loved, feeling happy, feeling unhated, feeling comfort, feeling safe, accomplishing goals etc.

From there we look at the sorts of behaviors that increase the likelihood of fulfilling or sustaining these values. From this analysis we may get behaviors like: Each person should learn as much as they can about themselves, because through understanding of our needs and desires we can set paths towards fulfilling them. Each person should guard against false belief, because we can be easily fooled into believing and doing things that are actually bad for us. Each person should work cooperatively to achieve difficult goals, because we can achieve goals much more easily by working together. Each person should make efforts to love more and hate less, because it leads both the person and the society to more happiness. Each person should avoid injuring the others, because that greatly increase the safety of that individual. It would NOT make claims to absolute action: such as you can never ever kill anyone under any circumstance.

As for the normative vs descriptive problem you have: I am saying there are descriptive truths about human nature which can directly inform and shape normative morality. This may not make those moralities objective in some senses of the word, but it gives them a substantial objective footing, and makes them more than merely subjective.

Also something that I never said that you seem to continually be confused about is this idea of humanity as the valuer... humanity is merely the frame of reference - the set of individuals that science examines to obtain their shared values. The people holding the values that are still each individual moral agent. There is no humanity demanding a performing of particular acts. There is merely a recognition of our shared characteristics and an acknowledgement that we are not always able to judge our own actions and belief systems as accurately as we would like.

 

[Weirdtopia]

I know that a crowd does not have one thought process but every individual in the crowd has a thought process. Therefore the crowd is made up of different individuals thoughts which when the collective of individuals discusses a topic they all think for a common goal. So if individuals think and the individuals make up the collective, then the collective thinks based on all the independent individuals that think. But they do not all think the same since every individual has a different mindset and different thought process. This is what Huxley calls "collective thinking". The collective does not think the same, they have # of brains to the # of people. The collective thinks, just not one thought process but the # of thought process that come from the each individual people. If the collective does not think as a group then one must not have a brain nor can think so it can think x-#. X= people without a brain.

 

[mknorman]

I know that a crowd does not have one thought process but every individual in the crowd has a thought process. Therefore the crowd is made up of different individuals thoughts which when the collective of individuals discusses a topic they all think for a common goal. So if individuals think and the individuals make up the collective, then the collective thinks based on all the independent individuals that think. But they do not all think the same since every individual has a different mindset and different thought process. This is what Huxley calls "collective thinking". The collective does not think the same, they have # of brains to the # of people. The collective thinks, just not one thought process but the # of thought process that come from the each individual people. If the collective does not think as a group then one must not have a brain nor can think so it can think x-#. X= people without a brain.

Reiterating the fallacy of composition does not stop it from being a fallacy.

Seriously, stop typing.

 

[mknorman]

I think you are repeatedly failing to understand the distinction I am trying to make. I'm no longer really certain what it is you are trying to do here - are you just trying to define morality in such a way that no objective claim could be asserted? I thought we had other words for such things, like cultural norms, or tastes.

I'm trying to point out the fact that 'morality,' whether objective or subjective, implies something that doesn't even rise to the level of coherence. It implies a 'right' and 'wrong' that depends on something other than the organism and its environment. Put simply, there is only the fact of actions and of emotional reactions (of the acting agent and of bystanders) to those actions. The monikers 'evil', 'bad', and 'good' have no meaning outside of the person applying those labels. To reify those labels by appealing to 'morality' may be psychologically tempting, but is semantically vacuous. The valuating effort is inherently subjective.

My goal is to narrow the application of 'objective' so that it can be applied to morality, but you seem to keep making efforts to narrow what can be considered moral until there is no way that the word objective could apply. If, by your definitions, values that are held by multiple people can't be morally meaningful, and that the valuer that points to such a morality must be conscious, then you may be starting from premises about morality that completely ends this conversation before it can possibly begin. I will most certainly agree that an objective morality cannot be defined under this sort of definition - but I'm not sure if this is a proper definition.

I don't mean that shared values aren't morally meaningful. I mean that no authority to apply the objective labels 'good' or 'bad' can be gained from a collection of subjective valuations. I do, now, understand that you're just trying to find an objective description values that are likely common to all individuals, and that this is not what you are saying is the source of moral authority. However, we are explicitly arguing about semantics, and this is well and good, because it is sloppy semantics that allow us to make incoherent statements like, "Morality is objective." I simply don't see how anyone has posited anything that allows us to assign 'moral weight' to a particular moral law.

