Dragan Glas
Well-Known Member
Greetings,
I disagreed with this analogy on the grounds that, if consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, they can't be identical, so it's a false analogy.
However, you insisted that your analogy is valid.
If that is the case, and the equivalences are valid – that "hand" is to "brain" as "five-fingered thing on the end of your arm" is to "consciousness" – then, since "hand" and "five-fingered thing on the end of your arm" are identical, that means that "brain" and "consciousness" must also be identical.
Ergo, by your argument, consciousness is reducible.
The "hard problem" has been suggested to be nothing more than a combination of "soft" problems, which are currently being investigated.
Are you able to change your mind?
We'll see as this discussion progresses.
You don't seem to be able to read between the lines: it's a valid inference that the simpler version of the simulation is more likely through parsimony. Chalmers, and you, have not escaped this fact – something that you keep attempting to avoid addressing.
And given that your "Nope" earlier is good enough for you, no-one else – including Chalmers - needs to provide anything more robust.
Let's see how you reached this sorry state:
So, you need to explain how you can reduce or eliminate the physical whilst still maintaining your realist position.
Then you can provide evidence of a mind independent of the physical.
HWIN linked to a video expaining how computer programs are irreducible, yet you have ignored and/or dismissed this.
You appear to be ideologically opposed to any equating of human and computer-generated/AI consciousness.
Empiric evidence is required for the real world, otherwise it's just an assertion.
You're not the first creationist to come here in the mistaken belief that they can "logic" God into existence, which is the only way you can argue for your Cosmic Entity, since you don't have any evidence of its existence anymore than any other creationist.
I've specifically stated that science's domain is the real world – not abstracta.
You're attempting to apply deductive logic to the real world, which is properly addressed by inductive logic.
If you're going to make claims about the real world, you need empiric evidence to corroborate said claims.
You're like someone pointing at the bonnet of a car – this doesn't tell anyone what's under the bonnet.
He's asking for what you mean by the term - what's under the bonnet.
Your scientism canard is an attempt to remove consciousness from the realm of scientific inquiry. If monism is true - which is for what you are arguing - then consciousness must be capable of being explored through scientific inquiry, experimentation and empiric evidence.
Now let's examine your continuing tendency to put introspection on a pedestal.
Like most creationists – who quote the abstract of a scientific paper in the mistaken belief that it "proves" evolution wrong, for example – you quote a single paragraph from the introduction of the SEP article on introspection, in the mistaken belief (undoubtedly due to the underlined text, and particularly the highlighted phrases) that it "proves" that your faith in introspection is justified:
However, if you actually read the article, you'll find that it questions the reliability of introspection throughout.
You also failed to cite its sister article from the IEP, which you were at pains to point out, in your OP, is a "peer-reviewed academic resource".
Again, it also questions the reliability of introspection - to an even greater degree than the SEP's article.
Then there's the empiric evidence.
In The Tell-Tale Brain, Ramachandran [2012] explores the brain and the consequences of damage to various regions of the brain on our ability to perceive, think, and act.
In the final chapter – An Ape With A Soul: How Introspection Evolved (pages 245-288) – he addresses the region of the brain associated with all aspects of awareness of the self and others, both physical and mental.
He identifies seven aspects of the self or, at least, our intuitions about the self:
Unity; Continuity; Embodiment; Privacy; Social embedding; Free will; Self-awareness.
Some of these he'd at least touched upon in earlier chapters but he addresses them more directly in this chapter.
Ramachandran points out that consciousness is often confused with both qualia and self, although we can't have the former without the latter. He also notes that Freud had argued that we cannot equate the self with consciousness since our mental life is governed by the unconscious. "Your 'conscious-life' is an elaborate after-the-fact rationalization of things you really do for other reasons" (Ramachandran [2012], 249) . Despite our experience of the self as the ("kernel" or centre of the) brain, it isn't – only a part of the brain is conscious, comprised of a relatively small cluster of regions linked into a vast network of neurons.
The anterior cingulate is critical to all aspects of self-awareness. Damage to this region of the brain can impair our ability to perceive ourselves (and others), either in part or in whole. This, along with certain pathways linking various parts of the brain, affect our impression of free will, unity, continuity, self- and social awareness, etc.
