The current (?) fad for the discussion of the objectivity or subjectivity of morality has, in my view, stalled based on a lack of agreement of what morality could even be.
1) Is morality authoritative? That is, are we saying that an action is good because one 'ought' to do it solely because a moral law says so? Or, are we merely saying that an action is good because it helps achieve some desirable end?
2) If morality is not authoritative, what differentiates it from a mere collection of recommendations? In other words, what can lay claim to being the source of 'moral weight' in the absence of the authority of an interested agent?
3) If morality is authoritative, what is the source of that authority? What is it that makes an action 'right or wrong' when it either comports with or does not comport with a given moral code?
Let me just come out and say that I'm a moral skeptic because of what I think are the most reasonable answers to the above questions. Those answers are motivated by the following understanding of the relevant notions. First, the concept of 'morality' rests on the concept of 'values', and that concept implies a 'valuer.' Basically, "Good or bad for whom?," is always a pertinent question. Thus, and second, the question, "Is this action good?," always has the implied ending, "...for (some specific) valuing agent?" That is, judgments about goodness or badness are always tied to the perspective of a valuer. Third, an objective and therefore disembodied (but somehow authoritative) morality is a contradiction in terms, because there can be no privileged valuer at the intersection of the affairs of two people. (Not between them nor outside of them.) And, finally, I'd have to add that a 'personal objective morality' is also a contradiction in terms, because 'personal' in this instance means 'subjective'.
If you're going to argue that there is such a thing as morality, please answer either 1 & 2 or 1 & 3 from above, and also convincingly and coherently point out the flaw(s) in the previous paragraph.
Also, note the following handy shorthand for my argument: I'm saying that it is improper to use the term 'morality' because it cannot be coherently differentiated from a non-authoritative list of behavioral suggestions.
I'll create another topic on the psychology of moral belief, and what it does or does not have in common with the psychology of religious belief.
1) Is morality authoritative? That is, are we saying that an action is good because one 'ought' to do it solely because a moral law says so? Or, are we merely saying that an action is good because it helps achieve some desirable end?
2) If morality is not authoritative, what differentiates it from a mere collection of recommendations? In other words, what can lay claim to being the source of 'moral weight' in the absence of the authority of an interested agent?
3) If morality is authoritative, what is the source of that authority? What is it that makes an action 'right or wrong' when it either comports with or does not comport with a given moral code?
Let me just come out and say that I'm a moral skeptic because of what I think are the most reasonable answers to the above questions. Those answers are motivated by the following understanding of the relevant notions. First, the concept of 'morality' rests on the concept of 'values', and that concept implies a 'valuer.' Basically, "Good or bad for whom?," is always a pertinent question. Thus, and second, the question, "Is this action good?," always has the implied ending, "...for (some specific) valuing agent?" That is, judgments about goodness or badness are always tied to the perspective of a valuer. Third, an objective and therefore disembodied (but somehow authoritative) morality is a contradiction in terms, because there can be no privileged valuer at the intersection of the affairs of two people. (Not between them nor outside of them.) And, finally, I'd have to add that a 'personal objective morality' is also a contradiction in terms, because 'personal' in this instance means 'subjective'.
If you're going to argue that there is such a thing as morality, please answer either 1 & 2 or 1 & 3 from above, and also convincingly and coherently point out the flaw(s) in the previous paragraph.
Also, note the following handy shorthand for my argument: I'm saying that it is improper to use the term 'morality' because it cannot be coherently differentiated from a non-authoritative list of behavioral suggestions.
I'll create another topic on the psychology of moral belief, and what it does or does not have in common with the psychology of religious belief.