Are moral values objectively real?

[Exogen]

Then this is pointless to even talk about. You said earlier that this possesses utility in regards to ethics and how we should live, yet in reality no such utility exists because our potentiality becoming actualized isn't a matter of conscious thought or self-determination, but rather of the passage of time.

I never said there couldn't be any other utility to this idea. I said that utility is always about what your aim, in the psychological sense, is. It depends. As for the ethics part, don't get ahead of yourself, I haven't given the actual ethical argument yet, so be patient and criticize only the arguments that have been given.

It would be one thing if we were talking about my current physical potentiality, and of things I could do to actualize that potential (such as, in your example, weight lifting), because that describes a way in which I can actually live my life. If the acorn/tree argument is the crux of your argument as opposed to the weight lifting example, then none of this actually goes to describe ways in which I should live, and this is specifically because in your acorn/tree argument the potentiality of an organism is actualized through the passage of time rather than through how said organism lives.

The acorn, as an example, is an illustration of 'part' of the concepts needed for teleological ethics. So I said originally that ethics are 'objectively derived' from nature, remember. So...this involves a discussion first and foremost about things that happen in nature in order to lay the groundwork for the ethical discussion to follow.

Seriously, drop the acorn/tree argument. You'll do better without it.

It's your job to show logical errors or how the idea doesn't fit the data.

Oh, okay, so aging is accumulated damage specifically because you've defined it as such. How quaint.
So wait, are you asserting that a tree isn't older 'biologically' than an acorn?

No....because accumulated damage is the measurable difference between a young cell for example, and an old one. Everything from breakdown in cell structure to telomere length and mitochondrial decay. Do you know about any of this stuff?

None of this is controversial, I have no idea why you brought it up while we were discussing the utility of a concept.

Yes, and therefore it isn't controversial that this concept has utility in that sense as something whcih fits the data.

No, it's actually quite arbitrary how you ignore the actual development of an acorn. Unless, of course, you're willing to assert that a sprout is an acorn, despite an observable change in form.

The sprout is part of the development of the acorn. So when I say 'the acorn' and the 'tree' I'm simplifying here. I've said 'many' times that this is a process of potential to actual, so by you guys 'imposing' this idea that I've made 'sharp' distinctions in terms of the stages of development, and that my view depends on it, is a misrepresentation.

In which case, the actual potentiality of an acorn would be to sprout, and the sprout would the the actuality of said potential. From there, the potentiality of the sprout would be, perhaps, to take root and become a sapling, and the sapling would be the actuality of said potential. From there, the potentiality of the sapling would be to grow into a mature tree, and the tree would be the actuality of said potential. In reality, you've ignored all of this, opting for the shortcut of acorn >>> tree, without ever recognizing that acorns don't suddenly turn into trees beyond saying, "I always said it was a gradual process", as though that somehow covers for all the nuance you've left out of your argument in spite of the statement being so vague that it could be interpreted in a multitude of ways (example: an acorn gradually expands in size until it weighs as much as an infant rhinoceros, then cracks open as a tree shoots out from inside of it). And you might say "well that's obviously not true", except it isn't obvious at all per your argument because you left all that nuance out.

The process would be 'gradual.' I literally said that many times now. The development comes in stages i.e. acorn to sprout, fledging tree, etc, and these stages are not sharply defined. But taxonomy doesn't depend on details like that, as it can have a degree of vagueness. Since when did biological taxonomy depend on exact and sharp distinctions in order to be objectively valid?

The bottom line is that there is a transition from one kind of state to the other, which obviously requires transitional stages. What 'defines that relationship in time as a whole' is one of potential, to actual, to the loss of potentiality and actuality, with respect to the organism.' And as of yet, you have not shown how that is logically erroneous or empirically false.

Except that even this is wrong: since the process is so gradual, you're already making a mistake by trying to split it into stages. an acorn and a slightly more developed acorn have different forms, and as such the potentiality of any acorn is only to become a slightly more developed acorn.

What you are saying is at this point no longer even making sense. We don't say for example, that a cell doesn't have mitochondria just because one might be slightly different from the one or ones in an adjacent cell. We don't say an infant isn't an infant because no two head shapes are alike. The notion of characteristics doesn't depend on exact morphological features being exact down to the last micro-detail. Taxonomy doesn't work like that. So it is neither invented nor exact.

Really, the attempt to describe any sort of organism as potential and actualized potential requires that you ignore subtle changes, and as such is a piss-poor way of describing any organism's life cycle. It doesn't even refer to specific periods of development in the life cycle of said organism. By labeling the zygote as the potentiality, and the adult as the actuality, and saying nothing else, you've failed to capture the developmental processes of gestation and puberty.

That's simply a false statement on your part, and the result of misrepresenting what I've explicitly said, with ideas I've denied and also contrasted. Nothing about gradual changes is incompatible with the idea that there are objective states of development and that these can be classified, and none of that is incompatible with the idea that the relations in time between these various stages of development that occur gradually are defined by (among other things) one of potential-actual-loss of P&A.

Okay, so it isn't factually irrelevant at all. This singular tree, which has a defined life cycle with a definite beginning and end, continues to produce acorns during it's defined life cycle as part of its defined life cycle. I'm not going to just ignore that this is literally part of the organism's life cycle because you feel like doing so.

Who is ignoring anything? Again, you continue this barrage of attributing ideas to me I never actually wrote, like the numerous examples I've given already. Like the one on forms needing to be exact in a taxonomic sense, or how development is a gradual process, or that 'purpose' isn't to be understood primarily in some subjective sense. Can we actually discuss the ideas I'm giving here and not strawmen?

Oh? Do tell. No, seriously. I'm already tired of you deflecting criticism with vague statements that you never bother elaborating on. Do tell us a bit about this process.

I've elaborated on this in detail already. The relationship in terms of development (which is a causal process) of the life cycle of the organism, is one of potential to actual to the loss of potential and actual. and yes, that occurs gradually, and there are no exact points in time where one stage ends and the other begins. And all of that is quite objective and not invented, meaning it is factual just to be clear. And as I said, that doesn't make what I said invalid, and to say otherwise is a strawman.

1) Define the boundary at which a child becomes an adult.
2) Find both a child and adult that straddle said boundary.
3) Recognize that you lack any capacity to differentiate between the morphology of this child and adult.

Strawman. What you are suggesting at this point is not even in congruence with current biology. We don't say that it is some psychological invention because there are not 'sharp' distinctions down to the last micro-detail as to what constitutes an infant for example vs. an adult. That's absurd.

It's almost as if these stages are arbitrary constructs defined by people in an attempt to make information easier to digest.

This is a misunderstanding of taxonomy. Taxonomy is based on grouping characteristics of an organism that are measurable. So for instance, we would say that all humans are eukaryotes because all mammals are. just because for instance, no two DNA pairs are alike, just because the DNA in your whole body might vary at times, say because there was a frame slip in the copying process in one of your cells or you incurred damage that gets repaired, doesn't mean you aren't a eukaryote. I'm sure if we went down to the last detail we could find that the exact subatomic structure is 'exactly' the same for every DNA nucleotide. So what? Again, this entire line of seeking exact boundaries in time and in identity as if what I'm saying hinges on it is a strawman line of criticism.

