William Lane Craig and his nonsense ethics

[Laurens]

On my blog, I have recently written a refutation of William Lane Craig's moral argument for the existence of God. I was just hoping to submit it to a bit of peer-review, so I'd welcome and comments on style, grammar, spelling, and of course to see if there are any problems with the arguments.

So here is what I have written:

William Lane Craig and his nonsense ethics

Christian apologist William Lane Craig, author of Reasonable Faith (the irony of this title will soon become apparent) argues that if objective moral values exist then God must also exist. Objective moral values do exist, he asserts, therefore God exists. One might be forgiven for thinking that someone with a Ph.D. In philosophy would be able to formulate a cohesive argument in favour of his assertion that objective moral values do indeed exist. One would be mistaken however. His reasoning is as follows; "objective moral values do exist and deep down we all know it." This is an utterly asinine philosophical argument that is almost too embarrassing to dignify with a refutation. Nonetheless I shall endeavour to persist.

His argument can, without parody, be translated thus; I have a gut feeling that something is wrong therefore it must be objectively wrong. But there are lots of things that human beings have strong aversions to; consider eating rotten meat for example. Most of us would wretch if we were presented with a platter of semi-decomposed carrion. Our strong abhorrence, or gut feeling that rancid flesh should not be consumed does not mean that it is objectively wrong to do so. There is no universal law that prohibits such an act, plenty of organisms do feed off fetid meat. Humans however, have evolved an innate sense of disgust in response to it as a defence against the potential diseases that we might contract from consuming it.

Similarly, our conscience doesn't necessitate the existence of a universal code of ethics. It merely necessitates that we have evolved a defence against certain destructive modes of behaviour. If you imagine there are two populations; one in which the people have no qualms about murder, theft and other such detrimental behaviour, and another in which the people have a fully developed conscience that prevents them from committing such actions. It is easy to see how the first population would fail to prosper. Their socially destructive behaviour would prevent the necessary cohesion that is required to persist as a population with for any great length of time. The second population on the other hand would cooperate and trust one another with ease, their society and institutions would flourish and they would have the means to deal with the challenges that face any culture. Whilst the first population are too busy squabbling and killing each other to solve even the simple challenge of making sure everyone gets fed, the second population could gain the strength and resources necessary to form armies and conquer the first population with ease, thus eliminating them, and their destructive habits. It is clear to see why having an aversion towards certain behaviours is an advantage in evolutionary terms, without appealing to the existence of objective values.



In order to move on however, I shall be unusually generous and put all that aside. Lets assume for the moment that there is some substance to Craig's claim that objective moral values do exist. Does it follow from this that God exists?

Craig's reasoning is predicated upon the assumption that only God could provide the grounding for objective morality. If one subscribes to the 'divine command theory', which states that an act is either good or evil depending on whether God commands it or prohibits it, then there are some problems with this assumption. If we take an act generally considered to be immoral, such as killing a child, for example. Is killing a child wrong because God prohibits it, or does God prohibit killing children because it is intrinsically wrong?

If God prohibits killing a child because it is intrinsically wrong, then it is wrong regardless of whether or not God exists, and thus objective moral values do not necessitate that God exists. If something is right simply because God commands it, and wrong simply because God prohibits it then anything can become right or wrong based upon the whim of God. Thus if God commands a person murder a child (a problem which is amplified by the fact that God does command exactly this in the Bible) then this would be the right thing to do by definition. This renders morality completely subjective, and arbitrary.

Some will respond to this problem by stating that goodness is derived from God's nature. However this creates a very similar dilemma. Is helping a suffering individual good because it is in God's nature, or is helping a suffering individual in God's nature because it is already intrinsically good? The latter option again removes the necessity of God, and the former can be refuted with an example from the Bible. Consider Jeremiah 19 verse 9: "And I will cause them to eat the flesh of their sons and the flesh of their daughters". Here God is causing people to cannibalise their own children, thus we can consider it to be in God's nature to induce others to eat their own progeny, and as such we can conclude that doing so is good. If one protests that causing people to eat their own offspring is morally wicked then they are either appealing to a moral standard that is beyond the nature of God, or they are saying that God is capable of acting against his own nature. But if it is in God's nature to be capable of acting against his own nature then the whole argument is rendered meaningless.

Either objective moral values do exist, but God is superfluous, which is contradictory to Craig's argument. Or objective moral values do not exist, and morality is down to the subjective and arbitrary whims of God, which again, contradicts the original assertion that objective moral values do exist. Craig's moral argument falls flat on its face.


William Lane Craig doesn't stop his ethical embarrassment here by any means. In his debate with Arif Ahmed, he openly declared that: "The premise that pointless suffering exists, or gratuitous evil exists is extremely controversial. We are simply not in the position to make these kinds of inductive probability judgements". What does he mean by this? He appears to be casting doubt on the existence of gratuitous evil, in other words, evil that is without reason, cause or justification. So, if we accept the implications of this, then we must accept that all evil and suffering exists to serve some kind of purpose. What might that purpose be? Well, God's purpose of course, as Craig states on his website reasonablefaith.org:

"God may well have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering in the world. We all know cases in which we permit suffering because we have morally sufficient reasons for doing so. What Law would have to prove is that it's improbable that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering in the world. But how could he possibly prove that? God's justifying reasons might never appear in our lifetime or locale or even in this life. Suppose, for example, that God's purpose for human life is not happiness in this life but the knowledge of God, which is an incommensurable good. It may be the case, for all we know, that only in a world suffused with natural and moral evil would the maximum number of people freely come to know God and find eternal life."

So, if evil exists to serve a purpose, and that purpose is God's supreme plan, which is ultimately good (unless you want to concede that God is evil), then it follows logically that all evil is ultimately good. Such a perfect way to commit moral suicide! Although to be fair on Craig, he doesn't assert that gratuitous evil definitely does not exist. However, his doubtful stance does completely undermine his ability to make any moral judgements whatsoever. If, for example, the torture of a small child for fun cannot definitely be said to be gratuitously evil, and that it might be a part of God's ultimately good plan, then there is no way to say for definite whether such an act is ultimately good or evil. Thus contrary to his laughably inane assertion that we can just know that something is right or wrong, Craig's own position actually undermines his ability to make moral judgements.



