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"Who created god?" is not a valid question (apparently)

arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
Fine. Whether you use parsimony, simplicity, or economy it is still the general concept. Regardless, parsimony does not equal validity based on parsimony alone. That is the general problem with Occam's Razor. I am surprised actually to see anyone invoke its usage since with wide consensus it is considered fallacious in philosophy. (Since we are arguing philosophy NOT physics.) I am shocked anyone was taught it in an actual philosophy class as well, it is more a footnote about a quirky and interesting principle that arose in history (so best taught in Western Civ) but was quickly debunked because of the ridiculousness of its argument.

Case in point, or let's use a sciencey one! Gravitational constant is variable. Therefore, instead of it just being variable, come up with a different unknown and unproven reason for why it is variable. Indeed! (Don't take this to mean I am saying DM doesn't exist, because that isn't what this paragraph is saying!)

So again I say, there is no evidence that simplicity, parsimony or economy of idea/data is the equivalent of truth. Not to mention, determining whether something actually posseses parsimony or simplicity or economy is a subjective measurement/judgment/means to an end. Therefore, using it to prove or disprove or weigh two theories against one another is, as priorly stated, fallacious.

borrofburi said:
Incorrect. In first order logic they say:
∀x∃y Cause(y, x)
First we have to define "AncestorCause(y,x)" where:
AncestorCause(y,x) := Cause(y,x) OR (AncestorCause(y,z) AND Cause(z,x))
Then they say that we either have infinite:
∃g∀x AncestorCause(g, x) AND (,¬Ã¢Ë†Æ’y AncestorCause(y, g))
And that that g is "god" and that obviously that g is a sentient omnipotent omniscient being who is both the most complex being in existence AND is so perfectly simple that occam's razor doesn't count, and that this argument proves you should give their church 10% of your income.

The problem is that I can derive a contradiction (I won't bore you with the actual math unless you really want to see it):
∃g∀y ,¬Cause(y, g) AND Cause(y, g)

In simpler less rigorous terminology:
They say that for all X, there is something that caused it, but they also say that there is an X that was not caused. This is a contradiction. That you say "well they define it that way" is immaterial: if they define it that way then their argument is invalid.

Moving on!
I actually would love to see your math. Not because I am arguing with you, but because I would honestly like it for its own sake.

But here again, you have failed to define it correctly. A deity is not the equivalent of X wherein X defines all that is in the universe, for the deity is again outside of the universe and unlike anything in the universe. (Though it can be expressed as having attributes similar to what is found in conceptual phenomena within the universe.) So when I said before that it is an invalid question to pose to people who say "All that begins has a cause and God is that cause," the key word to look at is "begins". Because the deity never began. Whether that is poor or not for a predicated principle could be determined but for the confines of the argument, the question isn't sound because of that principle. So it can't be X and X, it is D and X.

If you want an argument for that deity though, we could say back to the other post where we take the singularity and the abstract concepts, instead of the abstracts being inherent in the singularity, the now theoretically existant outside actor (deity) would be applying/adding them to the singularity and universe as it expands. Such a being would have to possess knowledge of what the universe needs to order it, possess direct knowledge of the universe itself and all its existence, therefore we say that being would be omniscient. Such a being would need to be omnipotent in order to create, add, and apply immaterial abstracts to another material and immaterial entity.


Let's move on more!


borrofburi said:
Your question has no more meaning than "why is there something rather than nothing?" or "why must the earth be so perfectly adapted to human life?" or the puddle's question "why does this hole fit me so well?"

I stand by the question. Since the topical question presupposes that causality exists, which cannot be empirically proven. Therefore, it is relevant.

borrofburi said:
I find it horribly ironic that here you say causality is just an idea, while in another thread you argue that logic/math/love are non-material things that exist whether man is around to perceive them or not.

Now it seems you have misread my post, two of them to be precise.

Causality cannot be empirically proven to exist. You can observe things in relation to other things but you can't observe the cause itself. (Such as ball hits ball and second ball moves, wagon moves ball appears to move but doesn't actually move, car falling into frozen lake, etc. You don't see the concept of causality, you see two actions you relate to one another and your only reason for supposing it is causal is that you have seen the things in relation to each other before. But then to assign causality, you are relying on it being a constant- that something that happened previously will continue to happen in the future. But since you have know direct knowledge of the specific association of the phenomena you witness, you cannot suppose causality.) Therefore, for empiricists, it can't exist outside of the mind. I went on to say, however, you can establish its existence but not from an empirical perspective.

In addition, in the other post, I never said abstracts were things in and of themselves absolutely. I said they could be things in and of themselves. I used them for a specific purpose in an argument, that doesn't mean it was held to be objectively true. That would need establishment.

Also, you misused irony.
borrofburi said:
Please demonstrate the possibility of the existence of a universe without causality. Also please demonstrate how that it is at all relevant to anything, especially more-so relevant than the idea that "it's not like the universe has to exist" or some other such "point".


If you are an empiricist, which could be a presumptious assumption so if it is I am sorry, explain how the universe possesses observable causality.
Because I can demonstrate a universe without it empirically- this one. Bellissimo!

So again, it is relevant to the topic because-
A) The underlying assumption was things must have cause
B) We can't empirically say anything has a cause since we can't observe the cause itself
C) Thus, the topic is invalid because causality cannot be empirically proven. Therefore it isn't a legitimate question from an empiricist perspective because it, the supposition, defeats empiricism itself. Neither deity or universe need a cause to exist, therefore one could say that the question is pointless because it empirically is illogical.
borrofburi said:
Seriously, did you miss the class where they discussed Occam's Razor?

Nope. Western Civ, but not taught in philosophy save as an example of a fallacious argument. I know physicists love it. Which is fine and dandy, one of my physics profs loved it but the thing about that is. .. just because you like something, doesn't make it correct. Yes yes, I understand, it is useful in equations, but we can all admit it is a shakey concept.
Well, at least I thought most people admitted that. I may have thought too much of most people!
borrofburi said:
Perhaps more importantly: you implicitly rule out the validity of the (often true) answer "I don't know" and the reality that "I don't know" can be the superior answer.
I also never ruled out the validity of, "I don't know." That is a valid answer. I was equating the concept of a universe just existing with no deity to the concept of a universe created by just an existing deity. They are both equally complex and equally simple.

borrofburi said:
While the topical question doesn't necessarily apply when someone says "all things except god must have a cause", it's hardly a better argument because it relies on special pleading even when phrased that way.

OH MY GOODNESS!
That was essentially the point, it doesn't apply here! So it isn't a valid question. Thus, again!, to answer the topical question, "No."

And! To be fair, it wasn't phrased that way. You phrased it very differently.
"All things that have beginning must have a cause." But defining a deity with no beginning isn't a walk in the park, it isn't just a statement. The arguments that must be built to come to that conclusion are philisophically extensive. (As the arguments for why the universe exists are scientifically extensive.)

borrofburi said:
Certainly, but then of course we return to the very standard yet still unanswered question: what evidence is there for a being so far removed from the universe?

There isn't evidence for a being. I never said there was. I think you can make an argument for one, as I mentioned earlier but it isn't evidenciary. It is philosphical. But philosophy is fun and that is what we have been engaging in for the last page, that is the purpose of the forums! Philisophical open debate! So. . there's that!
 
arg-fallbackName="borrofburi"/>
brewpanda said:
Fine. Whether you use parsimony, simplicity, or economy it is still the general concept. Regardless, parsimony does not equal validity based on parsimony alone. That is the general problem with Occam's Razor. I am surprised actually to see anyone invoke its usage since with wide consensus it is considered fallacious in philosophy. (Since we are arguing philosophy NOT physics.) I am shocked anyone was taught it in an actual philosophy class as well, it is more a footnote about a quirky and interesting principle that arose in history (so best taught in Western Civ) but was quickly debunked because of the ridiculousness of its argument.
...
So again I say, there is no evidence that simplicity, parsimony or economy of idea/data is the equivalent of truth. Not to mention, determining whether something actually posseses parsimony or simplicity or economy is a subjective measurement/judgment/means to an end. Therefore, using it to prove or disprove or weigh two theories against one another is, as priorly stated, fallacious.
Well then please, debunk it.

Please, define truth in this this context, for it is sounding ever more like Truthâ„¢.


brewpanda said:
If you want an argument for that deity though, we could say back to the other post where we take the singularity and the abstract concepts, instead of the abstracts being inherent in the singularity, the now theoretically existant outside actor (deity) would be applying/adding them to the singularity and universe as it expands. Such a being would have to possess knowledge of what the universe needs to order it, possess direct knowledge of the universe itself and all its existence, therefore we say that being would be omniscient. Such a being would need to be omnipotent in order to create, add, and apply immaterial abstracts to another material and immaterial entity.
This is filled with mere post-hoc assertions: you merely assert that the universe requires an outside actor to exist.