Out of curiosity, did you know that children have to be handled differently in emergency medical situations than adults? It's true. For example, let's say that both a child and an adult suffer comparable physical trauma which is severe enough to cause them to enter a state of shock. Both the child and the adult will respond to this trauma differently. In the case of the adult, their declining state is gradual, predictable. An adult will slowly lose color, become cold, and gradually lose control over their extremities as their body enters a state of shock. This isn't actually true for children; rather than deteriorating in a gradual, predictable manner, their bodies attempt to compensate for the physical trauma they've endured until they're no longer physically capable of doing so. While similar symptoms will appear in children, said symptoms appear later than normal, and whereas adults show a gradual deterioration, children show a sudden onset.

Ok great. thanks for that bit of info...has absolutely ZERO to do with what I said about the relationships in time as a whole....not relevant to the main idea because it is not in contradiction to it.

Question: who does a better job of maintaining homeostasis? The child, or the adult?

Maybe the child in that case, but that of course, as I said, doesn't contradict my point. Like for example, no one said that a child cannot be damaged let's say, or that children in some way are not more resilient than adults. We all know after all, that an ant can fall from the equivalent of a skyscraper and be just fine whereas a human would be reduced to a puddle on the ground. Doesn't change my point at all. Aging is the accumulation of damage in very specific ways. And all that is measurable.

You really did. You even went as far as to argue that the continued reproductive cycle of a tree years after reaching its 'zenith' was some extraneous outside factor as opposed to quite literally part of its own life cycle. All of this is just how you defined it.

What? I don't even now what you're saying at this point., Why would I said it is an 'outside' factor when it is part of the function of the tree? That doesn't even make sense.

So naturally, the acorn is the actuality here.

So as I pointed out to Dragan, you're using 'actual' in the sense of something which exists, which is, of course, true of anything that exists. Not what is meant by actuality in this context, so please refer back to the definitions provided.

And somehow, after all that, you've decided that adult you is the actuality.
Why do you keep thinking that the capacity to maintain homeostasis and the capacity to develop as an organism are somehow different? Not only can a zygote maintain homeostasis, it can do so while developing from a single cell into a multi-cellular organism. So how is the zygote not the actuality?

Once again, not getting it. So I never said that a zygoye doesn't maintain homeostasis.....or that any organism doesn't for that matter, at any stage of its life. The point is that the process of accumulated damage that occurs as the result of normal metabolic processes eventually kills the organism, but prior to that, it begins to decline in terms of functionality. You do know that there is an entire field of medicine called geriatrics whcih is based on that understanding don't you?

Well, I suppose we could try and further discuss what it means to maintain homeostasis and the fact that this is literally something that organisms manage to do right up until the day they die.

See what I mean about strawmen?

Or we could discuss how you've glossed over the actual developmental cycles of these organisms.

Again, see what I'm saying.

Or maybe we could revisit the fact that you're basically ignoring everything that an organism naturally does after it's 'zenith'.

Geriatrics, anyone....

Or maybe you could just do us all a favor and drop the acorn/tree argument.

Or maybe you are given a critique of the actual concepts I've given instead of blatant misunderstandings, please.

Oh no, don't worry, it can be inferior in other ways. It can be vague to the point of being meaningless, it can make needless and unsupported assumptions, it could lack any sort of utility, etc.

I think what is vague and meaningless is the vacuous strawman. Can you make an attempt to please engage what I'm actually saying?

Not your acorn/tree argument, no.
Not to mention, you'd expect a literal explanation of an acorn's life cycle to have some sort of utility regarding said acorn. Or to even have explanatory power at all.

Question begging. I've given an answer and I'm not required to give any more than what I am arguing for.

 

[Exogen]

Because "I say so" clearly meets the burden of proof, right?

Well no, again, I ask, how does 'what I've actually said" (not strawmen and misrepresentations) contradict the data and/or how is my reasoning in a logical error. Either you can show that, or you cannot.

How about you show that it is factually accurate first, then perhaps you can pass along the burden. Until then, you're still left arguing for a woolly idea, using nonsensical, pseudoscientific wibble to attempt to justify your claim that appears to possess zero utility or explanatory value.

Since when is 'utility' the criteria for 'objective' truth?

Well let's see, organisms are born, we know they develop into adulthood, we know they begin to age and eventually die. We have very detailed understandings at this point of those processes. So when I come along and simply point out the causal relationships in time in looking at the organism's life as a whole, I'm building on what we already know. Now you can say 'pseudoscience' and any other ad hominem you like, but until you can show that what I have given is factually inaccurate or logically erroneous, my claims fit quite nicely into our current understanding of biology.

Ever since we stopped being proudly perplexed by the fluff we dug out of our navels.

No need to defend science my friend as nothing I have said is attacking it. Again, read what I actually write, not read INTO what I wrote.

All valid explanations of natural phenomena have utility. They expose the workings of nature and provide potential applications or other avenues of inquiry.

Utility for WHOME!!! Utility is a 'psychological' concept as it refers to how 'useful' or beneficial something is to someone. Now maybe you might refer to how useful something is for an ant or a bear, but you wouldn't say how useful something is for a 'rock' or a 'river' unless you were anthropomorphizing them. And something being useful makes it relative to what the use actually is.

This is, of course, not to say that reality is obliged to be useful to me, but given my few years alive, I'll take whatever I can get. If it has utility, then it's unarguably worth something. But if an idea doesn't present any utility, then it's hard to see the point of being bothered with it.

So as I told the other guy above no one has shown that what I'm saying is 'useless' as no one has actually given a stated goal or set of goals that this idea could not fulfill. But I'm not required to go down that rather 'useless' line of discussion, because it is an irrelevant digression to my main idea, so I'm simply not going to entertain it. I've stated already that it is 'irrelevant' to my ethical claim and I will argue in that context and not be bothered with irrelevent digressions.

Your idea possesses zero utility, posits woolly contentions where they're unnecessary, and apparently requires ignoring the last 150 years of scientific knowledge.

I'll pass, cheers.

Question begging, strawman, unsubstantiated, and an irrelevant digression.

 

[Exogen]

So here are just some of the repeated fallacies I'm seeing from you guys. And by 'you guys' I mean everyone that has been debating here. I do not mean that everyone has exhibited these errors, but that I have seen all of these errors collectively.

1. The misunderstanding that temporal relations between stages of development needn't be exact in order for them to be real, as opposed to invented or subjective.

2. Misunderstanding that taxonomy does not have to be exact down to the last micro-detail in order to be valid and objective.

3. Conflating the more general natural cycles, be them geological, organic, etc, with the specific processes of a particular organism.

4. Conflating a particular organism's life with the life cycle of is parents, offspring, and species.

5. Conflating the subjective sense of purpose which is exclusively psychological, with the natural sense (telos) to which the subjective sense logically presupposes.

6. Misunderstanding what is meant by 'actual' and confusing it with the vernacular usage as a synonym for 'exist.'

7. Failing to use the definitions I've provided, and instead using other ideas I've shown by contrast to be different from what I've defined.

8. Misunderstanding that states of the world are not 'defined' to exist subjectively, and therefore the causal relations in time in terms of the structural development of various natural phenomena, including organisms, is not, therefore, an arbitrary matter as it pertains to notions like 'function' and 'capacity.'

9. The fallacy of composition. Example, life is a chemical process, therefore life is nothing but chemicals. This ignores the structural arrangement which life is.


10. The fallacy of composition with respect to temporal relations. animals having a purpose would imply evolution has a purpose which is again a fallacy of composition. Animals having a purpose does not necessarily imply evolution does or does not. If evolution does, then it would have a purpose of irrespective of whether or not individual organisms did or didn't. Organisms are things, evolution is not a thing, but a process. The notion of purpose already presupposes the notion of process. Things which undergo processes can have purposes.

