The Case for Idealism

[Collecemall]

One of the rubrics I've come to use is to ask what utility an idea offers. Holding that idea in hand as a candle, what previously dark areas does it illuminate? Does it present fertile vistas? Can I do something with it?

This is, of course, not to say that reality is obliged to be useful to me, but given my few years alive, I'll take whatever I can get. If it has utility, then it's unarguably worth something. But if an idea doesn't present any utility, then it's hard to see the point of being bothered with it.

I primarily lurk here. For a number of reasons. Among them is I'm not as smart nor as educated as most here. I also don't communicate all that well. I'm not all that perceptive but I do recognize these limitations. From the start of this discussion I had a similar thought to what I quoted here. My first response was a shrug of my shoulders followed by "And?". But as usual someone here says it in a manner that is both more clear and conveys more than my simple iterations might be able to muster. Thanks for that BTW.

I can't speak to the intentions of the OP. He's addressed a number of jibes at people such as being autistic and a retard that someone genuinely can't control were that the case. However, being a cunt is something you can control. I can't fathom an intention that this really helps achieve other than the person enjoys being a cunt. Which is fine in some instances. I think there are fine reasons to be a cunt to other people. I just haven't figured out what has happened here to trigger said behavior nor can I figure out what it's trying to achieve. With that I'm back to lurking.


Take care.

 

[Sparhafoc]

But as usual someone here says it in a manner that is both more clear and conveys more than my simple iterations might be able to muster. Thanks for that BTW.

Honestly, that's one of the things I value most out of discussion, whether online or otherwise: sometimes the unique experiences, personal vocabulary, and particular articulation of another person combines to give crystal clear form to a shadow I had previously only grasped at!

It does make it all worthwhile! /cheers

 

[Sparhafoc]

Amusingly apropos to both the points therein, I just recalled hearing another formulation of the same idea.

The guy (called Shrunk) raised the analogy of a beautifully wrought sausage-making machine from which, no matter how artfully one applies oneself to the handle, turning the precision mechanical instrumentation so carefully crafted and balanced inside, no sausages ever come out.

:lol:

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

In this post, you said:

Yeah, and that's not a premise now is it? The case for idealism is not predicated on Cosmic Idealism. There is no premise that includes a cosmic entity, you're mistaken. I've only made a general case for idealism.

In the cited quote, you claim to adhere to Cosmic Idealism, which is premised on the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

Your argument is premised on a unspoken assumption - the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

The fact that you claim you're only arguing for idealism, not Cosmic Idealism, sounds very like what Intelligent Design advocates do - attempt to hide the fact that they're arguing for a Creator by talking about the IDs being aliens.

I've pointed out the sophistry of this position in a number of threads before - such as here.

To summarize:

ID advocate: Humans were created by IDs - aliens.
Me: How did those aliens come into being?
ID advocate: Other aliens.
Me: OK, let's go all the way back through the history of the universe to the very first planet capable of supporting intelligent aliens. How did these first IDs come about? Evolution or a Creator?

At this point, I'm either met with silence or the IDer admits that they believe the first aliens came about through being created by a deity (and you'll note that Leroy never actually addressed the point I made).

In other words, they are being disingenuous - ID is sophistry because it's creationism disguised as something not involving a deity.

This is what you're doing when you say you're "only" arguing for idealism, not Cosmic Idealism. And in doing so, you're either blind to this or you are being willfully blind.

Also, with regard to the above, you have misread the context in which I used the term "premised".

No, if you meant something else then you're mistaken on the use of the word premised. Definition of premised: "base an argument, theory, or undertaking on." As we can clearly see, my argument is not based on a cosmic entity as your language suggests.

It is a hidden assumption for your argument.

Before putting forth your argument for idealism, you need to address - provide evidence for - said Cosmic Entity.

No I don't actually because my argument is only claiming that Idealism is true. The case for idealism is just that: a case for idealism, not cosmic idealism. The case for cosmic idealism is another case altogether.

No, it isn't, since it is the basis for your argument for idealism.

I'm not sure from where you get the notion from the above source that Dennett's being a "eliminativist materialist" precludes him from holding that consciousness is emergent.

You really should have read that link I gave you: if he's an eliminativist then he believes there are no mental properties, even emergent ones.

And yet my cited source indicates he's categorized as a member of those who believe in "emergence".

And if you'd read any of his books relevant to this discussion, you'd understand why. Perhaps this may clear up some of the confusion on where he stands. Apparently a reductionist who argues for a non-reductionist approach - what does that make him?!