From Craig's asinine argument from objective morality, to the absurd conclusions that follow inevitably from his scepticism over the existence of gratuitous evil, it is evident that his theological beliefs do nothing to advance any real ethical philosophy. That is not to say that William Lane Craig, is himself devoid of coherent ethics, however I think it is safe to say that they stem from somewhere other than the whims of a supernatural law-giver.

 

[Master_Ghost_Knight]

Altough I would have personally expanded in different ways there is nothing interinsically wrong with the argument, it is not even a new refutation. Some parts of what you have proposed is something similar to The Euthyphro Dilemma, other calls to the non-sequiteur nature of the argument itself (which I have personaly allways found quite obvious). But then again it is late and my brain isn't working properly anymore, I will give a new review tomorow.

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

Just a few quick notes...

On my blog, I have recently written a refutation of William Lane Craig's moral argument for the existence of God. I was just hoping to submit it to a bit of peer-review, so I'd welcome and comments on style, grammar, spelling, and of course to see if there are any problems with the arguments.

So here is what I have written:

William Lane Craig and his nonsense ethics

Christian apologist William Lane Craig, author of Reasonable Faith (the irony of this title will soon become apparent) argues that if objective moral values exist then God must also exist. Objective moral values do exist, he asserts, therefore God exists. One might be forgiven for thinking that someone with a Ph.D. In philosophy would be able to formulate a cohesive argument in favour of his assertion that objective moral values do indeed exist. One would be mistaken however. His reasoning is as follows; "objective moral values do exist and deep down we all know it." This is an utterly asinine philosophical argument that is almost too embarrassing to dignify with a refutation.

The simplest would be to name the logical fallacy he is committing.

Nonetheless I shall endeavour to persist.

His argument can, without parody, be translated thus; I have a gut feeling that something is wrong therefore it must be objectively wrong. But there are lots of things that human beings have strong aversions to; consider eating rotten meat for example. Most of us would wretch if we were presented with a platter of semi-decomposed carrion. Our strong abhorrence, or gut feeling that rancid flesh should not be consumed does not mean that it is objectively wrong to do so. There is no universal law that prohibits such an act, plenty of organisms do feed off fetid meat. Humans however, have evolved an innate sense of disgust in response to it as a defence against the potential diseases that we might contract from consuming it.

Similarly, our conscience doesn't necessitate the existence of a universal code of ethics. It merely necessitates that we have evolved a defence against certain destructive modes of behaviour. If you imagine there are two populations; one in which the people have no qualms about murder, theft and other such detrimental behaviour, and another in which the people have a fully developed conscience that prevents them from committing such actions. It is easy to see how the first population would fail to prosper. Their socially destructive behaviour would prevent the necessary cohesion that is required to persist as a population with for any great length of time.

Eh? That whole sentence is awkward.

The second population on the other hand would cooperate and trust one another with ease, their society and institutions would flourish and they would have the means to deal with the challenges that face any culture. Whilst the first population are too busy squabbling and killing each other to solve even the simple challenge of making sure everyone gets fed, the second population could gain the strength and resources necessary to form armies and conquer the first population with ease, thus eliminating them, and their destructive habits. It is clear to see why having an aversion towards certain behaviours is an advantage in evolutionary terms, without appealing to the existence of objective values.

Personally, I'd prefer to use an example to show moral relativity.

For example, many years ago at school, in Religion class (Roman Catholicism), we were given a choice of essay titles on which to write on ethical/moral issues.

The one I chose was "Conscience governs morality" - however, in the essay, I turned it round.

I argued that morality governs conscience and used the example of being born in a cannibalistic culture: eating people would be "normal" and therefore considered "moral". Were a individual to refuse to do so, would they not be thought of as "immoral"? If a cannibal were to visit a non-cannibalistic culture, would they not both be shocked at the other's "immorality"?

In order to move on however, I shall be unusually generous and put all that aside. Lets assume for the moment that there is some substance to Craig's claim that objective moral values do exist. Does it follow from this that God exists?

Craig's reasoning is predicated upon the assumption that only God could provide the grounding for objective morality. If one subscribes to the 'divine command theory', which states that an act is either good or evil depending on whether God commands it or prohibits it, then there are some problems with this assumption. If we take an act generally considered to be immoral, such as killing a child, for example. Is killing a child wrong because God prohibits it, or does God prohibit killing children because it is intrinsically wrong?

If God prohibits killing a child because it is intrinsically wrong, then it is wrong regardless of whether or not God exists, and thus objective moral values do not necessitate that God exists. If something is right simply because God commands it, and wrong simply because God prohibits it then anything can become right or wrong based upon the whim of God. Thus if God commands a person murder a child (a problem which is amplified by the fact that God does command exactly this in the Bible) then this would be the right thing to do by definition. This renders morality completely subjective, and arbitrary.

If one could show that (the biblical) God prohibited the killing of a child elsewhere in the bible, then you'd prove that the morality of killing a child is arbitrary.

Some will respond to this problem by stating that goodness is derived from God's nature. However this creates a very similar dilemma. Is helping a suffering individual good because it is in God's nature, or is helping a suffering individual in God's nature because it is already intrinsically good? The latter option again removes the necessity of God, and the former can be refuted with an example from the Bible. Consider Jeremiah 19 verse 9: "And I will cause them to eat the flesh of their sons and the flesh of their daughters". Here God is causing people to cannibalise their own children, thus we can consider it to be in God's nature to induce others to eat their own progeny, and as such we can conclude that doing so is good. If one protests that causing people to eat their own offspring is morally wicked then they are either appealing to a moral standard that is beyond the nature of God, or they are saying that God is capable of acting against his own nature. But if it is in God's nature to be capable of acting against his own nature then the whole argument is rendered meaningless.