Moreover it's simply false that any creator of a universe would have to be omniscient: I can start a very large (read: non-trivial) number of processes that are very well ordered without having the full knowledge of every element in that process.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Your question has no more meaning than "why is there something rather than nothing?" or "why must the earth be so perfectly adapted to human life?" or the puddle's question "why does this hole fit me so well?"
I stand by the question. Since the topical question presupposes that causality exists, which cannot be empirically proven. Therefore, it is relevant.
The topical question presupposes that existence exists, that seems a far more egregious error. It also presupposes a lot of other things... So what? This is no more interesting than "what if we were really living in the matrix, and we were like, so totally, like, in tubes and stuff, and like we only thought that we were moving around in the world, but like the world is just data, in a machine, dude..."


brewpanda said:
Causality cannot be empirically proven to exist. You can observe things in relation to other things but you can't observe the cause itself. (Such as ball hits ball and second ball moves, wagon moves ball appears to move but doesn't actually move, car falling into frozen lake, etc. You don't see the concept of causality, you see two actions you relate to one another and your only reason for supposing it is causal is that you have seen the things in relation to each other before. But then to assign causality, you are relying on it being a constant- that something that happened previously will continue to happen in the future. But since you have know direct knowledge of the specific association of the phenomena you witness, you cannot suppose causality.) Therefore, for empiricists, it can't exist outside of the mind. I went on to say, however, you can establish its existence but not from an empirical perspective.
Yes, congratulations, you understand inductive learning. So what?


brewpanda said:
In addition, in the other post, I never said abstracts were things in and of themselves absolutely. I said they could be things in and of themselves.
Please, demonstrate.


brewpanda said:
Also, you misused irony.
No, I really didn't.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Please demonstrate the possibility of the existence of a universe without causality. Also please demonstrate how that it is at all relevant to anything, especially more-so relevant than the idea that "it's not like the universe has to exist" or some other such "point".
If you are an empiricist, which could be a presumptious assumption so if it is I am sorry, explain how the universe possesses observable causality.
Because I can demonstrate a universe without it empirically- this one. Bellissimo!
Oh? Please show me how, all things being equal, I can have the same cause produce different effects thereby actually violating causality.


brewpanda said:
So again, it is relevant to the topic because-
A) The underlying assumption was things must have cause
Which came from the theist...


brewpanda said:
C) Thus, the topic is invalid because causality cannot be empirically proven. Therefore it isn't a legitimate question from an empiricist perspective because it, the supposition, defeats empiricism itself. Neither deity or universe need a cause to exist, therefore one could say that the question is pointless because it empirically is illogical.
I guess computers don't work either, since they rely on science, which is empirical, which means science is self refuting, and thus computers don't work because they rest on self-refuting principles. Which makes me wonder: how are we having this conversation?


brewpanda said:
Well, at least I thought most people admitted that. I may have thought too much of most people!
What a bitchy self-superior pompous, narcissistic, and conceited comment.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Perhaps more importantly: you implicitly rule out the validity of the (often true) answer "I don't know" and the reality that "I don't know" can be the superior answer.
I also never ruled out the validity of, "I don't know." That is a valid answer. I was equating the concept of a universe just existing with no deity to the concept of a universe created by just an existing deity. They are both equally complex and equally simple.
I think I missed something, but these two statements do not have the same parsimony:
1. The universe exists and was created by X, and X just exists (and X is an omnicient being, and X is an omnipotent beign, and X says homosexuals will burn in hell, also X says hell exists, also X has control of you after you die, also....)
2. X just exists and X is the universe
The first, even ignoring the implicit extra religious assertions, is less parsimonious. Unless you phrase it with an implicit step, the first sentence must necessarily have n+1 assumptions/assertions, because (unless you phrase it with implicit steps), it will always require the extra assumption/assertion "god exists".


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
While the topical question doesn't necessarily apply when someone says "all things except god must have a cause", it's hardly a better argument because it relies on special pleading even when phrased that way.
OH MY GOODNESS!
That was essentially the point, it doesn't apply here! So it isn't a valid question. Thus, again!, to answer the topical question, "No."

And! To be fair, it wasn't phrased that way. You phrased it very differently.
"All things that have beginning must have a cause." But defining a deity with no beginning isn't a walk in the park, it isn't just a statement. The arguments that must be built to come to that conclusion are philisophically extensive. (As the arguments for why the universe exists are scientifically extensive.)
Hmm... Well then perhaps the original disagreement can be cleared up:
There seem to be two primary ways of forming the kalam:
(1) everything has a cause
(2) everything but god has a cause
For #1 it *is* a valid question to ask what caused god.
For #2 the valid question is: why does god magically get an exception?

If you agree with the above then I don't know why you bothered to disagree with my posts in this thread in the first place, for all I was saying was that "who created god?" can be a correct response.
 
arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
borrofburi said:
Well then please, debunk it.

Please, define truth in this this context, for it is sounding ever more like Truthâ„¢.

I just did, you even quote the paragraph. Seriously. One more time.

Philosophers reject the principle because-

A) Simplicity or Parsimony or Economy of idea or data can only be subjectively measured or judged. There is no objective measurement of simplicity therefore philosophically, it isn't valid. You can say Y is more simplistic or parsimonious than Z but you can't prove that objectively. Someone else can say the opposite with different means of measuring that attribute of parsimony.

B) In addition, there is no evidence that because something is parsimonious or simplistic it must be true or valid.

This is a philisophical argument. Therefore, it is fallaciously used.


borrofburi said:
This is filled with mere post-hoc assertions: you merely assert that the universe requires an outside actor to exist.

No. . .It was predicated on the principles of the other hypothetical in the other thread.

Basically, if S exists and AC exist but S did not make AC, then an outside actor D made AC to apply to U and S. This isn't to say this is what really happened, it could possibly have happened. But it is no more stupid than saying S made AC itself.
borrofburi said:
Moreover it's simply false that any creator of a universe would have to be omniscient: I can start a very large (read: non-trivial) number of processes that are very well ordered without having the full knowledge of every element in that process.

Ordered? As in concepts that explain intuitively or can be deduced to explain the process themselves?
And the argument was that the deity was assigning concepts to the processes already in place, not already in place but in the future will be in place, and possible processes; therefore it must know of the processes to assign rational concepts (and the concept of rationality itself) to them.


borrofburi said:
The topical question presupposes that existence exists, that seems a far more egregious error. It also presupposes a lot of other things... So what? This is no more interesting than "what if we were really living in the matrix, and we were like, so totally, like, in tubes and stuff, and like we only thought that we were moving around in the world, but like the world is just data, in a machine, dude..."

No its not. Because existence, at least subjectively percieved by the perciever, is an absolute. One can't dispute "I think therefore I am."

The topic was whether it was a valid question, and based on the principle of non-existant empirical causality, it can't be because god doesn't empirically need a cause to exist so it is an inherently flawed format. The question supposes that a cause is necessary, but that is erroneous.

Again, relevant. (I also never said it was the only thing presupposed in the argument.)

borrofburi said:
Yes, congratulations, you understand inductive learning. So what?

. . . .
So causality doesn't exist in a knowable way as a characteristic or attribute to the outside world but only as a concept. . .therefore you can't suppose that the natural world necessitates cause or is necessitated by cause.


borrofburi said:
Please, demonstrate.

I did in the other thread. Do you want it here as well?
Do you want it to be demonstrated for them not to be things in and of themselves also? We could go back and forth demonstrating either all day.

borrofburi said:
No, I really didn't.

Mmm. . .you did. You really did. Its cool though, a lot of people make that mistake!


borrofburi said:
Oh? Please show me how, all things being equal, I can have the same cause produce different effects thereby actually violating causality.

Which only serves to disprove empirical causality more. . .which is what I said. . . I am beginning to wonder about you. . .
Wow. . .really? I mean. . .really! Your statement argues my case even further that empirical causality DOES NOT EXIST. You aren't observing the cause, you are observing a thing in relation to another thing and then a result. You are making the mental assumption that the first thing's interaction with the second thing is the cause of the result, but you didn't witness the cause itself.

The principle of nonexistent empirical causality is not something I just pulled out of my arse. We have known about it philosophically for awhile now, about 200+ years.


borrofburi said:
Which came from the theist...

Which I also said was flawed. So the better thing to ask said theist is, why must things have a cause?


borrofburi said:
I guess computers don't work either, since they rely on science, which is empirical, which means science is self refuting, and thus computers don't work because they rest on self-refuting principles. Which makes me wonder: how are we having this conversation?

This is a broad and misapplied argument that isn't a parallel.

If the topic is predicated on causality, causality must be proven to exist.
If causality does not exist, but the argument wrongfully assumes it does, it destroys both theist and nontheist argument alike.


borrofburi said:
What a bitchy self-superior pompous, narcissistic, and conceited comment.

Like your own have been? Brilliant! We are on the same page!

But honestly you also misinterpret me. I was saying with genuine earnestness that the fault was my own for imposing my limited and narrow understanding on others besides myself. So I am admitting error in being arrogant in my assumptions in the first place. Albeit, the latter statement can appear to be more condescending than what it was meant to be, so my apologies for that. I was simply trying to hurriedly have fun, and I didn't think about the broad implications of that statement.


borrofburi said:
I think I missed something, but these two statements do not have the same parsimony:
1. The universe exists and was created by X, and X just exists (and X is an omnicient being, and X is an omnipotent beign, and X says homosexuals will burn in hell, also X says hell exists, also X has control of you after you die, also....)
2. X just exists and X is the universe
The first, even ignoring the implicit extra religious assertions, is less parsimonious. Unless you phrase it with an implicit step, the first sentence must necessarily have n+1 assumptions/assertions, because (unless you phrase it with implicit steps), it will always require the extra assumption/assertion "god exists".

I never defined X in that way. I don't think X was ever defined that way. What deity are we talking about precisely anyway?
Seems like you are defining X with your own conceptions.

I was saying, since few things are considered to just exist and common nontheist theory suggests the universe had a cause (though that is empirically not sound) it is tantamount to saying a deity exists and caused the universe. Given the common conceptions about the world, it is assumed, as fallacious as it is, that things have a cause. Therefore, arguing for something that has a cause one way or the other is equally parsimonious.