In patients suffering from apotemnophilia, for example, neurons within this region of the brain can be over-sensitive to the signals coming from a limb, resulting in the patient feeling "overwhelmed" by that limb. More than half go on to have the offending limb amputated.
Ramachandran describes a patient named Jason who suffered damage to the anterior cingulate due to a car accident near the Mexico border. As a result, he can't walk, talk or interact with others in the same room as himself – including his father. However, if his father leaves the room and speaks to him over the telephone, Jason can talk to him as normal – but when his father returns, and Jason can see him, he's unable to recognize or talk to his father. Due to the fact that we are visually-oriented, the damage to his visual pathway to the anterior cingulate overides his auditory pathway, preventing him from talking to his father. This condition is referred to as "telephone syndrome". Although Ramachandran doesn't mention it, one assumes that if Jason were blind-folded, he'd be able to interact verbally with those in the same room as him: as long as he can't see whoever is speaking to him, he can interact with them.
Our sense of unity and continuity are illusions as, if we are reliant on our memories – the "pieces of light", as Fernyhough [2013] poetically puts it – and how they are linked, then our selves are likely to change depending on how these are linked and how these links change over time. Just as those who are struck by lightning, re-linking their memories in such a way, that they can end up being a completely different person.
Our idea of free will is also wrong.
The age-old question of, "If you were alone with a woman, and knew you would get away with it, *would you?* Do you think it depends on your upbringing? Would it surprise you to know that what you'd do depends more on your blood-glucose at the time?
Baumeister (Brockman [2016, 340) reports that studies where subjects were given various choices showed that there was a inter-relationship between decisions and self-control on the one hand and blood-glucose on the other. If the blood-glucose was low, their decisions were "shallow" and selfish – but if they were given some sugar, which provides a instant boost of glucose, their self-control returned and their decisions were more "moral". (The control group(s) were given artificial sweeteners, which provide no boost of glucose other than the sweet taste.)
In Cotard Syndrome, the patient can believe that they literally don't exist.
One wonders what would have happened if Descartes had suffered from this syndrome!? His famous dictum would never have been thought – let alone, passed on to posterity!
What would happen, Monistic Idealism, if you were ever to be unfortunate enough to suffer from this syndrome? You would declare that you don't exist, and your topic would be about non-existence of the self.
Which raises the question as to how reliable is introspection, if damage to this region of the brain can cause anyone to cease to feel that they exist? More importantly, how can the brain – "really just weakly emergent mental phenomena" – affect the mind's ability to perceive its own existence if idealism were true?
This only makes sense if consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of the brain – not the other way round.
So, why are you still claiming that you are conscious – that your mind exists (P1) – if introspection can not be relied upon?
[As it happens, I found a website belonging to a neuroscience student who covers this chapter as part of his course notes.]
Remember when you said this earlier whilst accusing me of scientism?:
I'm saying that you can't exclude P1-P3 – even if you grant P1 the benefit of the doubt, P2 and P3 can not be excluded.
He has indicated that "most" are questionable – P4-P8 inclusive are definitely so (along with the conclusion) but the earlier ones are not excluded from this.
There are eight premises (apart from the conclusion) – he only needs to find up to seven questionable for the term "most" to apply.
Given that introspection has been shown to be unreliable, you have nothing on which to base this claim.
The Psyhcology Today article describes DID as "a condition wherein a person's identity is fragmented into two or more distinct personality states ", and as "a disorder characterized by identity fragmentation rather than a proliferation of separate personalities ". It is predominantly associated with severe abuse – 90% of DID sufferers in the US, Canada, and Europe report physical and/or sexual abuse in childhood. More than 70% attempt suicide and/or self-harm.
There is some controversy about the diagnosis due to a cluster of American psychologists, who use hypnosis, being more likely to report DID in their patients – apparently, DID sufferers are more prone to hypnosis (possibly due to the fact that, whichever fragment of their identity is in control, it lacks the willpower of a unified identity(!?) – my inference). However, brain studies have shown actual changes in brain activity when an "alter" is in control. Also, if the subject presents symptoms sans hypnosis and/or prior to hypnosis, then the symptoms are likely to be genuine, rather than due to hypnosis.
Most interestingly, the article reports that:
In a similar vein, individuals struck by lightning may suffer a complete change in their personality – in some cases, moving elsewhere to start/live a different life, and even forgetting that they are married and/or already have a family.
Which raises a number of questions for idealism.