Either objective moral values do exist, but God is superfluous, which is contradictory to Craig's argument. Or objective moral values do not exist, and morality is down to the subjective and arbitrary whims of God, which again, contradicts the original assertion that objective moral values do exist. Craig's moral argument falls flat on its face.


William Lane Craig doesn't stop his ethical embarrassment here by any means. In his debate with Arif Ahmed, he openly declared that: "The premise that pointless suffering exists, or gratuitous evil exists is extremely controversial. We are simply not in the position to make these kinds of inductive probability judgements". What does he mean by this? He appears to be casting doubt on the existence of gratuitous evil, in other words, evil that is without reason, cause or justification. So, if we accept the implications of this, then we must accept that all evil and suffering exists to serve some kind of purpose. What might that purpose be? Well, God's purpose of course, as Craig states on his website reasonablefaith.org:

"God may well have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering in the world. We all know cases in which we permit suffering because we have morally sufficient reasons for doing so. What Law would have to prove is that it's improbable that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering in the world. But how could he possibly prove that? God's justifying reasons might never appear in our lifetime or locale or even in this life. Suppose, for example, that God's purpose for human life is not happiness in this life but the knowledge of God, which is an incommensurable good. It may be the case, for all we know, that only in a world suffused with natural and moral evil would the maximum number of people freely come to know God and find eternal life."

So, if evil exists to serve a purpose, and that purpose is God's supreme plan, which is ultimately good (unless you want to concede that God is evil), then it follows logically that all evil is ultimately good. Such a perfect way to commit moral suicide! Although to be fair on Craig, he doesn't assert that gratuitous evil definitely does not exist. However, his doubtful stance does completely undermine his ability to make any moral judgements whatsoever. If, for example, the torture of a small child for fun cannot definitely be said to be gratuitously evil, and that it might be a part of God's ultimately good plan, then there is no way to say for definite whether such an act is ultimately good or evil. Thus contrary to his laughably inane assertion that we can just know that something is right or wrong, Craig's own position actually undermines his ability to make moral judgements.

I'd love to know of what examples he's thinking for the underlined text...

Also, if evil is being used as a goad to encourage us to turn to God, this is not in keeping with a all-loving/all-good God!

[For myself, if God has given us free will, he *cannot* intervene - under any circumstances without negating it. Calling on God to intervene - through intercessory prayer or just shouting at the heavens - is utterly pointless.

This is why I often say, "Whether God exists or not, we're on our own: it's up to us - what are we going to do about all the ills in the world? Poverty, famine, inequality, etc."

How else would we grow spiritually? Assuming we have souls, and free will...]

From Craig's asinine argument from objective morality, to the absurd conclusions that follow inevitably from his scepticism over the existence of gratuitous evil, it is evident that his theological beliefs do nothing to advance any real ethical philosophy. That is not to say that William Lane Craig, is himself devoid of coherent ethics, however I think it is safe to say that they stem from somewhere other than the whims of a supernatural law-giver.

Kindest regards,

James

 

[Laurens]

Greetings,

Just a few quick notes...

The simplest would be to name the logical fallacy he is committing.

I am not too well versed in formally naming logical fallacies, not really sure which one it is he's committing there?

Eh? That whole sentence is awkward.

Ah yes, thanks for pointing that out. I think it ended originally with "with any longevity" and I just forgot to get rid of the "with".

Personally, I'd prefer to use an example to show moral relativity.

For example, many years ago at school, in Religion class (Roman Catholicism), we were given a choice of essay titles on which to write on ethical/moral issues.

The one I chose was "Conscience governs morality" - however, in the essay, I turned it round.

I argued that morality governs conscience and used the example of being born in a cannibalistic culture: eating people would be "normal" and therefore considered "moral". Were a individual to refuse to do so, would they not be thought of as "immoral"? If a cannibal were to visit a non-cannibalistic culture, would they not both be shocked at the other's "immorality"?

My angle was to refute his claim that "deep down we all know it" by demonstrating that we can know some things deep down, and get a very strong reaction to them without them being objectively wrong.

If one could show that (the biblical) God prohibited the killing of a child elsewhere in the bible, then you'd prove that the morality of killing a child is arbitrary.

Good point, I might look into that. One question though... Does he ever explicitly say not to kill a child?

I'd love to know of what examples he's thinking for the underlined text...

Also, if evil is being used as a goad to encourage us to turn to God, this is not in keeping with a all-loving/all-good God!

[For myself, if God has given us free will, he *cannot* intervene - under any circumstances without negating it. Calling on God to intervene - through intercessory prayer or just shouting at the heavens - is utterly pointless.

This is why I often say, "Whether God exists or not, we're on our own: it's up to us - what are we going to do about all the ills in the world? Poverty, famine, inequality, etc."

How else would we grow spiritually? Assuming we have souls, and free will...]

I doubt Craig actually believes some of this stuff he says. He can't really, can he? I think he just contorts himself one way to get out of the problem of evil, or pointless suffering (which he was attempting to do in the passage I quoted) and he contorts himself in a completely different direction to defend his moral argument. I don't think he cares that he ends up contradicting himself, as long as he appears to be winning the argument at the time.

Kindest regards,

James

Likewise

Laurens

 

[Dogma's Demise]

The reason some things are wrong is because they have negative consequences (i.e. increase suffering or the suffering outweighs the pleasure/happiness or there is a gross imbalance between individual-society's needs). That's really all there is to it in a nutshell.

God has no place in this equation. The act of murder for example has the same negative consequences on the individual (and society as whole) regardless of whether or not God exists.

This WLC moral argument is possibly one of the weakest (besides maybe the ridiculous ontological argument which simply tries to define God into existence, although this is not of the 5 arguments he typically uses).

 

[CosmicJoghurt]

The reason some things are wrong is because they have negative consequences (i.e. increase suffering or the suffering outweighs the pleasure/happiness or there is a gross imbalance between individual-society's needs). That's really all there is to it in a nutshell.

God has no place in this equation. The act of murder for example has the same negative consequences on the individual (and society as whole) regardless of whether or not God exists.