(The second theory or statement has inherent assumptions as does the first. And again, parsimony is subjectively judged. We could categorize and list all the principles and arguments for each statement, count them up and then try to quantify parsimony but I am sure some of the principles and arguments for both statemenst are complex themselves.)

borrofburi said:
Hmm... Well then perhaps the original disagreement can be cleared up:
There seem to be two primary ways of forming the kalam:
(1) everything has a cause
(2) everything but god has a cause
For #1 it *is* a valid question to ask what caused god.
For #2 the valid question is: why does god magically get an exception?

If you agree with the above then I don't know why you bothered to disagree with my posts in this thread in the first place, for all I was saying was that "who created god?" can be a correct response.

I disagreed with your definition of the deity, since it is more complex than #2 includes or the question to 2 includes. Plus it is inherently negative. The phrasing implicitly rejects any rational reason or explanation of the deity, which isn't a just way to argue.

I also took issue with presupposing causality itself. If I recall, my initial response wasn't to you. So both theist and nontheist alike in this case are supposing something they cannot suppose. Though, at least in the case of the theist who says "my deity doesn't need a cause" they are on the right track of understanding that one doesn't need a cause, while the person who asks them why presupposes that the notion of causelessness is errant, which it isn't.
 
arg-fallbackName="borrofburi"/>
brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Well then please, debunk it.

Please, define truth in this this context, for it is sounding ever more like Truthâ„¢.

I just did, you even quote the paragraph. Seriously. One more time.

Philosophers reject the principle because-

A) Simplicity or Parsimony or Economy of idea or data can only be subjectively measured or judged. There is no objective measurement of simplicity therefore philosophically, it isn't valid. You can say Y is more simplistic or parsimonious than Z but you can't prove that objectively. Someone else can say the opposite with different means of measuring that attribute of parsimony.

B) In addition, there is no evidence that because something is parsimonious or simplistic it must be true or valid.

This is a philisophical argument. Therefore, it is fallaciously used.
A is false, otherwise parsimony would not be able to be used in this system.

B again fundamentally misunderstands Occam's Razor, and it continues to amaze me that you have such a shallow conceptualization of it (hint: no one is arguing that parsimony proves something is The Truthâ„¢).


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Moreover it's simply false that any creator of a universe would have to be omniscient: I can start a very large (read: non-trivial) number of processes that are very well ordered without having the full knowledge of every element in that process.
Ordered? As in concepts that explain intuitively or can be deduced to explain the process themselves?
And the argument was that the deity was assigning concepts to the processes already in place, not already in place but in the future will be in place, and possible processes; therefore it must know of the processes to assign rational concepts (and the concept of rationality itself) to them.
Re: ordered: sure. But I merely meant that the complicated emergent properties of the universe did not themselves have to be planned for someone to start the processes that would create them (and definitely do not have to exist in the mind of someone who would start such a process).


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
The topical question presupposes that existence exists, that seems a far more egregious error. It also presupposes a lot of other things... So what? This is no more interesting than "what if we were really living in the matrix, and we were like, so totally, like, in tubes and stuff, and like we only thought that we were moving around in the world, but like the world is just data, in a machine, dude..."
No its not. Because existence, at least subjectively percieved by the perciever, is an absolute. One can't dispute "I think therefore I am."

The topic was whether it was a valid question, and based on the principle of non-existant empirical causality, it can't be because god doesn't empirically need a cause to exist so it is an inherently flawed format. The question supposes that a cause is necessary, but that is erroneous.

Again, relevant. (I also never said it was the only thing presupposed in the argument.)
Actually, "I think therefore I am" is rather disputed, here is a good place to start: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_think_therefore_i_am#Criticism

The topic is whether or not it's a valid question, however your response is rather like the following scenario. Someone asks if it's a valid question to ask if red wine goes well with meat. You respond "no, because you presuppose that time exists to ask the question". Or generally some other similarly inane sophism. Asking any question presupposes causality OTHER than some very specific questions like "why does causality seem to exist?", but even the asking of that question presupposes that there is some sort of cause and effect such that one can have a state of pre-asking, a state of asking, and a state of post-asking.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Yes, congratulations, you understand inductive learning. So what?
So causality doesn't exist in a knowable way as a characteristic or attribute to the outside world but only as a concept. . .therefore you can't suppose that the natural world necessitates cause or is necessitated by cause.
I think I'm going to follow the logic of everything you say with sophism about whether existence exists:
So existence doesn't exist in a knowable way as a characteristic or attribute to the outside world, but only as a concept. . .therefore you can't suppose that the natural world exists.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Please, demonstrate.
I did in the other thread. Do you want it here as well?
Do you want it to be demonstrated for them not to be things in and of themselves also? We could go back and forth demonstrating either all day.
I really want you to demonstrate how math, love, logic can exist in ways other than models of the universe in our (or other) minds (other than by mere assertion that they do/can).


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
No, I really didn't.
Mmm. . .you did. You really did. Its cool though, a lot of people make that mistake!
Except I didn't. That you would be so presumptuous as to assert you understand my true meaning so well as to tell me that the words I chose to communicate my true meaning do not successfully do so is quite arrogant indeed. You can say I was wrong, that I misunderstood you and thus my expression of a perception was expressing an incorrect perception (which currently seems more likely than not); however to say that my perception itself was wrong (or my communication of that perception) is going to need a hell of a lot more than baldfaced assertions.

Read: asserting that I used the word "irony" wrong and then reasserting it when challenged is hardly convincing. It would be far wiser to provide reasons why you think "irony" was an improper word to express what I really meant.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Oh? Please show me how, all things being equal, I can have the same cause produce different effects thereby actually violating causality.
Which only serves to disprove empirical causality more. . .which is what I said. . . I am beginning to wonder about you. . .
Wow. . .really? I mean. . .really! Your statement argues my case even further that empirical causality DOES NOT EXIST. You aren't observing the cause, you are observing a thing in relation to another thing and then a result. You are making the mental assumption that the first thing's interaction with the second thing is the cause of the result, but you didn't witness the cause itself.

The principle of nonexistent empirical causality is not something I just pulled out of my arse. We have known about it philosophically for awhile now, about 200+ years.
By asking you to demonstrate something I've disproved causality?

You seem to be using the word cause in a very odd way, perhaps you could clarify.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Which came from the theist...
Which I also said was flawed. So the better thing to ask said theist is, why must things have a cause?
Certainly, but that doesn't make the questions "what caused god" and "why doesn't god have a cause" invalid.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
I guess computers don't work either, since they rely on science, which is empirical, which means science is self refuting, and thus computers don't work because they rest on self-refuting principles. Which makes me wonder: how are we having this conversation?
This is a broad and misapplied argument that isn't a parallel.

If the topic is predicated on causality, causality must be proven to exist.
If causality does not exist, but the argument wrongfully assumes it does, it destroys both theist and nontheist argument alike.
I'm pretty sure everything we do is predicated on causality. When I make an egg in the morning, I presume an awful lot of causal relationships, from putting force on a dial causing it to turn, to the fire on the metal causing it to heat up. Yet I hardly think you disprove my making of an egg...

Moreover non-theists don't have to have an argument: there is no argument needed to say "I don't see sufficient reason to posit, accept, or believe in the existence of a god or gods". If both theist and non-theist argument are "destroyed", then the non-theist "wins".


brewpanda said:
But honestly you also misinterpret me. I was saying with genuine earnestness that the fault was my own for imposing my limited and narrow understanding on others besides myself. So I am admitting error in being arrogant in my assumptions in the first place. Albeit, the latter statement can appear to be more condescending than what it was meant to be, so my apologies for that. I was simply trying to hurriedly have fun, and I didn't think about the broad implications of that statement.
Ah. Ok.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
I think I missed something, but these two statements do not have the same parsimony:
1. The universe exists and was created by X, and X just exists (and X is an omnicient being, and X is an omnipotent beign, and X says homosexuals will burn in hell, also X says hell exists, also X has control of you after you die, also....)
2. X just exists and X is the universe
The first, even ignoring the implicit extra religious assertions, is less parsimonious. Unless you phrase it with an implicit step, the first sentence must necessarily have n+1 assumptions/assertions, because (unless you phrase it with implicit steps), it will always require the extra assumption/assertion "god exists".
I never defined X in that way. I don't think X was ever defined that way. What deity are we talking about precisely anyway?
Seems like you are defining X with your own conceptions.
I have met many theists who would agree with the above X (err, the X is #1); and really, most incarnations of the kalaam are arguing precisely for #1 because they say "god just exists" makes more sense than "the universe just exists".


brewpanda said:
I was saying, since few things are considered to just exist and common nontheist theory suggests the universe had a cause (though that is empirically not sound) it is tantamount to saying a deity exists and caused the universe. Given the common conceptions about the world, it is assumed, as fallacious as it is, that things have a cause. Therefore, arguing for something that has a cause one way or the other is equally parsimonious.
That you think the big bang necessitates the universe to be caused is a severe misunderstanding... I think (any doubt I have stems primarily from uncertainty of your meaning). And again you misunderstand parsimony...


brewpanda said:
(The second theory or statement has inherent assumptions as does the first. And again, parsimony is subjectively judged. We could categorize and list all the principles and arguments for each statement, count them up and then try to quantify parsimony but I am sure some of the principles and arguments for both statemenst are complex themselves.)
What inherent assumptions? And again parsimony is not subjectively judged.


brewpanda said:
borrofburi said:
Hmm... Well then perhaps the original disagreement can be cleared up:
There seem to be two primary ways of forming the kalam:
(1) everything has a cause
(2) everything but god has a cause
For #1 it *is* a valid question to ask what caused god.
For #2 the valid question is: why does god magically get an exception?