The biochemical reactions within a neuron, which govern its interactions with other neurons in a brain, and the chemical reactions within a CPU, and between the CPU and other parts of a computer, are all governed by physics - which is the study of physical systems.

There is no room for a non-physical level - aka, mental - as you seem to believe/think.

Is that mind or consciousness?

For sake of simplicity I'm using them interchangeably as my language suggests. Consciousness is mental, in nature, and when I talk about consciousness being fundamental I'm talking about mind being fundamental. I did define them just now, you're literally just ignoring it: first-person subjective awareness. Please stop pretending I didn't answer your question, it's coming off as disingenuous. thank you.

The fact that you chose to use them interchangeably without clarifying that you think of them as such meant that you didn't explain that to the rest of us.

As terms, "mind" is a thing, "consciousness" is a subset of the mind, which is part of a process.

Your use of them as interchangeable is problematic.

Westerhoff raises the question, what if you were a computer-generated hologram that's programmed to believe you are a real human? You can feel/hear your heart beat, and your blood pulsing through your veins. If you prick yourself, you experience pain, and see/feel yourself bleed. You're even programmed to believe that God exists.

I addressed this already, you guys have got to read more carefully: computers just shift around syntax. There's no reason to believe there's any first-person subjective awareness in any kind of computer-generated anything. You're asking me to conceive of something when there's no reason to believe its even conceivable. You're all just begging the question and ignoring this. We can doubt the external world all we want, but we can't deny that we're conscious without contradicting ourselves. Illusions need to be perceived, and you can't say it's all an illusion without conceding there really is a perceiver who can be deceived in the first place to experience an illusion. You're all sawing off the very branch you sit on and you don't seem to even realize it.

You appear unable to address the brain-in-a-vat conundrum.

Let me put it another way by changing one of your above statements: "There's no reason to believe there's any first-person subjective awareness in life-forms.", given that there's no such thing as "I" accepted in neuroscience.

So, I ask again, how can you prove you're not a hologram?

Kindest regards,

James

 

[Monistic Idealism]

No aversion. I just choose to reply how I choose to reply. If I choose to use two posts to address two of your posts, or if I choose to pull out one idea and expand on it in a separate post, then that's what I've chosen to do. Should it be a problem for your eyes, concentration, mouse-wheel, or some other imaginable grudge it could possibly inflict on you, then I most deeply and humbly apologize.

Alright then. Maybe it's because I'm a monist and why I like everything to be in one place lol it just seems that breaking up the responses can make some arguments slip through the cracks but whatever.

quite honestly from where I am sitting, the merit of the content of your OP doesn't really seem to be why you're here. Your attempts to spread scorn on the alleged collective here, the icky physicalists, suggests you have another motivation underlying your posts.

I just call it like it is, man. You guys have some opposing views but you don't seem to go after each other, like you put on a united front. I mean if it were about going after ideas that you disagreed with and such then surely there'd be some calling out of the others but there isn't. Seems pretty tribalistic. But either way, such analyses do not address my arguments or yours, its just an observation. Go ahead and formulate all kinds of conspiracies about me, I have a valid argument with support for each premise. It stands on its own merits.

Yes, you are correct, and in some ways I agree with you.

I appreciate the intellectual humility. No need to be contrarian because of any dislike of another, truth is truth no matter who says it. All the more reason to focus on the argument instead of the person.

However, you must also agree that this is not a formal debate where in the notion of fallacies has actual purchase

I agree this is not a formal debate and so there is some slack that we should give each other to a degree, at the least for sake of charity. But fallacies exist in the realm of logic, not necessarily debate. If one is going to form an argument, give reasons for what they believe is true or not true, then the reasoning still needs to be valid. We may not force each other to give them in premise-conclusion format like I volunteered to do but we still need to be logical.

Also, to go back to an aside I made earlier, but which I do think is a very valid point when it comes to discussions: labels only serve if they serve all the same.

I still stand by my position when I responded with how I could call what you just stated to me as labelism and we can affirm it to be true and everything would be just fine. As we can see from this, labels aren't the problem. They're useful ways to succinctly capture a description. Instead of always saying "the belief that everything is physical" I can just say physicalism. It's just a better way to communicate really.

In the instance where there is a perceived fallacy, for example, then it is only necessary to contend the point itself by showing how a statement is wrong. If it is actually wrong, then the reason why it's wrong is not because of a label but because it can be shown wrong.