This WLC moral argument is possibly one of the weakest (besides maybe the ridiculous ontological argument which simply tries to define God into existence, although this is not of the 5 arguments he typically uses).

Well that's consequentialism. Your view of morality, not "all there is to it in a nutshell".

And I disagree with your view on your example concerning murder. I can think of a few scenarios where, let's say, the existence of the Christian God, heaven and hell could (would?) drastically change the consequences for an individual's death.


@ontopic

I agree with Laurens . That's pretty much it.

 

[Deleted member 619]

I am not too well versed in formally naming logical fallacies, not really sure which one it is he's committing there?

Actually, he's committing two, namely argumentum ad populum and the fallacy of blind assertion.

Personally, the approach I generally take to this argument is the simple one, namely that anything rooted in the will of a single individual is necessarily subjective, by definition. It doesn't matter whether this individual is divine or not. The only get out for the apologist is to accept the other horn of Euthypro, which removes the necessity of a deity for objective moral values. Basically, either our morality is god-given, in which case it's subjective, or it's objective, in which case god is not required.

It's a piss-poor argument, frankly.

 

[Deleted member 619]

The reason some things are wrong is because they have negative consequences (i.e. increase suffering or the suffering outweighs the pleasure/happiness or there is a gross imbalance between individual-society's needs). That's really all there is to it in a nutshell.

All of which is entirely subjective, being rooted in the determination of what's negative and what's positive. You will run into problems if you present such an argument to, say, a masochist or a sadist.

God has no place in this equation. The act of murder for example has the same negative consequences on the individual (and society as whole) regardless of whether or not God exists.

And what of the person who wants to be killed?

This WLC moral argument is possibly one of the weakest (besides maybe the ridiculous ontological argument which simply tries to define God into existence, although this is not of the 5 arguments he typically uses).

I find it difficult to choose between them because, frankly, they're all asinine in the extreme.

 

[Dogma's Demise]

All of which is entirely subjective, being rooted in the determination of what's negative and what's positive. You will run into problems if you present such an argument to, say, a masochist or a sadist.

You know by this logic there can be no objective morality even with God because someone can just be masochistic enough to prefer Hell over obeying God. And this is not purely hypothetical, there are genuine satanists out there who believe that God exists just don't want to obey him.

There are also atheists who openly admit that even if the Christian God existed and threatened them with Hell, they would defy him.


But generally all feel pain in the same way, we don't desire it under normal circumstances. So don't think you that pain/suffering are in a way objectively bad?

For sadists, I don't see how a sadists' few moments of pleasure carry more weight than the enormous amount of suffering they often have to inflict on others, usually without consent. So it's not just overall more suffering than pleasure, but you're also violating a fundamental right which harms society as whole in the long term if it's not protected, because it encourages further acts of violence and instill terror into the minds of everyone else who don't have any guarantee they'll live another day.

As for a masochist, well technically that's overall pleasure for him. The harm he suffers is outweighed by the mental satisfaction from inflicting harm on himself. But at the same time, in the term long however it's also probably a net gain to seek professional help. (How bad of a masochist are we talking about?)

And what of the person who wants to be killed?

Depends on who we're talking about. Euthanasia for a terminally ill patient is a very specific case. Generally speaking death (especially premature death) is a net loss whether the person realizes it or not. Think of the number of failed suicide attempts that later regret ever contemplating it.



But anyway, I can see where this going. Now sure, someone who is a sadist or sociopath could just reject all the axioms (like pain = bad) I use to form my moral philosophy.

In which case, quite frankly, I don't see what other appropriate response I can give except distance myself from that individual and warn him that there will be retaliation from society (isolation, police etc.). If force is all he understands, then force is what he's gonna get. I don't see why I'm obliged to engage in lengthy discussions about morality with a total psycho. It's just not a practical approach.

 

[Go4th&X]

His reasoning is as follows; "objective moral values do exist and deep down we all know it." This is an utterly asinine philosophical argument that is almost too embarrassing to dignify with a refutation. Nonetheless I shall endeavour to persist.

His argument can, without parody, be translated thus; I have a gut feeling that something is wrong therefore it must be objectively wrong.

I think you have missed something crucial here, in that he isn't just claiming that he himself has a gut feeling, but we all do. He is assigning his subjectivity onto everybody else in order to claim objectivity, which is a festering turd of an argument. And even if he's right and deep down we do all know it, he is conflating objectivity with unanimity.

As for the rest, WLC has boxed himself into a corner. On one hand he's claiming moral objectivity, yet on the other he's claiming everything that happens does so for an ultimately good reason. So nothing objectively morally wrong ever happens. It's all good and right, which removes any distinction for morality, and removes any meaning to morality. In essence, it ceases to exist.

 

[Deleted member 619]

You know by this logic there can be no objective morality even with God because someone can just be masochistic enough to prefer Hell over obeying God.

Nail on head, and as soon as you realise what morality actually is, you'll also realise that there is absolutely no way it can ever be anything but subjective. Morality isn't something that has any real existence beyond being simply a social contract among the members of a social species.

 

[Dogma's Demise]

Well technically, you don't really know if the Universe exists as it appears because you don't know if your senses are accurate. You just assumed they are. Dare I say it, you had faith.

Sometimes you just have to adopt some axioms (i.e. things you take for granted) otherwise you wouldn't be able to function in the world.

Likewise without having some core moral principles, your social order would not exist. I mean really, when someone murders you don't think "oh that is just his subjective morality", no, you say "that's evil, it harms society, it creates suffering, and the person should be isolated from society whether he wants it or not".

Maybe we should abandon the word "morality" altogether and just directly discuss ways to make society as much a pain/suffering-free place as practically possible. Pain/pleasure for example is subjective but it's also very real. It's in the nerves. (And that is something even the most deranged sociopath can't deny, that some models of conduct lead to more pain and suffering than others. It may be hard to precisely determine which is more optimal, but you can't say they're equal.)