If you agree with the above then I don't know why you bothered to disagree with my posts in this thread in the first place, for all I was saying was that "who created god?" can be a correct response.
I disagreed with your definition of the deity, since it is more complex than #2 includes or the question to 2 includes. Plus it is inherently negative. The phrasing implicitly rejects any rational reason or explanation of the deity, which isn't a just way to argue.
Err, #2 presumes nothing about the deity labeled "god" and is an accurate statement for all of those who I've ever found arguing that version of the kalaam.


brewpanda said:
I also took issue with presupposing causality itself. If I recall, my initial response wasn't to you. So both theist and nontheist alike in this case are supposing something they cannot suppose. Though, at least in the case of the theist who says "my deity doesn't need a cause" they are on the right track of understanding that one doesn't need a cause, while the person who asks them why presupposes that the notion of causelessness is errant, which it isn't.
1) I think your crticism of presupposing causality is rather silly (as is clear above)
2) in the case where the question is valid the theist has already presupposed causality, the non-theist is merely going along with a large number of assumptions and taking them one step further to ask "what caused god?"
 
arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
I.
It isn't false. There isn't an objective measurement for what is parsimonious and what is simplisitic. A computer program that can discover or assign natural law doesn't in any way prove an objective measurement of parsimony. I don't even see how that logically follows.

Holy shit we made a program that can sift data and find relevant laws to that data. That has nothing to do with Occam's Razor other than the program could theoretically use the Newtonian concept of the principle, but that isn't applicable philosophically since measurement is still subjective. You can design an equation that sifts for simplicity, but your defining the parameters of the definition, making it again subjective.

II.
It doesn't misunderstand it, it doesn't at all. I didn't say that parsimony proves truth, but Occam's Razor stipulates that the principle of parsimony likely/has the probability to lead to truth, which is an errant supposition.

III.
It is disputed by idealists, but it is rationally debated based on context. It doesn't matter the definition of the word exist in so far as defining material or immaterial. The definition that matters is "has entity, nature, being or essence." The fact that you can reflect and recognize individual identity even if it is simply conceptually, means you are in being as essence or thing in and of itself. Even if you are part of some grand machine, you are individually aware of your own perception and cognition but not the machine's making you an independent entity with existence. Douchey McDouchenstein Neo still "existed" as an individual entity despite the nonactuality of his initial environment.

IV.
The purpose of the refutation was to state that by assuming causality exists, it defeats its own argument. There are certain generally accepted principles by rational people, namely that time exists (well, haha! Not exactly) and that we percieve some reflection of an actual world, therefore the question of time relating to meat and wine is less sensical. Your example is more far removed than the notion of causality and its relationship to a deity or universe when questions arise specifically about causality of said deity and universe. So it was directly connected.

V.
Empirical causality isn't tantamount to idealism or solipsism. You are misunderstanding the concept. A lot of people, you included, think because they personally see something in relation to a thing and what they assign to be a result, that necessarily means they see a cause. But that is empirically false.
I don't think it is possible for me to explain it to you in a way you can comprehend, but you can try looking it up. Hume would be tickled pink.

VI.
I can't demonstrate that love exists outside the mind. I don't think it can be demonstrated to exist inside the mind either. It is too abstract conceptually to make any resolute claims as to its nature. I could believe it exists outside the mind, I could believe it exists inside the mind. But anything beyond belief gets iffy.

However! I can demonstrate there is reason, and I stress this word reason, to suppose that math or logic exist outside of the mind, or physical laws. Namely, in terms of identity, quantity, spatial relationship, geometric planes as examples. For instance, identity. (The condition of being oneself or itself and not another.) We can observe a tree and say that tree has its own identity. It is distinct from the phenomena of other trees. We can quantify it and recognize the condition of its existence as itself. However, should we not be there to observe the tree, this doesn't change the fact that identity in that it is distinct in itself and quantity exist for that phenomena. Certainly no one is there to recognize the qualities, but that doesn't mean the qualities don't exist. These qualities can be formulated into a unified application to the universe. All things that exist themselves have identity, in that they aren't a thing not themselves and they have quantity. Law of Noncontradiction fits as well, as various others do. But in general, one need not experience the identity or quantity of tree for it to exist. We can say that numerically, we need not experience 2+3=5 for it to exist. It exists independent of experience without self containment of concept- 3 is not contained within the concept of 2 or 5 in the concept of 3. So if there are five oranges, those five oranges exist whether I or you percieve them or not. But again, this is dependent on what we limitedly discern from the universe.

Now of course, we could also say we don't percieve the tree in itself or the oranges themselves, the noumena of it if you will. Therefore we can't know that quantity or identity necessarily apply to it/them in itself/themselves. Which is fair. RedYellow made the argument earlier.

VII.
Causality was never defined, not be me or you. Thus to say it is ironic that I defined empirical causality as nonexistent as compared to when I hypothetically argued the actual existence of abstracts in another thread, is a misuse of the term irony. (Which simply means the use of words to convey a meaning opposite the literal or actual meaning or an outcome that is contradictory to what would otherwise be expected.)

VIII.
No by stating different results from the same relationships of things disproves empirical causality.
Cause- the act or reason that exists in such a way that it leads to a specific result. Be it material, efficient or formal.

IX.
It does if an empiricist is supposing empirical causality, which is illogical for the empiricist to suppose.

X.
Ah, I am not disproving that you make the egg. I am saying the predicated causes are conceptions and are not empirically known.

XI.
Not if the nontheist supposes that universe has cause, which many do. (Hence most theories on "beginning" of the universe.)

XII.
But that is subjectively defining a deity. If you are using that definition here, then I misunderstood. I thought we were using something more nebulous.

XIII.
It isn't misunderstanding parsimony. You asked me to clarify your misunderstanding of irony as I saw it, so here again you should probably follow your own advice and stipulate what you think I am misunderstanding.

Principle of Parsimony- Use the simplest route of explanation.
But it has very narrow and specific qualifications and criteria under which it can be used scientifically. Philisophically, as priorly stated, it isn't generally accepted.

But judging what is the "simplest" is subjective. The principles inherent in the statements "Universe exists" and "God exists and God created the universe" could have varying degrees of complexity or simplicity themselves, meaning the criteria by which we judge their complexity or parsimony, is subjective.

XIV.
Yes it is. Again, to say simplest route of explanation, assumes that one can measure the simplest route. Which one can't necessarily do unless the parameters used for measurement are priorly defined and accepted to be true and valid.

XV.
It implicity shows derision for the concept of a god without cause because of the facetious use of the word "magically." Not saying it can't be used, it simply isn't a just way to entertain an argument and it will be met with contempt by I would imagine, most theists. Your previous definition of a deity I don't think was abstract or "objective" enough.

XVI.
1) Fine. We each think the other is silly. Superb, something agreed on.
2) But the theist admits that cause isn't necessary. Beyond that, both the position of the theist is fallacious, as stated, and the retort to the position. I think it is a reasonable criticism to ask that critics act with equivalent or more reason than the people they seek to engage philosophically with.
 
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brewpanda said:
I.
It isn't false. There isn't an objective measurement for what is parsimonious and what is simplisitic. A computer program that can discover or assign natural law doesn't in any way prove an objective measurement of parsimony. I don't even see how that logically follows.

Holy shit we made a program that can sift data and find relevant laws to that data. That has nothing to do with Occam's Razor other than the program could theoretically use the Newtonian concept of the principle, but that isn't applicable philosophically since measurement is still subjective. You can design an equation that sifts for simplicity, but your defining the parameters of the definition, making it again subjective.
It sorts the solutions on an accuracy vs parsimony scale and reports the pareto front. That you consider such a definition of parsimony subjective is no more interesting than saying that accuracy is subjective.


brewpanda said:
II.
It doesn't misunderstand it, it doesn't at all. I didn't say that parsimony proves truth, but Occam's Razor stipulates that the principle of parsimony likely/has the probability to lead to truth, which is an errant supposition.
No it doesn't, even a simple wikipedia read clarifies that:
Occam's razor is not an embargo against the positing of any kind of entity, or a recommendation of the simplest theory come what may[37] (note that simplest theory is something like "only I exist" or "nothing exists").

The other things in question are the evidential support for the theory.[38] Therefore, according to the principle, a simpler but less correct theory should not be preferred over a more complex but more correct one. It is this fact which gives the lie to the common misinterpretation of Occam's Razor that "the simplest" one is usually the correct one.

For instance, classical physics is simpler than more recent theories; nonetheless it should not be preferred over them, because it is demonstrably wrong in certain respects.

Occam's razor is used to adjudicate between theories that have already passed 'theoretical scrutiny' tests, and which are equally well-supported by the evidence.[39] Furthermore, it may be used to prioritize empirical testing between two equally plausible but unequally testable hypotheses; thereby minimizing costs and wastes while increasing chances of falsification of the simpler-to-test hypothesis.
That you continue to strawman the principle as dictating Truthâ„¢ based only on parsimony is asinine.


brewpanda said:
III.
It is disputed by idealists, but it is rationally debated based on context. It doesn't matter the definition of the word exist in so far as defining material or immaterial. The definition that matters is "has entity, nature, being or essence." The fact that you can reflect and recognize individual identity even if it is simply conceptually, means you are in being as essence or thing in and of itself. Even if you are part of some grand machine, you are individually aware of your own perception and cognition but not the machine's making you an independent entity with existence. Douchey McDouchenstein Neo still "existed" as an individual entity despite the nonactuality of his initial environment.
Out of context this makes extremely little sense. Do you even bother to read your posts for clarity?