Taken solely on its own terms, morality is about actions informed by value judgments. Presupposing that such value judgments must be completely acknowledged and willed by the actor does make the only meaning of morality subjective. If you DON'T presuppose that, and I see no reason why we must, then we can try to establish an objective grounds for value judgments.

(!) This is not a presupposition, but the starting point. All other claims about 'morality' have to be recognized as positive, as requiring some kind of demonstration! It's really just a consequence of the fact of autonomy. Otherwise, what privilege does this [unconscious or involuntary or third party] valuer have to make these judgments in an objective way? How did it get this privilege? I still say that we have only the fact of nihilism, and that moral skepticism is its consequence. These actions aren't 'good' or 'bad' to anything or anyone outside of the judger. This is what you have to establish, the right or privilege of a third-party (possibly disembodied) valuer to make binding pronouncements about the objective goodness or badness of a particular action.

I suppose I could simply make a new definition for code of action based on shared human nature, that is determined by the external and impartial view of science, and I'll call it something else. I think I will name it moreality. Moreality (sometimes pronounced more - ality or mo reality) is an informed code of action that takes into account the shared needs and values of every human actor and suggests a course of action that will best fill those needs. It starts by investigating the shared values underlying all human actions, beliefs and cultures, which would be things like; survival, eating, drinking, healthiness, knowledge, feeling loved, feeling happy, feeling unhated, feeling comfort, feeling safe, accomplishing goals etc.

From there we look at the sorts of behaviors that increase the likelihood of fulfilling or sustaining these values. From this analysis we may get behaviors like: Each person should learn as much as they can about themselves, because through understanding of our needs and desires we can set paths towards fulfilling them. Each person should guard against false belief, because we can be easily fooled into believing and doing things that are actually bad for us. Each person should work cooperatively to achieve difficult goals, because we can achieve goals much more easily by working together. Each person should make efforts to love more and hate less, because it leads both the person and the society to more happiness. Each person should avoid injuring the others, because that greatly increase the safety of that individual. It would NOT make claims to absolute action: such as you can never ever kill anyone under any circumstance.

These are all contingent 'should's, which is a different thing than a moral 'should'. Again, this is the distinction between statistics and proscription, between the two senses of the word 'expect', for example. It's the difference between saying, "In order to procure a good, I will need to take the steps necessary to procure it," and "I am obligated to seek a certain good, and therefore obligated to take certain steps to achieve it." If there is no distinction between these, then the term 'morality' really is superfluous, and we should use a different term just out of respect for the language.

As for the normative vs descriptive problem you have: I am saying there are descriptive truths about human nature which can directly inform and shape normative morality. This may not make those moralities objective in some senses of the word, but it gives them a substantial objective footing, and makes them more than merely subjective.

And this is the fundamental confusion. Things are not subjective because they do vary between individuals, but because they can, in that they are grounded in the individual. It is this grounding which makes them purely subjective, and removes the authority necessary for a coherent definition of 'morality'.

Also something that I never said that you seem to continually be confused about is this idea of humanity as the valuer... humanity is merely the frame of reference - the set of individuals that science examines to obtain their shared values. The people holding the values that are still each individual moral agent. There is no humanity demanding a performing of particular acts. There is merely a recognition of our shared characteristics and an acknowledgement that we are not always able to judge our own actions and belief systems as accurately as we would like.

In this last we probably agree. Fair comment about you never having identified the collective human race as a valuer. This is probably due to my misreading of your posts.

There is still the separate question of what will establish the 'authority' of the recommendations reached. It is this authority, which was previously murkily provided by a deity or king and has hung on, that is the defining characteristic of a morality.

Finally, I don't think I'm 'defining morality' in the sense of 'redefining' it or limiting it. I think I'm unpacking the meaning that is there in common usage and showing that it is incoherent. For example, this means that you really don't want to replace existing morality with an objective morality, but rather to come up with pragmatic recommendations about courses of action likely to achieve certain goods, without making third party judgments about whether a given actor/agent is 'good' or 'bad' for taking this advice.

 

[Weirdtopia]

you never having identified the collective human race as a valuer

You got to be joking, i made that point LAST forum discussion in the post in which you were supposed to read, i guess that you didn't!

 

[Weirdtopia]

My apologies, just fustrated