As this is the general case for idealism, if, as you claim, the physical – including the brain - "is really just weakly emergent mental phenomena", then how do flawed minds exist? What causes their being flawed? It can't be due to their brains since, according to you, they're just emergent phenomenona, and should not be able to affect the mind. And, more importantly, on what are minds contingent, regardless of whether they're flawed or not?
For the cosmic idealist, it's even worse.
If minds are contingent on the existence of a Cosmic Entity, this suggests that either said entity is cruel/whimsical in creating flawed minds or the Cosmic Entity is itself Flawed.
Kindest regards,
James
Over the last several posts, you used an analogy where you equated "hand" with "brain", and "the five-fingered thing on the end of your arm" with "consciousness".Monistic Idealism said:No, elminativist deny the existence of mental states. Reductionists affirm that mental states exist, they just reduce them. Either way that doesn't address what I said. I already pointed out that weak emergence entails A=B and that identifying A identifies B, but you're now starting to see the problems with this (finally) so you're moving away from it. Good for you. But now you're agreeing with me about consciousness being irreducible and now have the problems of strong emergence and mental causation.If the eliminativists, like Dennett et al, are correct, then reductionism is true.
I disagreed with this analogy on the grounds that, if consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, they can't be identical, so it's a false analogy.
However, you insisted that your analogy is valid.
If that is the case, and the equivalences are valid – that "hand" is to "brain" as "five-fingered thing on the end of your arm" is to "consciousness" – then, since "hand" and "five-fingered thing on the end of your arm" are identical, that means that "brain" and "consciousness" must also be identical.
Ergo, by your argument, consciousness is reducible.
"Seems more like" is not "is".Monistic Idealism said:Nope. See the hard problem of consciousness. It seems more like consciousness is fundamental.Regardless, even at the time of the publication of Blackmore's book in 2010, all the evidence suggested that consciousness is naturalistic in origin.
The "hard problem" has been suggested to be nothing more than a combination of "soft" problems, which are currently being investigated.
See my point above about your analogy.Monistic Idealism said:Dude, you are getting so confused. That was said in the context of the default position. My other point about the future was in regards to your identity claim (A=B). You appeal to the future contradicted your identity claim, but now you're moving away from such a claim. Good move your weak emergence claims were failing pretty hard.So, it's a suspension of judgement when it suits you - but it's "an appeal to the future" when it doesn't.
I was exploring various possible solutions within naturalism, which is where I stand on the explanation for consciousness. None of them have been ruled out yet.Monistic Idealism said:The burden of proof is in the claimant no matter what. You made a claim, you have the burden of proof. I told you sooooo long ago that I'll be making the case for cosmic idealism in another thread. For now, we're just talking about idealism and you made a claim about strong emergence. Defend your claim about strong emergence or your claim stands unsupported.The burden of proof is, and has been throughout this thread, on you to show that your claim regarding monistic idealism is true.
I'm capable of changing my mind as new research, etc, changes the state of conciousness studies.Monistic Idealism said:It is indeed a weakness. You were making all sorts of claims earlier and over the course of our discussion you've realized you weren't quite as right as you thought you were. Good thing we had this conversation.I'm saying that I'm no longer sure where the truth lies, other than consciousness is naturalistic in origin. Again, that's not a weakness.
Are you able to change your mind?
We'll see as this discussion progresses.
Updating one's knowledge is a necessary step in learning. The latest edition was obviously necessary as the field has changed sufficiently to require it.Monistic Idealism said:gona need someone else to do the thinking for you, eh?I will have to buy/read the new edition of Blackmore's book to get a better understanding of where things stand.
Kindly name a monist version that you imply he mentions that doesn't fit into the broad categories I listed.Monistic Idealism said:Yeah and he lists a bunch of different versions there that you left out.His paper focuses more on realist, as against anti-realist, versions.
Since you again left out what I actually said, I'll repeat it for you and anyone else reading this:Monistic Idealism said:yes you did, your own quote proves this. If you want to take it back then take it back.You accused me of lying about what Chalmers said earlier - I didn't claim that Chalmers said that it was more likely, I said:
He was just explaining the argument, he wasn't suggesting that it's more likely or likely at all. Please read better.What he said suggests that it's a more likely scenario through parsimony
"Suggests" through parsimony – not "said".And given that Chalmers suggests that Bostrom's model - where we are ourselves simulations in a non-conscious simulation - is more likely...