My main point is, there is suffering in the world and there are ways to minimize it if people behave in a certain way. This does not, in any way, point to a God and that's why WLC's moral argument is so blatantly bogus.

 

[devilsadvocate]

I'm just popping in to congratulate Laurens on writing so eloquently as he always does.

One thing I would've liked more emphasis on, is the moral vacuum God must live in, if the definition of good is his will. Anything God does is good, so how does he figure out what to do?

 

[televator]

His reasoning is as follows; "objective moral values do exist and deep down we all know it." This is an utterly asinine philosophical argument that is almost too embarrassing to dignify with a refutation. Nonetheless I shall endeavour to persist.

His argument can, without parody, be translated thus; I have a gut feeling that something is wrong therefore it must be objectively wrong.

I think you have missed something crucial here, in that he isn't just claiming that he himself has a gut feeling, but we all do. He is assigning his subjectivity onto everybody else in order to claim objectivity, which is a festering turd of an argument. And even if he's right and deep down we do all know it, he is conflating objectivity with unanimity.

As for the rest, WLC has boxed himself into a corner. On one hand he's claiming moral objectivity, yet on the other he's claiming everything that happens does so for an ultimately good reason. So nothing objectively morally wrong ever happens. It's all good and right, which removes any distinction for morality, and removes any meaning to morality. In essence, it ceases to exist.

One thing I would've liked more emphasis on, is the moral vacuum God must live in, if the definition of good is his will. Anything God does is good, so how does he figure out what to do?

Looks like William Lame Craig's got a problem of uncompromised good in his moral system, but the only way to fix that is to admit god's evil side. I wonder if Craig realizes his cognitive dissonance.

 

[Deleted member 619]

Well technically, you don't really know if the Universe exists as it appears because you don't know if your senses are accurate. You just assumed they are. Dare I say it, you had faith.

Care to provide evidence of me making this assumption?

I don't do faith. I leave such things to fuckwits.

Sometimes you just have to adopt some axioms (i.e. things you take for granted) otherwise you wouldn't be able to function in the world.

Likewise without having some core moral principles, your social order would not exist. I mean really, when someone murders you don't think "oh that is just his subjective morality", no, you say "that's evil, it harms society, it creates suffering, and the person should be isolated from society whether he wants it or not".

Well, several problems here. Firstly, the origin of our social contract is reasonably well understood, and no magic entities are required. The contract is a result of our evolutionary history, and indeed there is a biological basis for ethical behaviour. I'll let the inimitable Blue Flutteryby take it from here:

I said I would cover some relevant scientific papers dealing with the evolutionary and biological basis for altruism, empathy and ethical behaviour, and so, I shall do that. Before doing so, however, I shall open with some pertinent remarks.

All morality is a human invention. The only evidence we have, of creatures producing an abstract concept of ethics and devising conceptual frameworks within an intellectual field of endeavour devoted to these, centres upon humans. We have evidence that humans have written treatises on ethics - everything from Urukagina's laws and Hammurabi's laws through to, for example, the works of Immanuel Kant. We have NO evidence that any other entity has produced treatises on ethics or formulated ethical ideas. Any statement that an invisible magic man is responsible for our ethical constructs is mere blind assertion, not least because the postulate that this invisible magic man even exists is a blind assertion. As a direct consequence, the observational evidence supports the notion that morality is a human invention.

Oh, and one of the more interesting developments from neuroscience that supernaturalists have apparently missed out on is this. Humans (and indeed other primates) possess a part of the brain known as the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex. It has been demonstrated experimentally, courtesy of cases of brain injury to this region, that this part of the brain is the very part of the brain responsible for our capacity to engage in ethical decision making. When that part of the brain is damaged, ethical decision making is manifestly impaired. In other words, we have an organic and biological basis for our capacity to act as moral beings. An interesting and relevant paper is this one:

Characterisation Of Empathy Deficits Following Prefrontal Brain Damage: The Role Of The Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex by S.G. Shamay-Tsoory, R. Tomer B.D. Berger and J. Aharon-Peretz, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15: 324-337 (2003)

Here's the abstract:

Impaired empathic response has been described in patients following brain injury, suggesting that empathy may be a fundamental aspect of the social behavior disturbed by brain damage. However, the neuroanatomical basis of impaired empathy has not been studied in detail. The empathic response of patients with localized lesions in the prefrontal cortex (n = 25) was compared to responses of patients with posterior (n = 17) and healthy control subjects (n = 19). To examine the cognitive processes that underlie the empathic ability, the relationships between empathy scores and the performance on tasks that assess processes of cognitive flexibility, affect recognition, and theory of mind (TOM) were also examined. Patients with prefrontal lesions, particularly when their damage included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, were significantly impaired in empathy as compared to patients with posterior lesions and healthy controls. However, among patients with posterior lesions, those with damage to the right hemisphere were impaired, whereas those with left posterior lesions displayed empathy levels similar to healthy controls. Seven of nine patients with the most profound empathy deficit had a right ventromedial lesion. A differential pattern regarding the relationships between empathy and cognitive performance was also found: Whereas among patients with dorsolateral prefrontal damage empathy was related to cognitive flexibility but not to TOM and affect recognition, empathy scores in patients with ventromedial lesions were related to TOM but not to cognitive flexibility. Our findings suggest that prefrontal structures play an important part in a network mediating the empathic response and specifically that the right ventromedial cortex has a unique role in integrating cognition and affect to produce the empathic response.

Another apposite paper is this one:

The Role Of The Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex In Abstract State-Based Inference During Decision Making In Humans by Alan N. Hampton, Peter Bossaerts and John. P. O'Doherty, The Journal of Neuroscience, 26(32):, 8360-8367 (9th August 2006) (full paper downloadable from here)

Here's the abstract:

Many real-life decision-making problems incorporate higher-order structure, involving interdependencies between different stimuli, actions, and subsequent rewards. It is not known whether brain regions implicated in decision making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), use a stored model of the task structure to guide choice (model-based decision making) or merely learn action or state values without assuming higher-order structure as in standard reinforcement learning. To discriminate between these possibilities, we scanned human subjects with functional magnetic resonance imaging while they performed a simple decision-making task with higher-order structure, probabilistic reversal learning. We found that neural activity in a key decision-making region, the vmPFC, was more consistent with a computational model that exploits higher-order structure than with simple reinforcement learning. These results suggest that brain regions, such as the vmPFC, use an abstract model of task structure to guide behavioral choice, computations that may underlie the human capacity for complex social interactions and abstract strategizing.