But I finally figured it out: this is a response to the fact that there are those who dispute "cogito ergo sum". I fully agree that it doesn't matter in the same way that I agree that the idea that "maybe we're all totally in the matrix right now" is silly and doesn't matter, and in the same way that "maybe the universe was created just 5 minutes ago with our memories so in tact it seems like it's been around for a long time" is silly and doesn't matter, and in the same way "maybe cause and effect doesn't exist" is silly and doesn't matter. Oh wait...


brewpanda said:
IV.
The purpose of the refutation was to state that by assuming causality exists, it defeats its own argument. There are certain generally accepted principles by rational people, namely that time exists (well, haha! Not exactly) and that we percieve some reflection of an actual world, therefore the question of time relating to meat and wine is less sensical. Your example is more far removed than the notion of causality and its relationship to a deity or universe when questions arise specifically about causality of said deity and universe. So it was directly connected.
I think you're wrong, in general we *have* to presume that some form of cause and effect exists (which presumes time, and some sort of objective reality), and that our perceptions have some degree of accuracy, else everything becomes incoherent. So from my perspective both the question of time relating to meat and causality relating to meat are nonsensical.


brewpanda said:
V.
Empirical causality isn't tantamount to idealism or solipsism. You are misunderstanding the concept. A lot of people, you included, think because they personally see something in relation to a thing and what they assign to be a result, that necessarily means they see a cause. But that is empirically false.
I don't think it is possible for me to explain it to you in a way you can comprehend, but you can try looking it up. Hume would be tickled pink.
Are you trying to say you *don't* presume causality when you make an egg for breakfast?


brewpanda said:
VI.
I can't demonstrate that love exists outside the mind. I don't think it can be demonstrated to exist inside the mind either. It is too abstract conceptually to make any resolute claims as to its nature. I could believe it exists outside the mind, I could believe it exists inside the mind. But anything beyond belief gets iffy.

However! I can demonstrate there is reason, and I stress this word reason, to suppose that math or logic exist outside of the mind, or physical laws. Namely, in terms of identity, quantity, spatial relationship, geometric planes as examples. For instance, identity. (The condition of being oneself or itself and not another.) We can observe a tree and say that tree has its own identity. It is distinct from the phenomena of other trees. We can quantify it and recognize the condition of its existence as itself. However, should we not be there to observe the tree, this doesn't change the fact that identity in that it is distinct in itself and quantity exist for that phenomena. Certainly no one is there to recognize the qualities, but that doesn't mean the qualities don't exist. These qualities can be formulated into a unified application to the universe. All things that exist themselves have identity, in that they aren't a thing not themselves and they have quantity. Law of Noncontradiction fits as well, as various others do. But in general, one need not experience the identity or quantity of tree for it to exist. We can say that numerically, we need not experience 2+3=5 for it to exist. It exists independent of experience without self containment of concept- 3 is not contained within the concept of 2 or 5 in the concept of 3. So if there are five oranges, those five oranges exist whether I or you percieve them or not. But again, this is dependent on what we limitedly discern from the universe.

Now of course, we could also say we don't percieve the tree in itself or the oranges themselves, the noumena of it if you will. Therefore we can't know that quantity or identity necessarily apply to it/them in itself/themselves. Which is fair. RedYellow made the argument earlier.
Your belief is hardly relevant, I can believe there's an undetectable dragon in my garage, but so what?

As far as your silly argument that the laws of identity and noncontradiction are abstract absolutes that actually exist, we have many threads on TAG, here are a couple (turns out TAG is really hard to search for):
http://forums.leagueofreason.org.uk/viewtopic.php?p=84692#p84692
http://forums.leagueofreason.org.uk/viewtopic.php?p=91179#p91179


brewpanda said:
VII.
Causality was never defined, not be me or you. Thus to say it is ironic that I defined empirical causality as nonexistent as compared to when I hypothetically argued the actual existence of abstracts in another thread, is a misuse of the term irony. (Which simply means the use of words to convey a meaning opposite the literal or actual meaning or an outcome that is contradictory to what would otherwise be expected.)
That you were, so far as I could tell, defending things I see as mere concepts as real existing entities while portraying something I see as fundamental as a mere concept to be ignored or justified *was* contrary to what I would have otherwise expected... So how precisely does that not fit the definition of ironic?


brewpanda said:
VIII.
No by stating different results from the same relationships of things disproves empirical causality.
How?

brewpanda said:
IX.
It does if an empiricist is supposing empirical causality, which is illogical for the empiricist to suppose.
Out of context this is meaningless because there is no subject.

brewpanda said:
X.
Ah, I am not disproving that you make the egg. I am saying the predicated causes are conceptions and are not empirically known.
So it is not empirically known that putting force on the switch will turn it, causing it to mechanically open a valve that will allow the pressure of the gas system to push molecules out of the pipe which will produce a flame that will impart heat onto my pan thereby cooking my egg? This seems quite contrary to every day life of humans, yourself included.

brewpanda said:
XI.
Not if the nontheist supposes that universe has cause, which many do. (Hence most theories on "beginning" of the universe.)
A non-theist may be defeated without the non-theists non-theism being defeated. As far as theories on "beginning" of the universe: you are equivocating the word universe. In english sometimes the same word means different things; a theory on the beginning of the universe means "the start of the universe as we know it" and NOT "the beginning of all there is". Sometimes the word "universe" means "space-time as we know it" and sometimes universe means "everything there is"; to equivocate the two is incorrect.

brewpanda said:
XII.
But that is subjectively defining a deity. If you are using that definition here, then I misunderstood. I thought we were using something more nebulous.
Out of context this is meaningless because there is no subject. It's ok I *think* I can infer this one from looking back in time (read: reading through my post, but why should I have to?) (but upon second reflection I'm pretty sure my attempted inference is wrong).

Of course, by that definition of the word "subjective" any definition of the word "god" must be subjective because no definition of "god" can encompass all possible definitions of the word "god". Perhaps you should define which of the definitions of the word god you thought we were using...

brewpanda said:
XIII.
It isn't misunderstanding parsimony. You asked me to clarify your misunderstanding of irony as I saw it, so here again you should probably follow your own advice and stipulate what you think I am misunderstanding.

Principle of Parsimony- Use the simplest route of explanation.
But it has very narrow and specific qualifications and criteria under which it can be used scientifically. Philisophically, as priorly stated, it isn't generally accepted.

But judging what is the "simplest" is subjective. The principles inherent in the statements "Universe exists" and "God exists and God created the universe" could have varying degrees of complexity or simplicity themselves, meaning the criteria by which we judge their complexity or parsimony, is subjective.
Parsimony is about the number of variables, constants, and functions in an equation (and since equations can be represented by trees, you can also say that it's the number of nodes in the tree describing an equation). Or in logic, it's about the number of predicates required for accurate CNF... Etc.

brewpanda said:
XV.
It implicity shows derision for the concept of a god without cause because of the facetious use of the word "magically." Not saying it can't be used, it simply isn't a just way to entertain an argument and it will be met with contempt by I would imagine, most theists. Your previous definition of a deity I don't think was abstract or "objective" enough.
Err... since the general definition of magic is that of supernatural powers, and since any deity is supernatural by definition, deities magically do things...

brewpanda said:
But the theist admits that cause isn't necessary. Beyond that, both the position of the theist is fallacious, as stated, and the retort to the position. I think it is a reasonable criticism to ask that critics act with equivalent or more reason than the people they seek to engage philosophically with.
I find it funny that you think your questioning of causality can be used to selectively declare an argument about god fallacious... If you can so deny causality then ALL arguments are fallacious.

Moreover, you deny that I'm allowed to accept something "for the sake of argument" (as the colloquial phrase goes)?
 
arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
Instead of quoting you line by line, and doing the whole back and forth thing, I will just state what the differences as to what we are arguing, reaffirming my argument, trying to clarify my reasoning. I hope that is acceptable.

On Occam's Razor and Parsimony

Parsimony is different than accuracy. But defining simplicity isn't absolute as parsimony doesn't have an absolute standard. You can quantify parts of principle, data or concept but rating those in comparison to other parts can be subjective because the quanta and figures themselves might possess different levels of simplicity or complexity.

Again, in addition, this application is used in science. As I said, parsimony has its merits in physics in that it has some degree of measurability within certain criteria, with set variables and quantifications but it lacks merit in philosophy since defining something as parsimonious is subjective when we aren't dealing with empirics or observational data. Rather, in philosophy, we are dealing with the conceptual.

I didn't say any of that which you highlighted in your wikipedia citation (Really? Wikipedia? Ugh), I didn't say it was an "embargo" nor did I say it absolutely recommends the simplest in all cases. In its primitive form it suggests the simplest above others but I did stipulate that it has altered meaning.
Towards the latter statement in this citation about scrutiny, this concept I did cite earlier, I specifically refered to earlier. If you read my post before I stated if you were invoking the use in comparison between these two theories philisophical evidence can easily support either claim both lacking testability.

I also did not dictate truth. . .you misused the principle and applied the use it maintains in physics to philosophy. You also failed to read my complete summation of the various ways the principle can be meant.



Causality

Except for certain philisophical arguments, both parameters of existence and concepts of cause and effect are necessary.