You don't seem to be able to read between the lines: it's a valid inference that the simpler version of the simulation is more likely through parsimony. Chalmers, and you, have not escaped this fact – something that you keep attempting to avoid addressing.
This is not a formal debate – it's a general discussion.Monistic Idealism said:Actually it is. You even cited his credentials as support, this is classic appeal to authority. You didn't cite an argument from him, you cited one sentence from him that contains no argument, and then used his credentials to prop it up. That's fallacious...As he's taken the time to comment on your argument, it's not an appeal to authority to reference what he said in addressing your argument.
And given that your "Nope" earlier is good enough for you, no-one else – including Chalmers - needs to provide anything more robust.
Now you are being disingenuous, to say the least. You are now displaying the very behaviour to which Sparhafoc described as your MO: deny/distract/dismiss.Monistic Idealism said:reduce≠eliminate. Learn what words means....But you would be with your claim with reducing/eliminating the physical
Let's see how you reached this sorry state:
You have attempted to avoid answering my question by pretending that I've mistakenly equivocated the two words – I haven't, as any one with an ounce of intelligence can see. You're not unintelligent, so you can't use this as an excuse for what you've just done.DG: On the contrary, to contradict naturalism the idealist has to provide evidence of a mind independent of the physical. Never mind evidence for a Cosmic Entity (God).
MI: Naw, we can just reduce the physical, or eliminate the physical.
DG: If you do that, then you're changing your stated position of realism to anti-realism.
If you're sticking with realism, then you'll have to come up with evidence of a mind independent of the physical.
MI: Not with reductionism.
DG: But you would be with your claim with reducing/eliminating the physical whilst claiming you're a realist - you need to explain how you could do that and still maintain your realist position.
And I'm still waiting for you to provide evidence of a mind independent of the physical.
MI: reduce≠eliminate. Learn what words means....
So, you need to explain how you can reduce or eliminate the physical whilst still maintaining your realist position.
Then you can provide evidence of a mind independent of the physical.
You keep claiming this but have not provided any evidence for this claim.Monistic Idealism said:I already corrected your misunderstanding on this. I already told you the physical is reducible and consciousness is irreducible. Stop ignoring what I say, learn what words mean.And I'm still waiting for you to provide evidence of a mind independent of the physical.
HWIN linked to a video expaining how computer programs are irreducible, yet you have ignored and/or dismissed this.
You appear to be ideologically opposed to any equating of human and computer-generated/AI consciousness.
Philosophical arguments are not "proof" in the real world, only in deductive logic.Monistic Idealism said:Proof is proof. Definition of proof: evidence or argument establishing or helping to establish a fact or the truth of a statement.The difference is evidence
stop being a logic denier
Empiric evidence is required for the real world, otherwise it's just an assertion.
You're not the first creationist to come here in the mistaken belief that they can "logic" God into existence, which is the only way you can argue for your Cosmic Entity, since you don't have any evidence of its existence anymore than any other creationist.
No, I'm not expanding it to "ALL knowledge claims", just those about the real world.Monistic Idealism said:Scientism is false, remember? Stop contradicting yourself.Statements about the real world need scientific evidence.
>Any claim made about the real world needs to be verified with empirical evidence and experimentation.
>I'm not holding to scientism.
pick one...
There's nothing being taken out of context, I'm quoting you directly. You said, and I quoted directly: "Any claim made about the real world needs to be verified with empirical evidence and experimentation."Again, you fail to read things in context.
That is the epitome of scientism... Science is restricted to its own domain, you're expanding it to ALL knowledge claims. That's scientism, and that's self-refuting... Go ahead and show me the scientific experiment that demonstrates that "Any claim made about the real world needs to be verified with empirical evidence and experimentation", go ahead I'll wait...
I've specifically stated that science's domain is the real world – not abstracta.
You're attempting to apply deductive logic to the real world, which is properly addressed by inductive logic.
If you're going to make claims about the real world, you need empiric evidence to corroborate said claims.
You think you have but you haven't.Monistic Idealism said:Yes I have, I've been addressing all you guys line by line. You assume just because I don't copy/paste everything that I don't address it, I do.The problem we're having is that you're not addressing our questions to you.