There are more, but that's just off the top of my head.

And the stuff about utility is really neither here nor there.

I've made a claim, so the burden of proof is on me. I've shown why my claim doesn't contradict basic descriptions of biology. It is on anyone here to show how my claim is either

A. Empirically false as it doesn't fit the data
B. Logically erroneous as there is a failure of inference in my reasoning or contradiction internal to the descriptions I've given.

Until anyone can show that, no valid objections have been given.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

I never said there couldn't be any other utility to this idea.

Nor did I say that you claimed as much. If anything, I claimed as much. So what? The point remains.

No....because accumulated damage is the measurable difference between a young cell for example, and an old one. Everything from breakdown in cell structure to telomere length and mitochondrial decay. Do you know about any of this stuff?

It means the same thing, again in terms of the relationship between the 'potential of the organism to develop' into said form. When the organism begins to age, it loses that potential because of 1. It has already reached that point and therefore cannot develop further what it has already reached 2. it is aging which is a loss of the capacity to maintain that actuality/end, 3. it is moving towards death which is a total loss of its actuality and its potential because it will be dead.

When the oak tree passes it’s apex point when its form starts to age (degenerate), this process of decline is defined (in time) by a ‘loss’ of the potentiality it once had, given the fact that the aging oak tree lacks the capacity to regenerate, as well as, clearly, the loss of the actuality it had given that the zenith of its development has passed.

Is a tree 'biologically' older than an acorn? Yes or no?

If yes, then the growth of the acorn into the tree would also be defined by this loss of potentiality and actuality. How, then, does the tree represent the actuality of the acorn's potentiality?

If no, then on what basis could you possibly claim that the tree isn't 'biologically' older than the acorn?

Yes, and therefore it isn't controversial that this concept has utility in that sense as something which fits the data.

Vague statements always fit data.

So when I say 'the acorn' and the 'tree' I'm simplifying here.

Yeah, we know.

I've said 'many' times that this is a process of potential to actual

And again, that statement is vague and means nothing.
Again, that means the acorn could just grow to the size of a rhinoceros before a tree shoots out of it.
Again, it ignores all the nuance of the process.

"It's a process" isn't an explanation, Exogen. You don't get to claim that it's an explanation when it literally tells us nothing.

The process would be 'gradual.'

Keep saying it, maybe someday a vague statement will actually inform someone of something.

Nothing about gradual changes is incompatible with the idea that there are objective states of development and that these can be classified

Of course not. It's impossible to contradict vague and meaningless statements. None of this contradicts an invisible creator pony that shit us all into existence, either.

Who is ignoring anything?

You, when you're discounting the life cycle of the tree after having reached its 'zenith'.

I've elaborated on this in detail already.

No, other users elaborated on the life cycle of an acorn while you said "trees are the actuality of an acorn's potential" and "it's a gradual process".

Strawman. What you are suggesting at this point is not even in congruence with current biology. We don't say that it is some psychological invention because there are not 'sharp' distinctions down to the last micro-detail as to what constitutes an infant for example vs. an adult. That's absurd.

It isn't absurd at all, Exogen. You said yourself that there is no "sharp" distinction. You said yourself plenty of times now that it's all a gradual process. So if this is all very gradual, to the point where we can't definitely pin down when a child stops being a child and starts being an adult, then what does "child" and "adult" refer to? Where did that idea come from?

Again, this entire line of seeking exact boundaries in time and in identity as if what I'm saying hinges on it is a strawman line of criticism.

What you're saying doesn't hinge on the idea that there are exact boundaries, and neither does taxonomy. What you're saying doesn't make any attempt whatsoever to recognize this problem, either. Well, not beyond saying "It's a process", anyway.

Maybe the child in that case, but that of course, as I said, doesn't contradict my point.

Sure it does. You've already linked homeostasis to this actuality as a means of explaining why you consider the actuality of the acorn to be the tree in its zenith as opposed to the tree well past said zenith, so of course this contradicts your point. If the child maintains homeostasis better than the adult, then it follows that the adult doesn't maintain homeostasis as well as the child, and if that's true then the adult represents a loss of actuality here as opposed to the actualized potential of the child.

Why would I said it is an 'outside' factor when it is part of the function of the tree? That doesn't even make sense.

I don't know, you tell me.

You would probably assert here that at such a point one begins to degenerate, which is again an entirely arbitrary means of selecting a cut-off point. You suggested previously that a 20 something year old human would be the actualized state, and that from there things are all downhill, but this is demonstrably wrong. Humans continue to learn and grow even until they die. Acorn trees continue to produce acorns years after becoming 'actualized'.

Again, factually irrelevant. We are talking about some entity X, which has a finite beginning and end in time. Just because that entity is situated in a larger world, universe and temporal causal nexus doesn't change that.

http://leagueofreason.org.uk/viewtopic.php?p=188797#p188797

So as I pointed out to Dragan, you're using 'actual' in the sense of something which exists, which is, of course, true of anything that exists. Not what is meant by actuality in this context, so please refer back to the definitions provided.

"It is true that as it ages it loses the ability to maintain homeostasis and optimal health."

"It means the same thing, again in terms of the relationship between the 'potential of the organism to develop' into said form. When the organism begins to age, it loses that potential because of 1. It has already reached that point and therefore cannot develop further what it has already reached 2. it is aging which is a loss of the capacity to maintain that actuality/end, 3. it is moving towards death which is a total loss of its actuality and its potential because it will be dead."

"The point is that the process of accumulated damage that occurs as the result of normal metabolic processes eventually kills the organism, but prior to that, it begins to decline in terms of functionality."

"When the oak tree passes it’s apex point when its form starts to age (degenerate), this process of decline is defined (in time) by a ‘loss’ of the potentiality it once had, given the fact that the aging oak tree lacks the capacity to regenerate, as well as, clearly, the loss of the actuality it had given that the zenith of its development has passed."

"Actuality: the fulfillment of a potentiality."

So naturally, the acorn is the actuality here. Or maybe your definition of actuality is just inconsistent given how you're attempting to apply it, who knows.

 

[Exogen]

Is a tree 'biologically' older than an acorn? Yes or no?

Depends on what you mean by 'age' whcih I pointed out to you before. If by 'age' you mean in terms of time, then obviously yes, as the tree exists at a later time in the life cycle.

If by 'age' you mean in terms of stages in the life cycle, then also yes, as the tree is a later stage of development.

If by 'age' you mean in terms of accumulated damage (not in terms of maturity), then the tree may or may not be older than the acorn, depending. If the tree is adult but in its 'prime' its 'apex,' then it wouldn't be older than the acorn as far as I know (though that depend on things like mutation rates and such), but in most cases the adult tree, in its prime should be relatively intact under normal environmental conditions. So it depends on what sense you mean in terms of age. But this shouldn't be all that complex, as we use these concepts all the time.

If yes, then the growth of the acorn into the tree would also be defined by this loss of potentiality and actuality. How, then, does the tree represent the actuality of the acorn's potentiality?

If no, then on what basis could you possibly claim that the tree isn't 'biologically' older than the acorn?

Well for starters, your whole description is still wrong. The acorn doesn't 'represent' it's potentiality, nor does the tree 'represent' the actuality. Rather, the acorn IS the potential of the tree, and the tree IS the actuality of the acron. And that doesn't have to be a relationship which is defined in an exact way for it to be real and not invented, and that doesn't mean taxonomy is invented, and that doesn't mean all the other fallacies I listed above in my last post.

Vague statements always fit data.