Likewise we have this paper:

Another apposite paper is this one:

Characterisation Of The Decision-Making Deficit Of Patients With Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions by Antione Bechara, Daniel Tranel and Hanna Damasio, Brain, 123: 2189-2202 (2000)

and also this one:

Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Activation Is Critical For Preference Judgements by Martin P. Paulus and Lawrence R. Frank, NeuroReport, 14(10): 1311-1315 (28th March 2003)

However, the one I'd really like to concentrate upon from here on is this one:

Impairment Of Social And Moral Behaviour Related To Early Damage In Human Prefrontal Cortex by Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel and Antonio R. Damasio, Nature Neuroscience, 2(11): 1032-1037 (November 1999)

Here's what this paper says:

The long-term consequences of early prefrontal cortex lesions occurring before 16 months were investigated in two adults. As is the case when such damage occurs in adulthood, the two early-onset patients had severely impaired social behavior despite normal basic cognitive abilities, and showed insensitivity to future consequences of decisions, defective autonomic responses to punishment contingencies and failure to respond to behavioral interventions. Unlike adult-onset patients, however, the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired. Thus early-onset prefrontal damage resulted in a syndrome resembling psychopathy.

Indeed, further research in this area has established an interesting fact: if the pre-frontal cortex is damaged in childhood, before a child has begun to learn basic ethical precepts, that child becomes a sociopathic adult, incapable of responding to any impulse other than instant gratification of wants and desires, regardless of the cost to that person or others affected by said behaviour. If the damage occurs in adulthood, the behaviour is still antisocial, but is accompanied by feelings of guilt because ethical precepts have already been learned, and knowledge of this affects the individual adversely in terms of guilt feelings after the fact. Plus, when subjected to testing in a clinical environment, adults with pre-frontal cortex damage can give appropriate responses to questions about appropriate behaviour in social settings, but are unable to act upon this knowledge, and continue to be driven by immediate gratification, even when they know that this behaviour is self-defeating. The pre-frontal cortex has also been implicated as the origin of fear memories in normal individuals, as of 2006 (courtesy of researchers at the University of Toronto). Modern data with respect to this relies upon functional MRI scanning, which can track brain activity in real time, and those brain imaging systems have found a startling correlation between reduced activity, reduced volume and reduced interconnections with other brain subsystems, and individuals falling into the following categories:

[1] Sufferers of unipolar depression;

[2] Persons subjected to repeated high-intensity stress (e.g., battlefield shock cases);

[3] Incarcerated criminals;

[4] Diagnosed sociopaths;

[5] Drug addicts;

[6] Suicide victims (survivors of suicide attempts have been imaged via fMRI: successful suicide victims have had the pre-frontal cortex directly measured by dissection).

Therefore there is a biological basis for ethical behaviour in humans, and work on the great apes is being performed in anticipation of finding corollary brain activity related to socialisation and the establishment of behavioural 'norms' within great ape social groupings.

The pre-frontal cortex is regarded as being implicated in the presence of empathy not just in humans, but on other mammals too, though this work is in its infancy and detailed, robust findings have yet to be published. However, given what has been verified empirically in cases of pre-frontal cortex injury, scientists anticipate that empathy will also be found to be correlated with healthy functioning of the pre-frontal cortex.

Additionally, I have since found that pre-frontal cortex damage is implicated in schizophrenia, courtesy of this page from the Society for Neuroscience. Again, it refers to brain imaging studies, this time in humans and other primates.

A letter to Nature is also apposite here (link), viz:

The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus of many recent empirical studies[sup]1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.[/sup] Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions[sup]12, 13, 14[/sup], produce an abnormally 'utilitarian' pattern of judgements on moral dilemmas that pit compelling considerations of aggregate welfare against highly emotionally aversive behaviours (for example, having to sacrifice one person's life to save a number of other lives)[sup]7, 8[/sup]. In contrast, the VMPC patients' judgements were normal in other classes of moral dilemmas. These findings indicate that, for a selective set of moral dilemmas, the VMPC is critical for normal judgements of right and wrong. The findings support a necessary role for emotion in the generation of those judgements.

Indeed the pre-frontal cortex appears to be involved in a surprising amount of decision making. This page on depression covers this in some detail. This page also reports a study from the British Journal of Psychiatry, which notes structural differences in the pre-frontal cortex that are observed between socially well-adjusted individuals and pathological liars, and a parallel reversal of those differences in persons with autistic spectrum conditions (who have been observed for many years as possessing a considerably reduced capacity to lie and fabricate - there are numerous peer reviewed studies with respect to this, from researchers such as Professor Uta Frith and Dr Simon Baron-Cohen).

A peer reviewed paper that can be accessed that discusses several of these findings in detail is this one, in which the connection between pre-frontal cortex damage and increased pursuit of immediate gratification is experimentally verified. This article from the American Journal of Psychiatry also covers the relation between pre-frontal cortex damage and schizophrenia.