You have simply attempted to deflect his question by arguing that, if he can understand English, he can't not understand the use of the term "I".Monistic Idealism said:I answered this question and in fact it is them who is refusing the answer my question... Your bias is so clear, you're not even acknowledging how they're the one who is actually refusing to answer my question... you guys are so tribal around here, it's ridiculous. If you weren't tribal you'd be going after him too, but alas, the tribal nature takes over instead of the genuine inquiry of truth...Momo888 has asked you to explain what you mean by this "I" and/or the "first person" to which you refer.
You're like someone pointing at the bonnet of a car – this doesn't tell anyone what's under the bonnet.
He's asking for what you mean by the term - what's under the bonnet.
None of which addresses Libet's experiments and the inferences and conclusions drawn from them.Monistic Idealism said:I did answer this with my point already with my critique of scientism, my point about introspection and direct knowledge and how this is important for empirical psychology.I've raised Libet's experiments in relation to this
Your scientism canard is an attempt to remove consciousness from the realm of scientific inquiry. If monism is true - which is for what you are arguing - then consciousness must be capable of being explored through scientific inquiry, experimentation and empiric evidence.
Now let's examine your continuing tendency to put introspection on a pedestal.
Like most creationists – who quote the abstract of a scientific paper in the mistaken belief that it "proves" evolution wrong, for example – you quote a single paragraph from the introduction of the SEP article on introspection, in the mistaken belief (undoubtedly due to the underlined text, and particularly the highlighted phrases) that it "proves" that your faith in introspection is justified:
The key phrases being "thought to be" and "held to be" – not "is". And "putative features" is an even more diminishing qualifier of introspection's reliability.Introspection is a key concept in epistemology, since introspective knowledge is often thought to be particularly secure, maybe even immune to skeptical doubt. Introspective knowledge is also often held to be more immediate or direct than sensory knowledge. Both of these putative features of introspection have been cited in support of the idea that introspective knowledge can serve as a ground or foundation for other sorts of knowledge. Introspection is also central to philosophy of mind, both as a process worth study in its own right and as a court of appeal for other claims about the mind. Philosophers of mind offer a variety of theories of the nature of introspection; and philosophical claims about consciousness, emotion, free will, personal identity, thought, belief, imagery, perception, and other mental phenomena are often thought to have introspective consequences or to be susceptible to introspective verification. For similar reasons, empirical psychologists too have discussed the accuracy of introspective judgments and the role of introspection in the science of the mind.
Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/
However, if you actually read the article, you'll find that it questions the reliability of introspection throughout.
You also failed to cite its sister article from the IEP, which you were at pains to point out, in your OP, is a "peer-reviewed academic resource".
Again, it also questions the reliability of introspection - to an even greater degree than the SEP's article.
Then there's the empiric evidence.
In The Tell-Tale Brain, Ramachandran [2012] explores the brain and the consequences of damage to various regions of the brain on our ability to perceive, think, and act.
In the final chapter – An Ape With A Soul: How Introspection Evolved (pages 245-288) – he addresses the region of the brain associated with all aspects of awareness of the self and others, both physical and mental.
He identifies seven aspects of the self or, at least, our intuitions about the self:
Unity; Continuity; Embodiment; Privacy; Social embedding; Free will; Self-awareness.
Some of these he'd at least touched upon in earlier chapters but he addresses them more directly in this chapter.
Ramachandran points out that consciousness is often confused with both qualia and self, although we can't have the former without the latter. He also notes that Freud had argued that we cannot equate the self with consciousness since our mental life is governed by the unconscious. "Your 'conscious-life' is an elaborate after-the-fact rationalization of things you really do for other reasons" (Ramachandran [2012], 249) . Despite our experience of the self as the ("kernel" or centre of the) brain, it isn't – only a part of the brain is conscious, comprised of a relatively small cluster of regions linked into a vast network of neurons.
The anterior cingulate is critical to all aspects of self-awareness. Damage to this region of the brain can impair our ability to perceive ourselves (and others), either in part or in whole. This, along with certain pathways linking various parts of the brain, affect our impression of free will, unity, continuity, self- and social awareness, etc.
In patients suffering from apotemnophilia, for example, neurons within this region of the brain can be over-sensitive to the signals coming from a limb, resulting in the patient feeling "overwhelmed" by that limb. More than half go on to have the offending limb amputated.