False. All objects in the natural world are vaguely defined, yet that doesn't change the fact that they are objects. A human being does not consist of an exact number of cells, but that doesn't mean there are not human beings or that these things are invented. Saying otherwise is a fallacy of composition as well as the strawman of saying that if objects are not exactly defined then their characteristics are not real.

With that in mind, a human is a vague object, yet a human is not a dog. So no, vague statements do NOT always fit the data.

And again, that statement is vague and means nothing.
Again, that means the acorn could just grow to the size of a rhinoceros before a tree shoots out of it.
Again, it ignores all the nuance of the process.

"It's a process" isn't an explanation, Exogen. You don't get to claim that it's an explanation when it literally tells us nothing.

Again, I don't know what you're even saying here, as it does not resemble what I've said. The acorn IS the potential of the Tree whcih is the actuality of the acorn. It is a relationship of structure in a causal context, in time, between the various stages. And yes, those stages are not sharply defined, and they don't need to be.

Keep saying it, maybe someday a vague statement will actually inform someone of something.

The only thing vague at this point is the strawman of my position you keep repeating. I refer you to my list of fallacies that have been commited in regards to the view I've been defending in this thread.

Of course not. It's impossible to contradict vague and meaningless statements. None of this contradicts an invisible creator pony that shit us all into existence, either.

Again, false, as I've shown above. A human is a vague object, but humans are not dogs. Just because two objects are vague does not mean they are identical.

And your 'vague' reference to theism, is, of course, completely out of touch with the conversation, as I have said that this is a naturalistic teleology, not a theistic one. I have stated I will NOT be defending theism, nor am I a theist, nor religious, nor do I want to even talk about any of that. So just for the record, and just in case you might be wondering, please never bring that sort of thing up to me again, as I have no interest in discussing it, at least for this topic. Thanks. Just so you know, I have a disdain for such discussions as I find them sophomoric IMO.

You, when you're discounting the life cycle of the tree after having reached its 'zenith'.

I've discounted nothing. The acorn falls from a tree, it eventually sprouts, grows into a fledgling tree, the tree eventually reaches maturity, and for a time its structure and functionality is intact, then it begins a process of decline. We can point to a relationship with respect to that developmental process as one of potentiality to actuality to a loss of potentiality and actuality over time in terms of structural changes and causality, with respect to that organism.

Now you might say that is very 'general' but it is not actually 'vague' though there are not exact boundaries. But as I've pointed out, none of that matters.

You've simply given nothing to show that what I've said is untrue.

No, other users elaborated on the life cycle of an acorn while you said "trees are the actuality of an acorn's potential" and "it's a gradual process".

Yes, and of course we could talk about further and further details of the process of the life cycle of the organism, and it wouldn't change anything I've said. Again, you are simply 'barking up the wrong tree' so to speak here, conceptually speaking.

It isn't absurd at all, Exogen. You said yourself that there is no "sharp" distinction. You said yourself plenty of times now that it's all a gradual process. So if this is all very gradual, to the point where we can't definitely pin down when a child stops being a child and starts being an adult, then what does "child" and "adult" refer to? Where did that idea come from?

Again, you are showing, and I mean this not to offend, a basic compositional fallacy here in your understanding and a misunderstanding of taxonomy. For something to be something, it does not have to be exact. A heaping pile of sand cannot be exactly defined, but that doesn't matter. Why? Because that identity is a generality. A generality is a real thing. It means that there is an identity at a level of generality in terms of the structural organization of matter. Generalities need not be subjective. All mammals are eukaryotes, even though eukaryotic cells are not all identical in terms of exact micro-structure. Generally speaking, they have the same characteristics.

What you're saying doesn't hinge on the idea that there are exact boundaries, and neither does taxonomy. What you're saying doesn't make any attempt whatsoever to recognize this problem, either. Well, not beyond saying "It's a process", anyway.

I'm glad you agree my idea doesn't hinge on such things. But my retort is, there simply is no problem, as composition and identity don't depend on a lack of generality, and nor does temporal causal relations between the structural stages of a process, be it a life cycle or otherwise.

Sure it does. You've already linked homeostasis to this actuality as a means of explaining why you consider the actuality of the acorn to be the tree in its zenith as opposed to the tree well past said zenith, so of course this contradicts your point. If the child maintains homeostasis better than the adult, then it follows that the adult doesn't maintain homeostasis as well as the child, and if that's true then the adult represents a loss of actuality here as opposed to the actualized potential of the child.

As I explained before, you're talking in terms of resilience, which is context dependent. But that simply not what I was talking. WHY does the child in your example maintain homeostasis better? It isn't because the biological structure of the adult in its prime is anymore intact than the child, obviously, and you know that. The DIFFERENCE between grandpa on the one hand, and the infant and the mature young adult on the other, is one of a very specific kind accumulated damage we call "aging." This damage is the net result of metabolism itself, a byproduct of it. It's not damaging that one gets from getting hit with a football or metal poisoning.

I don't know, you tell me.

That was a rhetorical question.

http://leagueofreason.org.uk/viewtopic.php?p=188797#p188797

I don't know what you're refering to here.

So naturally, the acorn is the actuality here. Or maybe your definition of actuality is just inconsistent given how you're attempting to apply it, who knows.

If it is inconsistent, then you need to show the at least two propositions which are in direct contradiction. Until you do that, this will remain an assertion on your part.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

Alright Exogen, looking back on our conversation thus far, I clearly see that I didn't give you a fair shake here. So, in the interest of continuing this discussion in a more productive manner, I'm going to abandon what we've discussed thus far. I'll be returning to your initial post(the "Sure" post that you referred me to earlier), and my next comment will be an attempt on my part to restate your argument just so we can establish a common understanding.

Now, as far as the taxanomy bit goes, I'll address that here as I see now that it isn't really relevant to the main conversation.

It isn't my intention to suggest that taxanomy is useless or in error. I understand that, despite both evolution and individual maturation being gradual processes, that there are demonstrable differences in the physiology of a given organism when examining two particular moments in this organism's life cycle so long as those moments are separated by a given stretch of time. What I was suggesting is that taxanomy is descriptive, not prescriptive: that taxanomy is a framework designed to explain these things in a more digestible manner.

 

[Exogen]

Alright Exogen, looking back on our conversation thus far, I clearly see that I didn't give you a fair shake here. So, in the interest of continuing this discussion in a more productive manner, I'm going to abandon what we've discussed thus far. I'll be returning to your initial post(the "Sure" post that you referred me to earlier), and my next comment will be an attempt on my part to restate your argument just so we can establish a common understanding.

Thank you, and no problem.

Now, as far as the taxanomy bit goes, I'll address that here as I see now that it isn't really relevant to the main conversation.

It isn't my intention to suggest that taxanomy is useless or in error. I understand that, despite both evolution and individual maturation being gradual processes, that there are demonstrable differences in the physiology of a given organism when examining two particular moments in this organism's life cycle so long as those moments are separated by a given stretch of time.

Ok, very good.

What I was suggesting is that taxanomy is descriptive, not prescriptive: that taxanomy is a framework designed to explain these things in a more digestible manner.

Oh sure, taxonomy is descriptive, not prescriptive. I'm not sure what you mean by the latter part exactly. Taxonomy is a method of 'classification.' So it is, therefore, a way to identify the characteristics of things and sort them into groups via those characteristics. Generalities are very much the point here.