So, the evidence the basis for morality is organic, and has precious little to do with any invisible magic men. In the case of humans, our accelerated brain evolution (courtesy of ASPM and FOXP2, two genes critical to the development of a large cerebral cortex and language capability, papers on which I have presented elsewhere) has also led to an expansion of the size of the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex, and the forging of connections between that brain region and the cerebral cortex proper, facilitating the coupling of our empathic capabilities, which are also seen in other primates. The following scientific papers, authored or co-authored by primate researcher Frans de Waal, are apposite here:

Empathy: Its Ultimate And Proximate Bases by Stephanie D. Preston and Frans de Waal, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 25: 1-20 (2001)

Mechanisms Of Social Reciprocity In Three Primate Species: Symmetrical Relationship Characteristics Or Cognition? by Frans B. M. de Waal and Lesleigh M. Luttrell, Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4): 101-118 (1988)

Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay by Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B. M. de Waal, Nature, 425: 297-299 (18th September 2003)

Primates,A Natural Heritage Of Conflict Resolution by Frans B. M. de Waal, Science, 289: 586-590 (28th July 2000)

Reconciliation And Consolation Among Chimpanzees by Frans B. M. de Waal and Angeline van Roosmalen, Behavioural Ecology & Sociobiology, 5(1): 55-66 (March 1979)

I'll now set about covering these papers in some detail. First,

Empathy: Its Ultimate And Proximate Bases by Stephanie D. Preston and Frans de Waal, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 25: 1-20 (2001). The full paper is downloadable from here. Here is the abstract, with appropriate sections highlighted in bold:

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations.

So already we have a paper that discusses evolutionary explanations for altruism. Let's take a further look at this, shall we?

In an experiment with rhesus monkeys, subjects were trained to pull two chains that delivered different amounts of food. The experimenters then altered the situation so that pulling the chain with the larger reward caused a monkey in sight of the subject to be shocked. After the subjects witnessed the shock of the conspecific, two-thirds preferred the nonshock chain even though it resulted in half as many rewards. Of the remaining third, one stopped pulling the chains altogether for 5 days and another for 12 days after witnessing the shock of the object. These monkeys were literally starving themselves to prevent the shock to the conspecific. Starvation was induced more by visual than auditory cues, was more likely in animals that had experienced shock themselves, and was enhanced by familiarity with the shocked individual (Masserman et al. 1964).

So we have hard experimental evidence that rhesus macaques will suffer privation rather than see fellow members of their species endure pain. Which means that these organisms possess empathy for each other that is directly observable, and reflects the sort of empathic responses that used to be thought to be exclusive to humans.

Continuing, the authors write:

These examples, all from empirical reports, show that individuals of many species are distressed by the distress of a conspecific and will act to terminate the object's distress, even incurring risk to themselves. Humans and other animals exhibit the same robust effects of familiarity, past experience, and cue salience (Table 1), and parallels exist between the development of empathy in young humans and the phylogenetic emergence of empathy (de Waal 1996; Hoffman 1990, respectively). These facts suggest that empathy is a phylogenetically continuous phenomenon, as suggested by Charles Darwin more than a century ago (1871/1982).

So the notion that empathy, and as a consequence, altruistic behaviour, is a natural consequence of evolutionary processes can be traced in the scientific literature all the way back to Darwin. Which means tht an evolutionary explanation for altruism is anything but a recent development.

The paper concludes with:

The complex social world of primates requires the central nervous system to perceive the facial expressions, body postures, gestures, and voices of conspecifics accurately and quickly in order to generate a response (Brothers 1990; Byrne & Whiten 1988). Parsimoniously, the same nervous system link between perception and action that helps us to navigate the physical environment helps us navigate the social environment. The perception-action link allows for facile motor skill acquisition as well as facile social interaction, as we perceive external conditions and incorporate them into our current plan of action. In this way, the proximate model is intricately linked with the ultimate model. While natural selection acts on phenotypes, these phenotypes reflect the underlying physiology. Thus, the general design of the nervous system, created through millions of years of evolution, should be considered a factor in the evolution of emotional processes like empathy and overt behaviors like helping. In this way, the proximate and ultimate levels of analysis are intimately related.

So, the authors conclude that in order to act in an altruistic manner, what is needed is:

[1] An ability to relate perceptions to actions within an internal mental model of some sort (and the model in question doesn't have to be anywhere near as intricate as ours);

[2] An ability to relate responses of other organisms of the same species to a given external action, to our own likely actions to those same external actions (in short, "putting oneself in the shoes of the other");

[3] An ability to make judgements, with respect to future actions to take, that maximise shared benefit and minimise shared suffering.

Since the papers on the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex and human brain development mediated by ASPM cover the development of the relevant hardware required for this, it should not be surprising to conclude, as a result of observing empirically that rhesus macaques possess the necessary hardware to act in this manner, that our own hardware supporting this behaviour arises from the familiar process of common descent with modification, and indeed, the ASPM papers provide evidence with respect to the modifications that took place in our lineage.

Next, we have this:

Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay by Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B. M. de Waal, Nature, 425: 297-299 (18th September 2003). The abstract reads as follows:

During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model[sup]1[/sup], and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations[sup]2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8[/sup]. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal[sup]9, 10[/sup] that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances[sup]11, 12, 13[/sup]. However, we are not the only cooperative animals[sup]14[/sup], hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources[sup]15, 16[/sup]. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.

Oh dear, that evidence that evolution can produce such behaviour is starting to pile up. So, even capuchin monkeys possess what might be termed "a sense of fair play". Sadly, I don't have access to the full paper, but I suspect it will make very interesting reading for those who do have full access.

Let's see another paper, shall we? Namely:

Reconciliation And Consolation Among Chimpanzees by Frans B. M. de Waal and Angeline van Roosmalen, Behavioural Ecology & Sociobiology, 5(1): 55-66 (March 1979). Abstract quoted yet again below:

Summary 1. After agonistic interactions among chimpanzees, former opponents often come into non-violent body contact. The present paper gives a quantitative description of such contacts among the chimpanzees of a large semi-free-living colony at the Arnhem Zoo, in order to establish whether these post-conflict contacts are of a specific nature.

2. Our data indicate that former opponents preferentially make body contact with each other rather than with third partners. They tend to contact each other shortly after the conflict and show special behaviour patterns during these first contacts. Data on contacts of the aggressed party with third animals indicate that such contacts are characterized by the same special behaviour patterns as first interopponent contacts. These patterns are: 'kiss', 'embrace', 'hold-out-hand', 'submissive vocalization' and 'touch'.