I never said we didn't have to presume or assume causality. In fact, I specifically said we presume it conceptually by our experience so that we might order the phenomena we percieve by relation to ourselves and other phenomena. I wasn't disputing that causality has merit, nor was I disputing causality as a concept existing. I was disputing that causality can be empirically known. So supposing causality exists in an argument between an empiricist and anyone else, one should first define the boundaries and definition of that causality. Since empirics can't prove or know causality, other means are needed to establish its existence and reasonablity.

If one associates B result with A cause but A cause doesn't always produce B result, but sometimes C result than logically, A might not be a cause of either. So empirically, you can't say that A caused B or C since you didn't observe it directly and because the results are variable to the supposed cause. (This is not to say that conceptually, a cause can't have multiple results. It is simply, if we are considering empirics we observe things in relation to one another but if the things in relation to one another remain constant but the results vary, the cause has not been empirically observed.)

I know you will sit there and say, "You have to do more than refute you have to prove." But I have already given you the argument for why causality doesn't empirically exist. And I am afraid we have arrived at the end of the line. You can call it arrogant of me, which is fine, but if you can't comprehend it, that is your limitation. It can only be expressed a set number of ways before explaining it further is wasted energy. And I could sit here explaining it over and over and you would respond the same way. (Yes, this is an example of conceptual causality itself!)


There is event X and event Y. In their association to one another, we then get cause and consequence. We can observe X and Y. We then induce, with no empirics to support the induction, that X and Y are cause and consequence. But we are in the habit of necessarily connecting and tying the two conceptually because we are accustomed to the events as we percieve how they relate to one another. The sequence we observe leads us to suppose causation. But we can't prove, empirics, that cause and consequence are necessarily connected.

Another way? We cannot know or observe the necessary connection between phenomena or things and thus we cannot know the relationship between cause and effect empirically. Basically, until we know what exists- noumena, we can't know the association between things that exist. Even with phenomena, we can't know what it is that we are observing empirically, therefore we can't know the relationship it has with other phenomena, things, objects, environment. Any conclusions we draw about the necessary connection isn't empirical, it is purely conceptually arrived at.

Therefore, if we don't have a priori knowledge of cause of effect, result or occurence we have no more principles from which to rationally deduce conclusions as to the cause. We can observe this happened, this other thing happened. We can observe that they seem to be connected and of relation to each other but we don't know why or how. We ultimately then rely on inductive reasoning to determine and order nature. We then go further and assume that what comes will be similar to what was, ie future like the past.

This is not to say that causation is inherently bad, because obviously we run our lives under the conception that causation is a given. And, metaphysically we can justify causation and prove its logistics but not empirically.



Existence and Abstracts

I didn't say they were abstracts absolutely (laws of philosophy and nature, math, etc). I said these concepts can concievably exist as abstracts outside of conceptualization, philisophically we can express or suppose this because of. . then follows the argument. But I did admit, if you read closely, that you can refute this by saying I can't percieve anything of actual existence, I only can percieve things of phenomenal existence. My conceptions are regarding those phenomena and thus may arise out of my mind to order the phenomena I percieve but possibly have no relation to the noumenal. I said that was valid.

The two threads aren't related to one another. One hypothetically postulated a possible argument for fun, the other refuted a faulty claim. Your intermingling the two was irrelevant and erroneous. In the other thread I said they could possibly exist as entities, but not that they absolutely do.

You subjectively see it (empirical causality) as a fundamental given or absolute. But you are wrong. You can use pragmatism to self justify empirical causality, but empirical causality can't exist purely from an empirical perspective.

On Non-Theism or Theism Definitions
The definitions weren't objectively defined for the sake of the argument, which was erroneous on both our parts. But the definition of beginning, universe, cause and deity all depend upon the right employment of their meaning for the sake of an argument. But I would say that universe can mean the same for the theist or nontheist. But in any event, to empirically assume the universe (be it as we know it) needs cause or has empirical cause is errant. So ultimately, it isn't equivocating that is the problem. They both claim cause (in whatever definition of universe or beginning they are currently employing) thus making the self-defeating argument possible.

On citing other forum threads to prove a concept right or wrong

You and Hacky make the assumption, I am presuming, that because it has been discussed at length by the intelligent members of these forums, the concepts or arguments you support are proven or the concepts you don't support are disproven. But I take issue with the quality level of the "references" you cite and decry them as being absolute. It also supposes, by citing the threads, that the discussion of the subject should be ended because it has previously been discussed elsewhere to some extent. Which is silly, because everything we are discussing has been discussed an infinite amount over prior to our discussing it within these confines.


Personal Beliefs and Claims


You have made the suggestion numerous times that I believe Y or I believe Z, that I argue a personal position which is erroneous. With the exception of arguing against empirical causality, I haven't imposed personal beliefs of nondeity or deity, abstracts as conception or abstracts as actuality, into the argument.

As to your last statement on me denying causality, again, it isn't simply me denying empirical causality (notice I am qualifying what kind of causality, that is important). It has already been admonished philosophically for, as earlier said, 200+ years. I admitted, there are ways around the problem of causation and induction but they aren't grounded in empirics. (Well, there is possibly one but there are problems with it.)

I don't deny you the right to accept causality for the sake of the argument, I assume that is what you refer to. You can accept causality exists, but it should be defined for the sake of the argument because it can fallaciously exist in an argument or rationally exist within an argument as a principle onto that argument. But based on meaning and invocation, rests the argument's soundness and validity.



I am not saying what follows as an end to the argument, but I think the two of us can agree that we simply aren't going to see eye to eye on basic principles. You necessarily will think I am not understanding the Principle of Parsimony and I am necessarily going to think you don't understand the problem of empirical causation. You are going to mix threads and use possible arguments as actual arguments held to be true, I will maintain that the inability to need or prove causation invalidates the question. Therefore, I can pretty much assume that we aren't likely to get further with each other and while in general, I never think an argument is a waste, I think there is so much distaste on either side for the other party (what with masked insults, fundamental conceptual and philosophical differences and understandings, and an array of misconceptions), any benefit that could be gained won't be discerned based on possible sentiments. If you wish to continue, fine. But if you don't, I do thank you for the process thus far. It has been an adventure!
 
arg-fallbackName="borrofburi"/>
brewpanda said:
On citing other forum threads to prove a concept right or wrong

You and Hacky make the assumption, I am presuming, that because it has been discussed at length by the intelligent members of these forums, the concepts or arguments you support are proven or the concepts you don't support are disproven. But I take issue with the quality level of the "references" you cite and decry them as being absolute. It also supposes, by citing the threads, that the discussion of the subject should be ended because it has previously been discussed elsewhere to some extent. Which is silly, because everything we are discussing has been discussed an infinite amount over prior to our discussing it within these confines.
It baffles me how you continually to fail to understand my basic meaning. It wasn't "this has been proved wrong"; rather it was a combination of "I don't really want to deal with this, so if you want to discuss that go here", "If you want to prove this then we already have arguments against this that you should refute, as seen here", and "this isn't really the thread for it, these are more appropriate". That you think it boils down to the equivalent of "nuh-uh, I'm right, here's my proof <forum threads>" is beyond my comprehension.


brewpanda said:
I am not saying what follows as an end to the argument, but I think the two of us can agree that we simply aren't going to see eye to eye on basic principles.
Probably not.


brewpanda said:
I will maintain that the inability to need or prove causation invalidates the question
Perhaps I should be clearer... I think causation is a necessary axiom for basic human function in the same way that existence (of reality) is a necessary axiom for basic human function and in the same way that I think that "we are perceiving some form of objective reality) is a neessary axiom for basic human function. This is why I ridicule your "well prove causation exists!" as being on the level of solipsism, "prove existence exists!", "prove time exists!", or "prove we're not in the matrix!".

Yet I am fond of pointing out that, for example, the 2nd law of thermodynamics isn't an absolute, and over an eternity it would only need to be violated once (on a massive scale) to create the-universe-as-we-know-it; that a single exception to the rule is sufficient and that our inductive learning can't guarantee it has always been and will always be a certain way. So if all you're saying is that it would take only a single exception of causality at some sort of "beginning" for "all there is" to come into being uncaused, then, as much as I'd prefer to disagree with you, I agree (and have pointed it out in other discussions).

Yet I was saying that "who created god" does have a limited use, and none of this causality stuff invalidates that limited use.
 
arg-fallbackName="Deleted member 619"/>
brewpanda said:
Fine. Whether you use parsimony, simplicity, or economy it is still the general concept. Regardless, parsimony does not equal validity based on parsimony alone. That is the general problem with Occam's Razor. I am surprised actually to see anyone invoke its usage since with wide consensus it is considered fallacious in philosophy. (Since we are arguing philosophy NOT physics.) I am shocked anyone was taught it in an actual philosophy class as well, it is more a footnote about a quirky and interesting principle that arose in history (so best taught in Western Civ) but was quickly debunked because of the ridiculousness of its argument.

Case in point, or let's use a sciencey one! Gravitational constant is variable. Therefore, instead of it just being variable, come up with a different unknown and unproven reason for why it is variable. Indeed! (Don't take this to mean I am saying DM doesn't exist, because that isn't what this paragraph is saying!)

So again I say, there is no evidence that simplicity, parsimony or economy of idea/data is the equivalent of truth. Not to mention, determining whether something actually posseses parsimony or simplicity or economy is a subjective measurement/judgment/means to an end. Therefore, using it to prove or disprove or weigh two theories against one another is, as priorly stated, fallacious.