When I refer to the natural telos of an organism, that isn't prescriptive either, in the ethical sense. It is an objective causally defined relationship between the structure of the organism at various times in its life cycle. Saying as an old man, for instance, I no longer have the same degree of potential or actuality I had when I was young is factually true. My body lacks the ability to maintain itself as I was as a young man due to the accumulated damage that is a byproduct of metabolism. When I was a kid, I had a 'causal' potential towards my adult body, because that is simply the later stage of my development in terms of the 'structure' of me as the adult organism. That is not 'prescriptive' but 'descriptive.'

As I said, the ethical part comes 'later' in the argument. For now, I'm just saying that 'purpose' in the natural sense, is simply a fact about the relationships between for example the various stages of the organism at different points of its life in terms of the causal potentiality and actuality of those stages compared and in relation to one another. Again, see my post before where I defined those terms.

 

[Exogen]

When I first entered this topic into this thread, you will recall I said that many people tend to have a subjective understanding of teleology, which is incorrect as to what telos actually means. I've been trying to correct that misunderstanding. Often times, when you see people for instance, arguing over 'Gods purpose' vs. 'the meaningless universe' BOTH the theist and the atheist or whomever, are operating under the misunderstanding of what telos actually is. Same for the intelligent design folks both pro and against. It's a misunderstanding of what Aristotle actually mean.

And I'm not an Aristotelian, nor do I discount the fruits of science, but that doesn't mean everything the guy said was wrong either. Everything should be taken on its own merits. But sometimes ancient people saw things very clearly and we don't, is what I've found to be the case at times, and this is, I would argue, one of those instances, is all I'm saying.

Needless to say, as I said, everything needs to be weighed on its own merits. Hence our discussion.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Question begging, strawman, unsubstantiated, and an irrelevant digression.

Have you opted for beat poetry instead, or something?

Exactly what kind of response is this meant to be?

 

[Sparhafoc]

So here are just some of the repeated fallacies I'm seeing from you guys. And by 'you guys' I mean everyone that has been debating here. I do not mean that everyone has exhibited these errors, but that I have seen all of these errors collectively.

1. The misunderstanding that temporal relations between stages of development needn't be exact in order for them to be real, as opposed to invented or subjective.

2. Misunderstanding that taxonomy does not have to be exact down to the last micro-detail in order to be valid and objective.

3. Conflating the more general natural cycles, be them geological, organic, etc, with the specific processes of a particular organism.

4. Conflating a particular organism's life with the life cycle of is parents, offspring, and species.

5. Conflating the subjective sense of purpose which is exclusively psychological, with the natural sense (telos) to which the subjective sense logically presupposes.

6. Misunderstanding what is meant by 'actual' and confusing it with the vernacular usage as a synonym for 'exist.'

7. Failing to use the definitions I've provided, and instead using other ideas I've shown by contrast to be different from what I've defined.

8. Misunderstanding that states of the world are not 'defined' to exist subjectively, and therefore the causal relations in time in terms of the structural development of various natural phenomena, including organisms, is not, therefore, an arbitrary matter as it pertains to notions like 'function' and 'capacity.'

9. The fallacy of composition. Example, life is a chemical process, therefore life is nothing but chemicals. This ignores the structural arrangement which life is.


10. The fallacy of composition with respect to temporal relations. animals having a purpose would imply evolution has a purpose which is again a fallacy of composition. Animals having a purpose does not necessarily imply evolution does or does not. If evolution does, then it would have a purpose of irrespective of whether or not individual organisms did or didn't. Organisms are things, evolution is not a thing, but a process. The notion of purpose already presupposes the notion of process. Things which undergo processes can have purposes.

There are more, but that's just off the top of my head.

And the stuff about utility is really neither here nor there.

I've made a claim, so the burden of proof is on me. I've shown why my claim doesn't contradict basic descriptions of biology. It is on anyone here to show how my claim is either

A. Empirically false as it doesn't fit the data
B. Logically erroneous as there is a failure of inference in my reasoning or contradiction internal to the descriptions I've given.

Until anyone can show that, no valid objections have been given.

Provide a single instance of me employing even one of these fallacies (not that most of them are actually fallacious).

The only time its even come close is when you've misread what I wrote and inserted one of the above ideas on my behalf.

 

[Exogen]

Provide a single instance of me employing even one of these fallacies (not that most of them are actually fallacious).

The only time its even come close is when you've misread what I wrote and inserted one of the above ideas on my behalf.

Sure, but recall I said there were other errors, as that list is off the top of my head, and directed at all of you guys. You were the main one coming with what are irrelevant epistemic issues of utility, which I did mention in that post where I had the list, just below the list, which you quoted. As for the list itself, given what I just said I'm not required, therefore, to give you one, but if you want a 'single' example, let's see.

You wrote

I am afraid to say it absolutely does contradict empirical knowledge about life. The form of the acorn itself has no potential whatsoever towards the tree. There's no tree homunculus being nurtured within. At the moment of acorn, there is no tree form to be found anywhere within, so there can be no potential towardsit.

This is an example, not only of misstating the actual teleological thesis, but also a clear indication of 7. The notion of potentiality doesn't mean what you're saying it does here, and you're imposing stipulations that aren't required for the definition. As I corrected you before on this, the acorn IS the potential of the actuality that is the tree. This means that acorn form develops into tree form. That it has a causal capacity for development into the tee. There isn't any sort of little tree form inside the acorn or something like that. I don't even know what that would mean. So that's a blatant misstatement of what I said about this prior to that. Again, the potentiality-actuality idea is a 'relationship' in time between forms, defined causally, of a developmental process of those form i.e. an acorn developing into a tree. This is not arbitrary because the form of the acorn exhibits a developmental 'capacity' to develop into the adult form which is the tree. And this is deducible given the functions of the various stages and the causal potentials thereof.

With that in mind, you continue to misunderstand when you would seem to be saying that this developmental potential must be entirely self-contained as if necessary and sufficient environmental conditions would somehow invalidate the notion of telos with respect to the organism itself. You say

Tree form cannot happen following the instructions inside. Instead, a series of triggers - both internally and externally - will cause particular types of development to happen in very constrained ways. For example, sunlight and gravity have to be reacted to, else tree form never could occur, so there's an absolutely fundamental reaction to external stimuli as the shoot the acorn forms quests towards the sunlight. This, in turn, will trigger the production of new chemical instructions, not directly from the DNA, but from RNA reacting to the resulting chemical environment so triggered. First leaves open, new trigger, new environment, new instructions, and so on. And of course, this doesn't even consider the dramatic changes the external environment will have on the final tree's form.

So this further demonstrates the misrepresentation of this idea. It would even be a misrepresentation of Aristotle himself as if he couldn't recognize that certain and specific environmental conditions were not both necessary and sufficient for organisms to develop. Potential is simply more or less synonymous with developmental capacity 'in relation' to the fulfillment of that capacity, in regard to form. Aristotle's point is that each thing develops according to its 'nature,' not that there are not conditions both necessary and sufficient that influence or regulate the process further. Again, Aristotle is a naturalist and a wholist, so he is going for the 'big picture' here, so the interdependence of the environment is not a concept that was unknown to him.

As I mentioned before, a good analogy might be weightlifting. All environmental conditions considered, I can only reach my full genetic potential if the right conditions obtain. Now you might say, but if I take drugs I will go beyond my genetic potential. And that is true, but notice I damage my 'capacity' to maintain that genetic potential via use, as androgenic sterorids damages the testicles ability to produce testosterone naturally (in addition to other damage), so notice the drugs destroy the potential towards that actuality, they destroy the form that is my body.