3. Such interactions apparently serve an important socially homeostatic function and we termed them 'reconciliation' (i.e. contact between former opponents) and 'consolation' (i.e. contact of the aggressed party with a third animal). According to our data, 'kissing' is characteristic of reconciliation and 'embracing' of consolation.

This was a paper that performed a quantitative analysis of the requisite behaviours back in 1979. And which, moreover, contains what appears to be a direct empirical observation of chimpanzees acting socially to mitigate the results of violent conflict, and seek to minimise the occurrences thereof amongst their number. Which once again demonstrates that we are not unique in this vein by any stretch of the imagination.

Let's see what else is in the literature shall we?

Mechanisms Of Social Reciprocity In Three Primate Species: Symmetrical Relationship Characteristics Or Cognition? by Frans B. M. de Waal and Lesleigh M. Luttrell, Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2-4): 101-118 (1988). Again, here's the abstract:

Agonistic intervention behavior was observed in 23 chimpanzees, 50-60 rhesus monkeys, and 25 stumptail monkeys. Reciprocity correlations of interventions were determined while removing the effects of matrilineal kinship, proximity relations, and same-sex combination. It was considered likely that if significant reciprocity persisted, it was based on cognitive mechanisms. All 3 species exhibited significant reciprocity with regard to beneficial interventions, even after controlling for symmetrical traits. Harmful interventions were reciprocal among chimpanzees only. Both macaque species showed significantly inversed reciprocity in harmful interventions. Macaques rarely intervened against higher-ranking group members.

Next, we have:

Primates,A Natural Heritage Of Conflict Resolution by Frans B. M. de Waal, Science, 289: 586-590 (28th July 2000) (full paper downloadable from here). Once again ...

The traditional notion of aggression as an antisocial instinct is being replaced by a framework that considers it a tool of competition and negotiation. When survival depends on mutual assistance, the expression of aggression is constrained by the need to maintain beneficial relationships. Moreover, evolution has produced ways of countering its disruptive consequences. For example, chimpanzees kiss and embrace after fights, and other nonhuman primates engage in similar "reconciliations." Theoretical developments in this field carry implications for human aggression research. From families to high schools, aggressive conflict is subject to the same constraints known of cooperative animal societies. It is only when social relationships are valued that one can expect the full complement of natural checks and balances.

Well, I think that more or less wraps that up, don't you?

Basic empathy for others of our species, and to a varying extent, individuals of other species as well, is an integral part of us as human beings, and it has its origins in our primate social ancestry. Indeed, examples of that ancestry coming to the fore in other modern primates are well documented - the gorilla Binti Jua, who, in her zoo enclosure, rescued a three year old boy who fell into it, carried him to a place of safety, and guarded him from the other gorillas, until the zookeepers could carry the boy to a waiting ambulance. You can read more about this here, here and here. Presumably, Binti Jua knows nothing about an invisible magic man, and certainly not the invisible magic man that numerous supernaturalists contend is supposedly "necessary" for altruistic or ethical behaviour. That last link I just provided, incidentally, highlights the fact that scientists are increasingly aware of the presence of behaviours in other species that can be classified as 'ethical', and indeed, much of the primate research of Frans de Waal and others has brought this into sharp relief in recent years, as I documented above.

Incidentally, one of the papers above also cites the instance of Binti Jua (described briefly on page 19 of the paper, with a reference to an earlier paper describing the incident more comprehensively).

I think that should deal effectively with the "you need my magic man to be moral" canard, don't you?

Maybe we should abandon the word "morality" altogether and just directly discuss ways to make society as much a pain/suffering-free place as practically possible. Pain/pleasure for example is subjective but it's also very real. It's in the nerves. (And that is something even the most deranged sociopath can't deny, that some models of conduct lead to more pain and suffering than others. It may be hard to precisely determine which is more optimal, but you can't say they're equal.)

Whether or not they can be deemed equal depends entirely on what metric one employs to chose between them, which means applying a subjective metric by definition. In short, while not equal, you can't actually state that one way is better than another. Unless you claim omniscience, of course.

My main point is, there is suffering in the world and there are ways to minimize it if people behave in a certain way.

This presupposes that the reduction of suffering is a good thing.

This does not, in any way, point to a God and that's why WLC's moral argument is so blatantly bogus.

Indeed, but erecting bogus arguments against bogus arguments is, well, bogus. Erecting arguments that are entirely subjective in nature, as all moral arguments necessarily are, is easy. Defending them is another matter.

Kalamity Kraig is a fuckwit, and I haved little interest in his apologetic arse-gravy.

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

Wow! That's some riposte by Blue Flutterby to "Kalamity Kraig"!

Damasio's Descartes' Error draws some of the above literature, as well as others, to show that the mind (and morality) comes from a biological source.

Frans de Waal's book, Primates and Philosophers, is also a very interesting read.

In my humble opinion, Craig doesn't practise philosophy, he indulges in sophistry.

Kindest regards,

James

 

[Dogma's Demise]

In my humble opinion, Craig doesn't practise philosophy, he indulges in sophistry.

Nooo!! He's a sophisticated philosopher and great intellectual of this century!!! :lol:

 

[nemesiss]

In my humble opinion, Craig doesn't practise philosophy, he indulges in sophistry.

Nooo!! He's a sophisticated philosopher and great intellectual of this century!!! :lol:

well, this century is still young, we only had 11 and a half years of it.
his ethics only work in extremes, when it comes to gray area's, his ethics become useless.
when talking about WLC, i only have one thing to say to sums up any of his arguments: "speaks a lot words, says very little"

 

[Laurens]

Thanks for the feedback and responses everyone. It's much appreciated.

And for the record, I am still rather baffled as to how Craig managed to get a Ph.D. in philosophy...

 

[Dogma's Demise]

Philosophy as far as I can tell is a bit of a gray area, always room for debate, so maybe that's why WLC can get away with some things.

I mean it's not like science where you have a great degree of consensus and the scientific method to filter bad and good ideas. Why do you think issues in philosophy are constantly debated and re-debated over and over with no clear result?