Ramachandran describes a patient named Jason who suffered damage to the anterior cingulate due to a car accident near the Mexico border. As a result, he can't walk, talk or interact with others in the same room as himself – including his father. However, if his father leaves the room and speaks to him over the telephone, Jason can talk to him as normal – but when his father returns, and Jason can see him, he's unable to recognize or talk to his father. Due to the fact that we are visually-oriented, the damage to his visual pathway to the anterior cingulate overides his auditory pathway, preventing him from talking to his father. This condition is referred to as "telephone syndrome". Although Ramachandran doesn't mention it, one assumes that if Jason were blind-folded, he'd be able to interact verbally with those in the same room as him: as long as he can't see whoever is speaking to him, he can interact with them.
In what is known as "blindsight", individuals have damage to a particular area of the visual cortex – the V1 area – and, as a result, cannot see anything. They are consciously blind. If a spot of light is shone on a wall, the individual will say they cannot see anything – yet if asked to touch the spot, they can do so, and even tell what colour it is. They can also, in the case of a horizontal or vertical line, tell how it is oriented. This is because, although the V1 area is damaged, the pathway from the retina to the parietal lobe is intact. Although the person cannot consciously see the spot or experience the qualia of seeing the spot, they are still seeing it uncounsciously. Why is only the information streaming through your visual cortex associated with self, whilst the same information passing through the parallel pathway – where all the calculations about location, colour, orientation are performed - is not? Why aren't all visually-related information - including visually-guided movement – conscious? Most of what we think of as the mind is unconscious – only a small part is actually conscious.Jason presents a striking case of a fragmented self. Some of the "pieces" of Jason have been destroyed, yet others have been preserved and retain a surprising degree of functionality. Is Jason still Jason if he can be broken into fragments? As we shall see, a variety of neurological conditions show us that the self is not the monolithic entity it believes itself to be. This conclusion flies directtly in the face of some of our most deep-seated intuitions about ourselves – but data are data. What the neurology tells us is that the self consists of many components, and the notion of one unitary self may be an illusion. (Ramachandran, 247)
Our sense of unity and continuity are illusions as, if we are reliant on our memories – the "pieces of light", as Fernyhough [2013] poetically puts it – and how they are linked, then our selves are likely to change depending on how these are linked and how these links change over time. Just as those who are struck by lightning, re-linking their memories in such a way, that they can end up being a completely different person.
Our idea of free will is also wrong.
The age-old question of, "If you were alone with a woman, and knew you would get away with it, *would you?* Do you think it depends on your upbringing? Would it surprise you to know that what you'd do depends more on your blood-glucose at the time?
Baumeister (Brockman [2016, 340) reports that studies where subjects were given various choices showed that there was a inter-relationship between decisions and self-control on the one hand and blood-glucose on the other. If the blood-glucose was low, their decisions were "shallow" and selfish – but if they were given some sugar, which provides a instant boost of glucose, their self-control returned and their decisions were more "moral". (The control group(s) were given artificial sweeteners, which provide no boost of glucose other than the sweet taste.)
In Cotard Syndrome, the patient can believe that they literally don't exist.
One wonders what would have happened if Descartes had suffered from this syndrome!? His famous dictum would never have been thought – let alone, passed on to posterity!
What would happen, Monistic Idealism, if you were ever to be unfortunate enough to suffer from this syndrome? You would declare that you don't exist, and your topic would be about non-existence of the self.
Which raises the question as to how reliable is introspection, if damage to this region of the brain can cause anyone to cease to feel that they exist? More importantly, how can the brain – "really just weakly emergent mental phenomena" – affect the mind's ability to perceive its own existence if idealism were true?
This only makes sense if consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of the brain – not the other way round.
So, why are you still claiming that you are conscious – that your mind exists (P1) – if introspection can not be relied upon?
[As it happens, I found a website belonging to a neuroscience student who covers this chapter as part of his course notes.]