Firstly, nobody said that parsimony equals truth, or that it has anything to do with validity. Secondly, Occam's Razor is anything but fallacious in any area of thought, and that's before we get into whether philosophy is remotely of any utility other than teaching one how to think.

Properly applied, Occam's Razor is a valuable tool for choosing between competing hypotheses, because it allows us to strip away that which is unsupported or constitutes unnecessary assumptions. Without it, all claims must be given equal weight. With it, we can discard that which is lacking in explanatory power or contains additional entities. It is often misunderstood, as you have so ably demonstrated. A proper application can only occur when hypotheses are making equivalent claims but where one contains unnecessary assumptions or entities. A good example would be proposition P='Automobiles operate by means of an internal combustion engine and a series of gears' versus proposition P'='Automobiles operate by means of an internal combustion engine, a series of gears and a group of pixies pushing from behind'. The latter contains unnecessary additional entities not supported by the evidence, so OR strips them away.

Any application that does more than this is misusing the principle.

Oh, and again, parsimony is not simplicity, it's economy.
 
arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
borrofburi said:
It baffles me how you continually to fail to understand my basic meaning. It wasn't "this has been proved wrong"; rather it was a combination of "I don't really want to deal with this, so if you want to discuss that go here", "If you want to prove this then we already have arguments against this that you should refute, as seen here", and "this isn't really the thread for it, these are more appropriate". That you think it boils down to the equivalent of "nuh-uh, I'm right, here's my proof <forum threads>" is beyond my comprehension.


Proven or disproven were one of the concepts covered in my complaint of your citation (I also admitted I wasn't claiming them as absolute but rather theorized as to intent). However, if you read on I do cover another possible argument which you are making. Namely that this has no place here.
So should I be like you and be baffled that you misread or failed to read further or with more attention?

And by the same token, empirical causality has been refuted philisophically before, instead of discussing it as it pertains to the specific argument at hand, should I tell you instead of trying to present the argument to you to both explain my meaning and to give you the respect of economizing your time, rather I should say, "Go look it up and refute it"?

I haven't read every discussion you are party to. And, in addition, you are again misunderstanding me. I said empirical causality can't exist, not causality. As a conception, causality clearly exists as I said before. But if an empiricist is trying to use the concept of causality to argue against a deity, he should examine and know that empirical causality isn't something that exists so he hurts his own opposing argument.

If you think this is such a waste of time here or inappropriate, and eating up or exhausting others who would otherwise engage in the topic should it not be for us, then I am happy to continue it elsewhere, in its own thread or even pms. One need not an audience to argue or discuss. And I do apologize to everyone else who would otherwise read or participate in the topic for the possible derailment. It was not intended nor was it meant with arrogance or malice.

I also find it a bit confuzzling that you can preside in judgment over condescending insults but so easily can dispense them yourself.
borrofburi said:
brewpanda said:
I am not saying what follows as an end to the argument, but I think the two of us can agree that we simply aren't going to see eye to eye on basic principles.
Probably not.

Good, then we are agreed it is a waste of time for both of us.


borrofburi said:
Perhaps I should be clearer... I think causation is a necessary axiom for basic human function in the same way that existence (of reality) is a necessary axiom for basic human function and in the same way that I think that "we are perceiving some form of objective reality) is a neessary axiom for basic human function. This is why I ridicule your "well prove causation exists!" as being on the level of solipsism, "prove existence exists!", "prove time exists!", or "prove we're not in the matrix!".

Yet I am fond of pointing out that, for example, the 2nd law of thermodynamics isn't an absolute, and over an eternity it would only need to be violated once (on a massive scale) to create the-universe-as-we-know-it; that a single exception to the rule is sufficient and that our inductive learning can't guarantee it has always been and will always be a certain way. So if all you're saying is that it would take only a single exception of causality at some sort of "beginning" for "all there is" to come into being uncaused, then, as much as I'd prefer to disagree with you, I agree (and have pointed it out in other discussions).

Yet I was saying that "who created god" does have a limited use, and none of this causality stuff invalidates that limited use.

When entering an argument regarding whether or not a thing does exist or can exist with or without a creator, questions of causality arise. A theist vs an empiricist should stipulate the following:
1) Causality and whether it is a conception and an absolute
2) The definition of time and spacetime
3) The specific definition of the deity
4) The definition of the universe

Because if any of the definitions aren't set beforehand, one can easily refute an objection by the other party in saying, "I don't accept that definition." As we have ample proof of here. But I think it is also important for the argument to establish that empirical causality doesn't exist, that it exists as a human conception to order the phenomena we experience therefore presupposing or imposing it onto another abstract that is very different to anything in our discernable universe, is a mistake. And an empiricist supposing empirical causality destroys his own case. A more intelligent theist would say, "Do you believe in empirical causality? Because if you do, you are A) believing in something that isn't real and B) under your system, the universe itself must have cause, so what is the empirical cause of that?"
So the intelligent anti-theist or atheist or nontheist should say to the theist who says, "All things that begin have a cause and a deity is that cause," the following: "Establish that beginning necessitates or is predicated upon a cause."

I understand very well what you were saying. I agree with it that it has limited use, but I disagree with it having use in this context. Or rather, its use and context is questionable enough to allow for the response, why must something have cause?
 
arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
hackenslash said:
Firstly, nobody said that parsimony equals truth, or that it has anything to do with validity. Secondly, Occam's Razor is anything but fallacious in any area of thought, and that's before we get into whether philosophy is remotely of any utility other than teaching one how to think.

Properly applied, Occam's Razor is a valuable tool for choosing between competing hypotheses, because it allows us to strip away that which is unsupported or constitutes unnecessary assumptions. Without it, all claims must be given equal weight. With it, we can discard that which is lacking in explanatory power or contains additional entities. It is often misunderstood, as you have so ably demonstrated. A proper application can only occur when hypotheses are making equivalent claims but where one contains unnecessary assumptions or entities. A good example would be proposition P='Automobiles operate by means of an internal combustion engine and a series of gears' versus proposition P'='Automobiles operate by means of an internal combustion engine, a series of gears and a group of pixies pushing from behind'. The latter contains unnecessary additional entities not supported by the evidence, so OR strips them away.

Any application that does more than this is misusing the principle.

Oh, and again, parsimony is not simplicity, it's economy.

The principle of parsimony suggests that whatever is most parsimonious is likely to be or has higher probability to be (for the sake of shortest distance between two points is a straight line theorizing) the correct or valid or preferred solution or truth or hypothesis. But not the absolute one.

Since this is a philosophical forum, we are discussing philosophical concepts using philosophical arguments. Therefore, philosophy is being used right now by us and Occam's Razor has most certainly been decried as being logically unsound in philosophy because the parameters of defining it are vague. We could intend it to mean, "Do not multiply or replicate entities or postulates beyond necessity." But it could also be, "If all things are equal and X is more simplistic or parsimonious than X1, than it is rational for one to prefer X." Generally though, it is best used when two hypotheses are explanations in equal wellness, validity or with equal soundness. Yet this is rarely the case and it certainly, one could easily argue, isn't possible to say that is the case for the postulates in question; universe exists and universe caused by a simply existing deity, since we would need much more development and set of explanatory concepts and facts to make the judgment that or suppose that both are equivalent statements.

It isn't even taught, as I said, in most philosophy classes. Well, I should clarify this. It isn't taught as a thing of absoluteness, but rather a historical postulate. The questions regarding simplicity which are contained within it, however, are taught in many philosophy courses.

And, indeed, as I also said earlier, Occam's Razor is useful under specific context with specific criteria, but usually in science. In philosophy, it is often ignored because the measurement of simplicity or parsimony is subjective when applied to concepts and reasoning. It has very rigourous "rules" and parameters within acceptable philosophical usage.

In addition, I freely admitted in my FIRST post regarding Occam's Razor that it can properly be used to distinguish and invalidate or validate between two competing theories or hypotheses all things quantifiable within them. However, I don't think comparing the universe just existing or universe caused by a just existing deity are the equivalent in quantifiable variables nor are they parallel to your example of automotives. While on the surface we might say, X is simpler as a hypothesis than X1, therefore it might be rational or equal in rationality to believe in X over X1, I think it isn't just to assign such meagerness to the hypotheses themselves because they are much more complex than that, not to mention the definition of simplicity or parsimony or economy will vary. For an empiricist or materialist, X is more simplistic because it relies on only observation of phenomena. But for a metaphysicist or theist, or idealist or even a rationalist, X1 is more simplistic because abstracts exist while the world of observation is more or less ruled out since it doesn't tell us anything about what is real.

Oh and again, read the posts, because I covered economy, simplicity and parsimony and simplicity can be expressed within the principle of parsimony because simplicity can be used as a synonym for economy and I established that economy was part of parsimony earlier. Simplicity is often used in expressing parsimony and I thought that the context would be fairly clear here. I could use frugality instead if that better suits your demands or liking.