It is worth noting that Aristotle did not believe in evolution, HOWEVER, this is not because he believed some sort of design theory or something like that. Aristotle was a naturalist, and he believed in an eternal universe, that time and the world stretched back and back forever. Aristotle, being really the first real empiricist one might say, wouldn't be against evolution given the empirical data we have at this time, but I want to point out that nothing about the concept of telos is incompatible with it, as it is simply a causal description of how form develops and the relations in time between the stages i.e. the causal potential of some entity X towards some from Y. That's purely descriptive and objective.

I also want to reiterate that I'm not an Aristotelian, only that his notion of telos, generally considered, is a valid one.

Most importantly, as of yet, you haven't shown that this concept is either empirically false or that there is some contradiction or invalidity in what I've given. until you do that, you have simply not given a valid objection.

Going back to the subject of epistemology and utility, again, I've given a reason for the utility of this concept, which is within the ethical domain. Given that this is the subject I'm arguing for, in a thread that is devoted to that topic, I'm not required to go into irrelevant epistemic digressions on a philosophy of science discussion. So unless you can show how this issue of utility relates to the 'ethical conversation' it is an irrelevant and off-topic digression.

Also, one other fallacy I didn't add to the list, but you most certainly have committed, and I've already pointed out is ad hominem. See my other posts on that.

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

Hi Dragan,

If evolution isn't teleological then species, and indeed individual organisms, can't be teleological, because that would imply that the species is heading towards something that the individual organisms are contributing.

The individual organisms would be contributing to the trajectory of the species, although that's not obviously the only factor. But that still misses the point. The organism, in particular, has a purpose because it is an entity with a specific form. Evolution as a whole in time is a process, not a particular entity. 'Things' acting in the process can have purposes, but processes themselves are not necessarily. The acorn, in reaching maturity and doing what it does, laying acorns, when it has done so, has achieved its purpose, it ends. It doesn't matter if in so doing it makes a contribution to the species as a whole say by introducing a new gene into the population that was caused by a frame slip in the copying of it's DNA or its parents DNA which is advantageous or disadvantageous to the survival of the next generation of Oak trees. Whether or not the organism's offspring successful in surviving and reaching their end, does not change the fact that the parent reached its end.

Even on the notion that the 'purpose' of evolution is to continue life let's say, in whatever form, only means that the purpose of individual organisms and the purpose of evolution as a process, would be different from one another, and possibly in conflict at times. But so what?

Since biochemistry - "the chemistry of life" - is a subset of chemistry, that makes it a chemical cycle. Ergo, no teleology.

That is a fallacy of composition. Just because the 'parts' may be categorically one thing, doesn't mean that the 'arrangement' of them is identical to the property or causal function of those parts individually. Water is nonflammable, yet comprised of parts which exhibit the opposite property i.e. hydrogen and oxygen being flammable. the parts are gasses, they make a liquid. But the issue of emergence to the side, it doesn't even matter that life is a complex chemical and ultimately physical process. The telos is from the 'forms' of the matter and the various causal relations in time between the various stages of its development in time. So just because the parts don't have a telos let's say, doesn't mean the whole they comprise doesn't.

The cell has no "vision" of what it may become - it has no "mission statement".

We're the ones effectively anthropomorphizing - assigning attributes to the cell, or other stages in a organism's life-cycle.

There is no "potential" or "actuality" within the organism.

Of course, it doesn't have a mission statement. It's mindless as far as we know.....and?........... You seem to be criticizing an idea I'm not defending, as it would appear you seem to mean 'purpose' in an exclusively subjective sense, as opposed to one in terms of functional causal relations in time. So recall I distinguished between function and purpose in my OP on this subject. Recall both of those ideas were about objective causal chains, not causal chains of the variety that involve subjects (although that's a kind of purpose within that framework). I'm talking about purpose in terms of its rudimentary objective sense. and again, I never said the potentiality is 'within' the organism. The acorn IS a potential, the oak tree IS an actuality, both of which are determined by the causal relations in time with respect to the relationship in change of form.

This is what makes me think you guys are taking 'purpose' in the subjective sense. The notion I'm defending here is 'natural' telos, which is a causal relation in time between the form of something moving from a potential to an actual in terms of development, and then degenerating. Nothing 'subjective' about that. Did you read my very long post recently above? I wrote out some paragraphs where I defined terms and try to clarify all this.

Again, one is taking an arbitrary point in the organism's life-cycle - its apex of development - as an "end", a goal to which it apparently strives.

This is simply our tendency to categorize things to make it simpler for us to understand the world around us - we find it very difficult to think in terms of processes, of cycles.

the organism doesn't 'strive.' The acorn, as far as we know, is mindless. There is no 'goal' that the organism is conscious of. Again, the telos is simply about the causal relations in time with respect to a kind of structural stages of the process of the life cycle of the individual entity which is the organism.

And none of that is in any sort of contradiction to cycles within cycles within cycles, etc. Again, you seem to be criticizing an idea I'm not advocating. Please read the long post I made above, where I tried to clarify. Hopefully (fingers crossed) you see the view I'm trying to defend here, not the one you seem to be criticizing.

No, it isn't - as I said earlier: if evolution isn't teleological, then species - and the individuals within them - can't be teleological.

in order for something to be teleological it has to be a stable continuity of identity in terms of 'order.' So with respect to a particular organism, that is a kind of order. This ordered form must have a causal potential to develop into another stage which is the full development of its form in particular. So let's use weightlifting as an example. I'm born, I grow, when I was younger, say in my twenties, I had a chance to reach my full genetic potential in terms of how much muscle I could pack onto my frame. There is a limit to how much I can do that unless I were to take drugs (which damages that potential in the long-term). So suppose with hard work over 5-7 years I reach my full potential, as I cannot pack on any more muscle. I'm maxed out. If we look at the causal relations in time, I went from a point of potential, to develop via the process of weight training into my full potential with respect to my muscular development. That principle of development, that apex, is the 'actualization' of the potential, the actuality. That causal relationship in time is demonstrable empirically. And if I was a mindless being somehow lifting weights, and had no idea what I was doing, it wouldn't change that relationship. It wouldn't change the telos of my younger body to the full development of that form, the actuality.

Again, I would appreciate if you read my longer post above if you haven't already at this point.

I've re-read your long post above again to refresh my memory.

The problem I have with it is that the idea of "natural telos" is itself a human construct - Aristotle's, in this case.

There is nothing to suggest that this is actually the case in Nature.

Returning to the point to which I alluded earlier about chemistry - ie, that it's all chemistry - we are looking at things from the wrong perspective. We're looking at life-forms instead of the underlying chemical elements and their interactions. It's really about thermodynamic efficiency, as the recent branch of science called biothermodynamics acknowledges.

This changes the idea of "purpose", and therefore any other ideas we wish to attribute to anything in Nature.

To continue to talk in terms of Aristotlean notions is misguided.

It is no more appropriate than my talking in terms of Celtic folklore: that the three stages of the Morrigu are the maiden, mother, and crone.

Kindest regards,

James

 

[Exogen]

Hello Dragan,

you wrote

I've re-read your long post above again to refresh my memory.

The problem I have with it is that the idea of "natural telos" is itself a human construct - Aristotle's, in this case.

There is nothing to suggest that this is actually the case in Nature.

Returning to the point to which I alluded earlier about chemistry - ie, that it's all chemistry - we are looking at things from the wrong perspective. We're looking at life-forms instead of the underlying chemical elements and their interactions. It's really about thermodynamic efficiency, as the recent branch of science called biothermodynamics acknowledges.