This is ironic, given that, immediately after accusing me of an appeal to authority, you do the very thing of which you accuse me...Monistic Idealism said:omg, you're not seeing the irony here... I'm pointing out a contradicting in what you have said. You keep going "well Chalmers says it so it must be true!" I'm pointing out your inconsistency here since Chalmers is cool with the first premise and by your own appeal to authority you need to just roll over and accept it. If you don't, then you have to surrender your appeal to authority.Chalmers didn't say "it's cool"- you're now guilty of what you accused me
Monistic Idealism said:It does. Chalmers is a known realist about consciousness and affirms that its irreducible.You seem to think that this excludes P1-P3
Remember when you said this earlier whilst accusing me of scientism?:
"Well, Chalmers says it, so it must be true!" :facepalm:You even cited his credentials as support, this is classic appeal to authority. You didn't cite an argument from him, you cited one sentence from him that contains no argument, and then used his credentials to prop it up. That's fallacious...
I didn't say he said all – he said "most".Monistic Idealism said:Chalmers told us which premises he says are questionable and it's P4+
What you're saying entails that Chalmers finds all of them questionable, and we both know didn't say "all"...
I'm saying that you can't exclude P1-P3 – even if you grant P1 the benefit of the doubt, P2 and P3 can not be excluded.
He has indicated that "most" are questionable – P4-P8 inclusive are definitely so (along with the conclusion) but the earlier ones are not excluded from this.
There are eight premises (apart from the conclusion) – he only needs to find up to seven questionable for the term "most" to apply.
But of what exactly?Monistic Idealism said:Yes it does, it gives us direct awareness. Direct knowledge.It still tells us nothing about the nature of this experience
Given that introspection has been shown to be unreliable, you have nothing on which to base this claim.
Again, how do you know, given that introspection has been shown to be unreliable?Monistic Idealism said:I've answered this long ago. Consciousness is unified, it is one.is it a single- or group-entity?
What evidence do you have for this claim other than your worldview?Monistic Idealism said:The physical is reducible and consciousness is irreducible. Consciousness is fundamental and what you're calling the physical is really just weakly emergent mental phenomena.Is it independent of/(co-)dependent on the physical?
By this argument, if you're not able to spot an illusion, then you can't be conscious. :|Monistic Idealism said:Nope, that's impossible since there needs to be consciousness in the first place to perceive an illusion.Is it an illusion?
This is clearly just your opinion.Monistic Idealism said:This is no problem at all, they're just delusional. It's not hard to figure out, there's no philosophical paradox here. There is still clearly an "I" that they are aware of, and it exists, they just had a mental disorder which makes them believe all sorts of weird stuff just like any other disorder that causes delusions. No problem.If there's an "I", how can we suffer from Dissociative Identity Disorder - what used to be called Multiple Personality Disorder?
The Psyhcology Today article describes DID as "a condition wherein a person's identity is fragmented into two or more distinct personality states ", and as "a disorder characterized by identity fragmentation rather than a proliferation of separate personalities ". It is predominantly associated with severe abuse – 90% of DID sufferers in the US, Canada, and Europe report physical and/or sexual abuse in childhood. More than 70% attempt suicide and/or self-harm.
There is some controversy about the diagnosis due to a cluster of American psychologists, who use hypnosis, being more likely to report DID in their patients – apparently, DID sufferers are more prone to hypnosis (possibly due to the fact that, whichever fragment of their identity is in control, it lacks the willpower of a unified identity(!?) – my inference). However, brain studies have shown actual changes in brain activity when an "alter" is in control. Also, if the subject presents symptoms sans hypnosis and/or prior to hypnosis, then the symptoms are likely to be genuine, rather than due to hypnosis.
Most interestingly, the article reports that:
This suggests that - like a number of psychiatric conditions, most notably schizophrenia – there may be a genetic basis for this disorder, which suggests that it's not just a figment of their imagination and/or that they're making things up.Several studies suggest that DID is more common among close biological relatives of persons who also have the disorder than in the general population.
In a similar vein, individuals struck by lightning may suffer a complete change in their personality – in some cases, moving elsewhere to start/live a different life, and even forgetting that they are married and/or already have a family.
Which raises a number of questions for idealism.
As this is the general case for idealism, if, as you claim, the physical – including the brain - "is really just weakly emergent mental phenomena", then how do flawed minds exist? What causes their being flawed? It can't be due to their brains since, according to you, they're just emergent phenomenona, and should not be able to affect the mind. And, more importantly, on what are minds contingent, regardless of whether they're flawed or not?
For the cosmic idealist, it's even worse.
If minds are contingent on the existence of a Cosmic Entity, this suggests that either said entity is cruel/whimsical in creating flawed minds or the Cosmic Entity is itself Flawed.
Kindest regards,
James