I should state, that I think the main issue you and I are facing, as well as BB up there, is we are interchanging the different subset of contextual principles within the principle of parsimony and occam's razor and their categorical applications. Namely, syntactic and ontological. You seek to define parsimony and use that as the lone concept (I think?) within the razor principles. However, I am also using besides parsimony, the concept of simplistic elegance, or simply put, elegance itself.
 
arg-fallbackName="lrkun"/>
We created god. Humans created god. Our ancestors created god. Because god is a convenient explanation, justification, and a something to pass the blame or as a meanst to control the masses, as the case may be.
 
arg-fallbackName="Time Lord"/>
Who created God?
Is not really a valid question in my view.
I believe this because the whole point of God is to be eternal and have no begging or end.
 
arg-fallbackName="IBSpify"/>
Time Lord said:
Who created God?
Is not really a valid question in my view.
I believe this because the whole point of God is to be eternal and have no begging or end.

which is fine, but if the argument is that god is eternal the precursor to making that claim can not be that all things require a cause
 
arg-fallbackName="Deleted member 619"/>
brewpanda said:
The principle of parsimony suggests that whatever is most parsimonious is likely to be or has higher probability to be (for the sake of shortest distance between two points is a straight line theorizing) the correct or valid or preferred solution or truth or hypothesis. But not the absolute one.

Nobody said anything about it being absolute. That's something you erected yourself so you could knock it down.
Since this is a philosophical forum,

Who said this was a philosophical forum? Where did you get that idea? You'll find the philosophy forum on the front page. You can't miss it. It's marked 'Philosophy' in big, friendly letters.
we are discussing philosophical concepts using philosophical arguments.

Ah, you're making shit up using made-up shit.
Therefore, philosophy is being used right now by us and Occam's Razor has most certainly been decried as being logically unsound in philosophy because the parameters of defining it are vague.

Bollocks. The parameters for the application of Occam's Razor are anything but vague, and have been provided for the reduction of your abject ignorance in this regard by myself above. I will require a citation that it has been descried in philosophical circles, because I suspect that this is more of your 'philosophy' or 'making shit up'.
We could intend it to mean, "Do not multiply or replicate entities or postulates beyond necessity." But it could also be, "If all things are equal and X is more simplistic or parsimonious than X1, than it is rational for one to prefer X." Generally though, it is best used when two hypotheses are explanations in equal wellness, validity or with equal soundness. Yet this is rarely the case and it certainly, one could easily argue, isn't possible to say that is the case for the postulates in question; universe exists and universe caused by a simply existing deity, since we would need much more development and set of explanatory concepts and facts to make the judgment that or suppose that both are equivalent statements.[/quotre]

Utrter guff, and you still; don't understand Occam's Razor, despite just having had it explained to you. The propositions you describe are most definitely amenable to Occam's Razor, because we have two equable propositions, namely P = 'The universe operates by means of testable and definable natural processes' and proposition P' = 'The universe operates by means of testable and definable natural processes and a magic man'.

Like the example of the automobile given above, the testable natural processes are a matter of empirical fact, while the magic man is not. No set of circumstanes yet elucidated by science has required any explanation that involves anything other than testable natural processes, so positing a magic man constitutes an unnecessary multiplication of entities.

Further, when you actually understand what the universe is and what it is not, positing the universe as a simple brute fact is entirely justified, while positing a celestial peeping-tom is not. This is a proper and justified application of Occam's Razor, a principle you clearly don't understand.
It isn't even taught, as I said, in most philosophy classes. Well, I should clarify this. It isn't taught as a thing of absoluteness, but rather a historical postulate. The questions regarding simplicity which are contained within it, however, are taught in many philosophy courses.

When will you fucking learn that it has fuck all to do with simplicity?
And, indeed, as I also said earlier, Occam's Razor is useful under specific context with specific criteria, but usually in science. In philosophy, it is often ignored because the measurement of simplicity or parsimony is subjective when applied to concepts and reasoning. It has very rigourous "rules" and parameters within acceptable philosophical usage.


Bzzzzzzzz. Thank you for playing. Science is philosophy, albeit a much improved branch of philosophy in which postulates must be measured against reality, rather than simply extract them from the rectum and present them as if they constituted axioms about reality. In any event, you're still demonstrating that you don't have a clue what you're talking about here, because it has fuck all to do with simplicity.



I'm going to skip the rest of your post, because it's bollocks and I can't be bothered. Learn what Occam's Razor is and how it's to be applied before you erect any more ignorant drivel about it, there's a good chap.
 
arg-fallbackName="brewpanda"/>
hackenslash said:
Nobody said anything about it being absolute. That's something you erected yourself so you could knock it down.

Who said this was a philosophical forum? Where did you get that idea? You'll find the philosophy forum on the front page. You can't miss it. It's marked 'Philosophy' in big, friendly letters.

Ah, you're making shit up using made-up shit.

. . .

I clarified the concept of absoluteness and its inapplicability here for the general purpose of knowledge, not because I said you held it to be, that it couldn't be absolute and it can't necessarily hold any hypothesis superior to another in itself. I also stated it, since the Razor's invocation has little use here. Simply because you argue, X is more frugal than X1, doesn't mean it is more rational to X1. So supposing that X1 is perfectly legitimate is acceptable since this isn't a scientific hypothesis that serves a test.

I must ask, if this is not a philosophical discussion, than pray tell, what is it? Philosophy is defined by studying and critiquing values, ethics, knowledge, beliefs, reason, existence, mind. The approach to the subjects just stated is applied with rational argument. Discussion regarding theism vs. atheism constitutes this since we are discussing what we cannot know, what we can know, and what we can reasonably discern.
hackenslash said:
Bollocks. The parameters for the application of Occam's Razor are anything but vague, and have been provided for the reduction of your abject ignorance in this regard by myself above. I will require a citation that it has been descried in philosophical circles, because I suspect that this is more of your 'philosophy' or 'making shit up'.


Your parameters were lacking in themselves and I had stipulated valid reasons as to why. You simply don't subjectively accept them and thus refute. Of course, swearing at someone and telling them they are outright wrong isn't a reasonable refutation. But I guess you are not one to worry about trifles of reasonablity or courtesy.

Chatton, Kant, Leibniz, Jarry, Menger, Longino, Borges, Gernert, Baker, and Doyle. There are more, if you are so inclined to listen to them listed off to you.

hackenslash said:
Utrter guff, and you still; don't understand Occam's Razor, despite just having had it explained to you. The propositions you describe are most definitely amenable to Occam's Razor, because we have two equable propositions, namely P = 'The universe operates by means of testable and definable natural processes' and proposition P' = 'The universe operates by means of testable and definable natural processes and a magic man'.

Like the example of the automobile given above, the testable natural processes are a matter of empirical fact, while the magic man is not. No set of circumstanes yet elucidated by science has required any explanation that involves anything other than testable natural processes, so positing a magic man constitutes an unnecessary multiplication of entities.

Yet those definitions of Occam's Razor exist. And we are, incidentally, precisely acting my claim, the criteria are being subjectively interpreted to determine its applicability.
hackenslash said:
Further, when you actually understand what the universe is and what it is not, positing the universe as a simple brute fact is entirely justified, while positing a celestial peeping-tom is not. This is a proper and justified application of Occam's Razor, a principle you clearly don't understand.

And I am sure you are certain of what the universe is or is not. I could of course go further to refute your argument, or rather, tantrum-esque claim, but I am done with politeness with you. If you can't show respect I can't see that I should show you any.
hackenslash said:
When will you fucking learn that it has fuck all to do with simplicity?


When will you learn that economy and frugality were expressed by me, but even among citations for the definition, be it from Columbia, Marquette, Oxford Press, Stanford or Wikipedia as was cited by someone earlier, the word "simple" is used.

hackenslash said:
Bzzzzzzzz. Thank you for playing. Science is philosophy, albeit a much improved branch of philosophy in which postulates must be measured against reality, rather than simply extract them from the rectum and present them as if they constituted axioms about reality. In any event, you're still demonstrating that you don't have a clue what you're talking about here, because it has fuck all to do with simplicity.



I'm going to skip the rest of your post, because it's bollocks and I can't be bothered. Learn what Occam's Razor is and how it's to be applied before you erect any more ignorant drivel about it, there's a good chap.

Hard science vs philosophy.

I am well aware about the all encompassing history and principles within the Razor, including ontological parsimony or syntactic simplicity, which I said, is at the root of our problem most likely. That or. . .well, I will refrain from completing that thought. I am aware, however, of its various incarnations, applications, and subjects it is best used for. But I can tell, for a fact, that you are not. (For historical sake, I find it especially funny how often it is used by atheists because its author used it for a very different purpose. This is not to say it can't have evolved meaning, it does. I just find it humorous with regards to historical context.) I see it daily misapplied on these, the LoR forums.

Yet none of this is here nor there.

I have apparently supposed too much when I considered we were discussing amongst equals in rationality. I will not be so foolish as to make the mistake ever again in supposing you specifically are capable of civility or reasonableness in nature. Thank you again for your begrudgingly given attention to the argument, as lousy and insulting as it was. I will be sure and quit my addresses to you in the future and my apologies for insulting your prestigious sensibilities. Slan agat.
 
arg-fallbackName="TheGreekDollmaker"/>
Something different but related to the topic.

Apparently my orthodox teacher claims that the question who created god is meaningless since "God is Outside Time".

This is complete Bullshit.There is no imperial evidence that god is outside time.How the hell can he be outside time.Does it mean he is outside the universe.Well How can we know that.We dont even know if he is inside the universe, hell we dont even know what is outside of the universe so this could pretty much fit in the ''God of the Gaps'' Argument if someone were to try to explain what was outside the universe with this.

Also doesnt God Lose his identity.He could be the Christian God, he could be the Allah God he could be another god that cant interact in any shape of form into the current universe.

And how the hell can he be outside time.Time is a madmade instrument which is used to record the results between indevitual events.
The "real" time is the ability for particles,atoms,monicles too move around and to more into the next state of the present.

So does what does that mean about god outside of time.Does that mean that his particles are frozed.Actually how can that be.
 
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