This changes the idea of "purpose", and therefore any other ideas we wish to attribute to anything in Nature.

To continue to talk in terms of Aristotlean notions is misguided.

It is no more appropriate than my talking in terms of Celtic folklore: that the three stages of the Morrigu are the maiden, mother, and crone.

Kindest regards,

James

I don't know exactly what you mean when you say the telos is a human 'construct.' For example, as you may have read with my discussion with the other two fellows, taxonomy, for example, is not an invention, as the characteristics that are being identified with respect to the groupings of organisms according to the categories which are defined by those characteristics are real aspects of real things in the world.

What it 'seems' to me is that you are indeed committing a fallacy of overreduction, a type of fallacy of composition. So what I mean is that you appear to be saying that since life can be described by chemistry that means that for example, generalities of organic structure and its interaction with the environment and process thereof we call biology don't exist. That doesn't follow. It doesn't follow that just because we can describe, say, the workings of a car in terms of the behavior of subatomic particles that the structure those atoms comprise, and the properties that structure exhibits are unreal or 'constructed.' It does not follow that, as another example, water is comprised of subatomic particles that water and waves do not exist and that hydrodynamics is a construction as opposed to being a description of structurally complex levels of the organization of matter and the behavior and causal relations thereof. We don't say a building merely bricks, and it is not a construct on our part to say so.

Simply put, Aristotle's telos is not only a level of describing the whole, a whole which is, in fact, a real structure in nature, say the life form (and its environmental context in the backdrop), but also the causally defined relationships between the structure that is the life form at the various stages of development. That is not constructed or arbitrary, that is pretty much a causal taxonomy of development of something in time. Everything described is objective.

Edit: The real difference between the reductionist language and the wholist is simply talking in the language of parts in themselves vs. parts that comprise wholes. If we talk about the organism strictly in terms of the workings of subatomic particles we are not talking about the organism but in a language of parts in themselves i.e. the particles, and not the parts as they comprise a whole i.e. the whole being the organism.

There is nothing constructed here, only the difference in 'focus.' Notice you mentioned 'perspective.' You said the 'wrong' perspective. But there is nothing wrong about the existence and behavior of the whole, just that there is nothing wrong in the existence and properties of the parts which comprise it. Aristotle is talking in general terms, and in the language of the whole. You seem to be talking in the language of the parts in themselves.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

Okay.

Given an organism X, the life cycle of X can be broken up into three general stages: the stage of Infancy, the stage of Maturity, and the stage of Impotency.

The stage of Infancy refers to the beginning of the life cycle of X: X has yet to reach the prime of its life. This stage is defined primarily by continuous growth.

The stage of Maturity refers to the zenith of the life cycle of X: X has reached the prime of its life. This stage is defined primarily by a greater capacity for X to function in and interact with the surrounding environment in relation to the other two stages.

The stage of Impotency refers to the end of the life cycle of X: X has aged past its prime. This stage is defined primarily by continuous degeneration and a loss of function in comparison to the stage of Maturity.

The stage of Infancy leads into the stage of Maturity, which leads into the stage of Impotency.

While X is less capable of functioning in and interacting with its surrounding environment during its Infancy than it would in its Maturity, it will eventually develop this capacity. Likewise, the capacity that X exhibits in its Maturity is the result of its growth in its Infancy. These statements are necessarily true by virtue of the temporal relationship of Infancy and Maturity.

XInfancy will inevitably grow into XMature. For this reason, XMature is the actuality of XInfancy.
XMature is contingent on XInfancy. For this reason, XInfancy is the potentiality of XMature.

While XInfancy is the potentiality of XMature, this doesn't guarantee that XInfancy will grow into XMature. Certain circumstances must be met for X to grow. These circumstances can be referred to as necessary conditions.

The actuality of X is the purpose of X.

 

[Exogen]

Okay.

Given an organism X, the life cycle of X can be broken up into three general stages: the stage of Infancy, the stage of Maturity, and the stage of Impotency.

The stage of Infancy refers to the beginning of the life cycle of X: X has yet to reach the prime of its life. This stage is defined primarily by continuous growth.

The stage of Maturity refers to the zenith of the life cycle of X: X has reached the prime of its life. This stage is defined primarily by a greater capacity for X to function in and interact with the surrounding environment in relation to the other two stages.

The stage of Impotency refers to the end of the life cycle of X: X has aged past its prime. This stage is defined primarily by continuous degeneration and a loss of function in comparison to the stage of Maturity.

The stage of Infancy leads into the stage of Maturity, which leads into the stage of Impotency.

While X is less capable of functioning in and interacting with its surrounding environment during its Infancy than it would in its Maturity, it will eventually develop this capacity. Likewise, the capacity that X exhibits in its Maturity is the result of its growth in its Infancy. These statements are necessarily true by virtue of the temporal relationship of Infancy and Maturity.

XInfancy will inevitably grow into XMature. For this reason, XMature is the actuality of XInfancy.
XMature is contingent on XInfancy. For this reason, XInfancy is the potentiality of XMature.

While XInfancy is the potentiality of XMature, this doesn't guarantee that XInfancy will grow into XMature. Certain circumstances must be met for X to grow. These circumstances can be referred to as necessary conditions.

The actuality of X is the purpose of X.

Just reading it one time, that sounds about right, in so many words. That's the gist of it, yes. This state of maturity is simply the actuality of the potentiality which is infancy. The actuality/maturity leads to a loss of both potentiality and actuality which is impotency, and ultimately death, at which point X is concluded. X's purpose is its actuality, it's maturity as this is the prime/zenith/apex when quite literally, it is in 'top form' and has full functionality. So the being is born, exhibits a potential, then actualizes that potential, then later begins to slowly lose all of that and dies. And that's it's purpose, yes. This is a temporal relationship of causal stages of the form in terms of development. And indeed, there are conditions that would need to be met in order for the particular organism to pass through those stages i.e. environment, circumstances, etc.

And mind you, at this point of the argument, this is purely 'descriptive,' not prescriptive. Aristotle is just saying that temporal relationship of potentiality-actuality-loss thereof, is the things natural purpose.

No sort of deeper meaning or subjective senses of purpose are employed at this stage of the argument. And certainly, no purpose 'lurking' inside the acorn or w/e.

The acorn IS a potential tree. The infant IS a potential mature adult.

So you could say that this potentiality is a subspecies of the more general notion of possibility.

Does that make sense? Any questions, comments, or objections at this stage of the argument? I don't want to move on until we all agree that at least this much is true.

Also, one other thing I was thinking about with regard to what Dragan Gias said.

I could be wrong, but it seems some here may be looking at the reductionism issue in a flawed way. So obviously science wants to give us a unified theory of everything, say it's all strings or w/e theory ultimately science agrees upon. As I explained, this does not undercut the idea that a particular universe exists with particular things in it, which are wholes. Everything may be a phenomenon of strings, but this doesn't change that there are levels and layers of organization of the manifestation and complexity of those strings (or w/e). Saying 'it's all strings' is true because it is a generality, but generalities are not specifics or particular cases. And both are true at the same time. String theory, or any other final unified theory of physics, would be a simplification of nature in literal terms. Any simplification is, of course, true, but doesn't tell the particular story. So with that in mind, nothing about this notion of telos is in contradiction to such simplifications, to such empirical generalizations. And I say that on top of the point I made in my last post about wholes and parts.

I'm hoping what I'm saying is becoming more clear, and differentiated from what I consider to be a convoluted notion of what teleology actually means that I see running around, namely this idea that one's purpose is one's 'meaning' or w/e.

