psikhrangkur said:Not really, no. The way they handle severe trauma becomes different, the rate at which their heart is expected to beat is different, their capacity to reproduce is different, etc. There are demonstrable changes of form, there.
YES, I know... but I mean we could say look 'two arms two legs, torso, head, etc' and call it a day, without paying attention to the 'details' that you re doing here. See what I mean? If we take a general enough lens, the child is still a human, just the man or women is a human. But what differentiates one from the other, that's what I'm getting at. Is the bacteria identical when it is small to when it is large with respect to details?
psikhrangkur said:As part of its reproductive cycle, sure. Meaning that no change in form had to occur before this stage began, which can't be said of multiple other species including humans and acorns.
You can correct me if I am wrong here, but I distinctly recall that there are phases a bacteria needs to go through the growth phases in order to be even at the size to divide, which requires the construction of various structures like ribosomes, cytoplasm, cytoskeleton, and/or things to that effect, does it not? And if so, are not these necessary structural features that need to be of a certain aggregate number and order so that the cell can divide? Does it not need to 'develop' enough to be able to divide? If yes, then that's all I'm saying. When one cell becomes two, the two halves are a 'potential' of the cell that is capable of division, which would be the actual, the form.
psikhrangkur said:Even if you're correct about the size of the organism growing before its reproductive cycle, I don't see how that qualifies as a change in form.
Because it doesn't have the machinery to actually divide. I mean, even on the more general level, and mind you this is really quibbling, but some kinds of bacteria when they divide, the two new bacterias are more 'roundish' and later become more oblong. But even if it stays round, again, certain internal parts need to be constructed otherwise the bacteria is not at full size or even capable of division. Granted, this life cycle is VERY simple, but it still goes from potential to actual, then splits and starts all over again.
psikhrangkur said:I'm rather confused by this. You suggest that it would apply to any organism for the sake of argument, but didn't we just accept that bacteria were an exception to this?
I'm not convinced they are, for the reasons above. But IF some organism could gestate its young inside itself, and give birth to fully formed live young capable of all the fully formed functions, then it would simply mean that the 'potential' stage would be the gestation period itself. So IF the bacteria, let's say counted here, which I don't think it does, it would mean that the potential would be the process itself of the division followed by the actuality of the 'fully formed bacteria' which is as of yet incapable of reproducing (I just see that as factually incorrect given what I know about cell division).
psikhrangkur said:You could say the same thing of humans or any other social species, except that this would fail to explain the importance of the superorganism in relation to ants as a species.
Essentially, I can't argue that you could describe ants in this way, but it's all rather wishy washy to me. Better explanations of the species exist if we're approaching this from a biological perspective, and it seems like a matter of convenience on your part if we're approaching this from an ethics perspective. It feels like you're forcing it to work.
We 'aren't' approaching this from an ethics perspective at this point in the conversation (though that is ultimately where this will all be used later). Recall, I said none of this is prescriptive. I'm just talking about a certain kind of causal relation. And yes, you could say the same of other social species. But so what? If there is indeed this natural telos, then why cannot it be 'layered' as all other kinds of organization are layered at times as well?
psikhrangkur said:Well, the only point to be made here is that this all just seems like a poor description of what we observe in reality.
We could sit here and describe the superorganism as a whole made of individual organisms that each possess their own potentiality and actuality, but that seems to discount the importance of the superorganism itself, as though it's something that exists as a convenience as opposed to a necessity. Humans could in theory survive outside of society, whereas ants can't actually exist on their own.
We could sit here and try to describe the superorganism the same way we've tried describing other individual organisms, on account of previously cited(and as far as I'm aware, uncontested) evidence that suggests it displays psychophysical reactions similarly to individual organisms, but that comes with its own problem of whether or not a superorganism has stages of Infancy, Maturity, and Impotency.
It doesn't discount it though, as the two are not in conflict. So take your usual way of thinking about this, and simply note that what I've been saying is one sort of pattern in nature, one among many others. The question is, is any of this factually inaccurate? If no, then it is simply one pattern in nature, one among many.
The whole superorganism is really a red herring because the ants to follow the pattern of going from potential to actual, so whether or not the superorganism does or even if there is a superorganism or just a tightly knit social order, doesn't matter.
psikhrangkur said:Not to me, no. I'm not sure how this explanation ties into the rest of our discussion. Unless I just assume that actuality is based on function, but that seems hasty to me.
Wait and see. My issue for now is, is there anything flat-out factually incorrect about what I have been saying?
psikhrangkur said:The point of the hypothetical is to determine whether the actuality of an organism is tied to its natural form or to its capacity to function. So how about this:
We have an adult that was in a car accident. Their spine has been damaged, and as a result, they can't walk on their own.
Their spine can't actually be fixed. However, we develop some means of bypassing this issue entirely, which results in the man being able to walk.
This man, whose spine is still damaged, can now walk via artificial means. Has actuality been lost, because his spine has been damaged, or has actuality been preserved, because he can still walk?
The problem I have with your example is, unless we 'modified' his body, repaired it, or used some other tool to allow him to walk, he simply cannot walk. Walking is itself a certain function, which is inseparable from a form that allows for such an action. Talking you could say, is a kind of action, which presupposes a certain form that can act in that way i.e. which can 'function' in that way. So if his spine is gone, unless we say, install a prosthetic somehow (which would have to be pretty sophisticated) or have some other assisted method, he isn't going to walk. But any of those options require we bring in 'some' form which allows for said action, said function. You can't have the function of anything.
In regards to your last sentence, the answer is, his actuality 'has NOT' been preserved. Rather, the function of walking has simply been achieved by a different form, albeit one which may be similar or dissimilar to his spine, to whatever degree. His form has been destroyed, though the part which was destroyed has been replaced or assisted by another, which allows for the fucntion he once had. Do you recall, I said that the same fucntion can be achieved by more than one form, depending?