As we will hopefully soon see, as long as everyone is on board with this much, the subjective sense of purpose comes into play later, and is built on top of this more descriptive sense that I've been arguing for thus far.

 

[Sparhafoc]

So here are just some of the repeated fallacies I'm seeing from you guys. And by 'you guys' I mean everyone that has been debating here. I do not mean that everyone has exhibited these errors, but that I have seen all of these errors collectively.

Provide a single instance of me employing even one of these fallacies (not that most of them are actually fallacious).

The only time its even come close is when you've misread what I wrote and inserted one of the above ideas on my behalf.

Sure, but recall I said there were other errors, as that list is off the top of my head, and directed at all of you guys.

We're not a borg collective.

You were the main one coming with what are irrelevant epistemic issues of utility,...

Irrelevant because you decree so? Regardless, a judgment of irrelevance is a world away from 'repeated fallacies'.

This conversation is rapidly going south.

As for the list itself, given what I just said I'm not required, therefore, to give you one...

And I revise my previously stated opinion and find no further interest here.

 

[Exogen]

Sparhafoc

You're obviously not a borg collective, but you guys have all been arguing the negative so I was merely grouping it like that to be practical. I never said which fallacies, mistakes, misrepresentations were done by whom.

Irrelevant because you decree so? Regardless, a judgment of irrelevance is a world away from 'repeated fallacies'.

This conversation is rapidly going south. .

No, irrelevant because unless you can show how what I have given thus far in regard to teleology is either empirically false and/or logically incoherent or invalid, your criticism is simply not relevant to the topic, namely moral realism.

And I revise my previously stated opinion and find no further interest here.

As I said, if you want to show how what I've given on teleology is either empirically false or logically incoherent or invalid, fine, as that would undercut my case for a moral realism which I am building. And as far as I can tell, you're issue with 'utility' is an in regards to the epistemic status of this teleological concept within the scope of the scientific method, and in some sense. That's a fun discussion, but it has no relevance in this one, as this is an 'ethical' discussion, and therefore the relevance is to that topic. So, if you have an objection along the lines of showing that what I have given is empirically false or logically incoherent or invalid, then feel free to present that, as I'm willing to examine these ideas critically. But I'm not going to entertain question begging value judgments 'ironically' like what is an ideas utility when it has no relevance to the topic.

 

[Sparhafoc]

The 'ethical discussion' about acorns with tree-potential homunculi?

Pull the other one cobber, it's got bells on.

 

[Exogen]

The 'ethical discussion' about acorns with tree-potential homunculi?

Pull the other one cobber, it's got bells on.

If you read my discussion with Psikhrangkur (as he seems to be getting it loud and clear at this point), you will see that there are no 'homucili' in the acorn. The potential is not 'in' the acorn, as in some property it has which can be distinguished from its whole, or a part of it in any other general or specific sense. The potential isn't something 'lurking' inside the acorn. Rather, the acorn IS the potential oak tree. The oak tree IS the actuality of the acorn.

And as I said also many times over, the acorn-tree is an example of the concept of potentiality-actuality which defines what is meant by 'telos' in this natural sense. This natural sense of telos is a presupposition for teleological ethics. So this natural telos is just the first step in building the case for moral realism along teleological lines of the naturalistic variety.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

Okay.

Given an organism X, the life cycle of X can be broken up into three general stages: the stage of Infancy, the stage of Maturity, and the stage of Impotency.

The stage of Infancy refers to the beginning of the life cycle of X: X has yet to reach the prime of its life. This stage is defined primarily by continuous growth.

The stage of Maturity refers to the zenith of the life cycle of X: X has reached the prime of its life. This stage is defined primarily by a greater capacity for X to function in and interact with the surrounding environment in relation to the other two stages.

The stage of Impotency refers to the end of the life cycle of X: X has aged past its prime. This stage is defined primarily by continuous degeneration and a loss of function in comparison to the stage of Maturity.

The stage of Infancy leads into the stage of Maturity, which leads into the stage of Impotency.

While X is less capable of functioning in and interacting with its surrounding environment during its Infancy than it would in its Maturity, it will eventually develop this capacity. Likewise, the capacity that X exhibits in its Maturity is the result of its growth in its Infancy. These statements are necessarily true by virtue of the temporal relationship of Infancy and Maturity.

XInfancy will inevitably grow into XMature. For this reason, XMature is the actuality of XInfancy.
XMature is contingent on XInfancy. For this reason, XInfancy is the potentiality of XMature.

While XInfancy is the potentiality of XMature, this doesn't guarantee that XInfancy will grow into XMature. Certain circumstances must be met for X to grow. These circumstances can be referred to as necessary conditions.

The actuality of X is the purpose of X.

Just reading it one time, that sounds about right, in so many words. That's the gist of it, yes. This state of maturity is simply the actuality of the potentiality which is infancy. The actuality/maturity leads to a loss of both potentiality and actuality which is impotency, and ultimately death, at which point X is concluded. X's purpose is its actuality, it's maturity as this is the prime/zenith/apex when quite literally, it is in 'top form' and has full functionality. So the being is born, exhibits a potential, then actualizes that potential, then later begins to slowly lose all of that and dies. And that's it's purpose, yes. This is a temporal relationship of causal stages of the form in terms of development. And indeed, there are conditions that would need to be met in order for the particular organism to pass through those stages i.e. environment, circumstances, etc.

And mind you, at this point of the argument, this is purely 'descriptive,' not prescriptive. Aristotle is just saying that temporal relationship of potentiality-actuality-loss thereof, is the things natural purpose.

No sort of deeper meaning or subjective senses of purpose are employed at this stage of the argument. And certainly, no purpose 'lurking' inside the acorn or w/e.

The acorn IS a potential tree. The infant IS a potential mature adult.

So you could say that this potentiality is a subspecies of the more general notion of possibility.

Does that make sense? Any questions, comments, or objections at this stage of the argument? I don't want to move on until we all agree that at least this much is true.

Also, one other thing I was thinking about with regard to what Dragan Gias said.

I could be wrong, but it seems some here may be looking at the reductionism issue in a flawed way. So obviously science wants to give us a unified theory of everything, say it's all strings or w/e theory ultimately science agrees upon. As I explained, this does not undercut the idea that a particular universe exists with particular things in it, which are wholes. Everything may be a phenomenon of strings, but this doesn't change that there are levels and layers of organization of the manifestation and complexity of those strings (or w/e). Saying 'it's all strings' is true because it is a generality, but generalities are not specifics or particular cases. And both are true at the same time. String theory, or any other final unified theory of physics, would be a simplification of nature in literal terms. Any simplification is, of course, true, but doesn't tell the particular story. So with that in mind, nothing about this notion of telos is in contradiction to such simplifications, to such empirical generalizations. And I say that on top of the point I made in my last post about wholes and parts.

I'm hoping what I'm saying is becoming more clear, and differentiated from what I consider to be a convoluted notion of what teleology actually means that I see running around, namely this idea that one's purpose is one's 'meaning' or w/e.

As we will hopefully soon see, as long as everyone is on board with this much, the subjective sense of purpose comes into play later, and is built on top of this more descriptive sense that I've been arguing for thus far.

Before we can continue, assuming of course that after having another chance to see my reiteration of your argument you still feel that it's a fair restating of your argument, I need you to hear more of your thoughts concerning the capacity of a given organism. I've described it as a greater ability to function in and interact with its surrounding environment, but this still strikes me as vague, and I'd appreciate clarification on this point.