I understand the importance of trying to negate the actual point, but sometimes you don't have to go there. If someone makes a claim and their logic is formally invalid, which is indeed demonstrable, then their claim lacks support and you can just point that out for what it is: a non-sequitur. There's nothing wrong with that.

So for example, calling something a 'strawman' means you are actually positing an intention; a constructed proxy to knock down.

Not necessarily. The Straw Man Fallacy is defined as: Substituting a person’s actual position or argument with a distorted, exaggerated, or misrepresented version of the position of the argument.

There's nothing about it being deliberate, or about intention, it's just a fact that they are attacking a sort of different version of the argument of which is not the author's.

And one last addendum. There is always a possibility that people see connections you don't.

Burden of proof would have to be on them, and if that's the case then they would have to still accept the fact that the author is not actually making such a claim regarding X. It makes sense to say "what you said leads to X" but you start getting into murky waters when you insist the author actually said X. If you see a connection then make it, point it out, and don't forget the author is the authority on what they mean regardless of how well they may be at communicating what they mean. To avoid attacking straw men, you always want to make sure you get your ducks lined up in a row first, clear the air and make sure everything is understood first, then go for it.

Alternatively, perhaps you want to test out your idea? If so, then I would argue that critical feedback is vastly more useful than passive acceptance.

I agree, which is partly why I made the comment about tribalism and physicalism. Looks like a bubble, and that should worry you if you really believe what you said here. Gotta be critical of each other as well ya know.

There are obviously not remotely analogous.

Yes they are, especially when you consider the context of why I said that. The other guy kept responded with "well that's what the computer would say!" well guess what? The reflection says what you say as well and can even convince another person that it's really a person right there, when in fact there isn't. This alone on its face does indeed show a contradiction in his argument. He would have to make a more sophisticated point from here other than "but that's what a computer would say!" since that would commit him to reflections being conscious too, which we know is lunacy.

Several pages back, I raised Nick Bostrum's Simulation Argument. Let's be quite clear here. Raising an argument doesn't mean I subscribe to it, but rather that there is something useful to be taken from it.

Well I mean, with an admission like that then why can't I just note that we can have doubts about this argument for the same reasons you seem to. But yeah the OP actually has a mini preemptive strike on such simulation arguments: you can doubt all kinds of things about the external world like how maybe we're in the matrix (simulation) but one thing you cannot doubt is that you're conscious. To state otherwise is to state a contradiction. From here, the case for idealism takes over in such considerations about consciousness. Even if you're in a simulation and the universe is a simulation, it would still follow that everything that exists would still have to be mental. And Bostrum's argument has been shown to lead to a sort of infinite regress as those who simulate us would also be governed by laws like ours which would have to be explained by yet another simulation and so on.

Not only is it fallacious (discrediting the person rather than actually countering the argument) it's also another iteration of your repeated condescension and smarmy self-pleasuring

Okay so now you care about fallacies and proper debate format? This is the internet man, you can handle some bants. If it's too much you can always look away from the screen, come on now. I wouldn't say it's fallacious given I'm pulling on commitments we know sane people to hold: reflections are not themselves conscious. We all know that if someone started treated reflections as actual conscious people then we would be questioning their mental states in a very serious manner and would say what they're doing is lunacy. Don't get all turbo-skeptic on me all of a sudden out of nowhere, you know what I'm talking about man.

Again, the point really is that I have never in my life suggested that one's reflection is conscious.

Just to make sure we're clear, the point about reflections needs to be taken in context. It was in response to the guy who kept using the "but that's what the computer would say!" line over and over. To rip it out of context from here is to tread the territory of straw man land.

This is also insulting and its a frequently used insult. Whenever you are challenged, you repeat this line.

I say that when people are like "where's your argument for that?" or "you have no support for that claim" when I have like a whole paragraph going over it with scholarly citations. If I have a point to make and somebody missed it all the way back from the OP then yeah I'm going to rightfully point them in the direction of the OP.

You're not making the case TO us, because you refuse to engage with any refutation or discussion of your case.

Yeah that's a blatant lie on your part lol on the very first page it was YOU who decided to stop engaging with my arguments and you said you were done and now you're here because I had to trigger you back into the discussion. There's pages of me not only giving arguments and rebuttals but of me insisting on you to focus more on the argument instead of the person, but its clear I triggered you a bit too much. A little bit of banter here and there is whatever, it's the internet we can all get over it, but when you dedicate the majority of your effort on that instead of the argument at hand there's an issue. Honestly dude, look how much time and effort you've spent talking about me instead of the argument. Focus.

Even in a formal debate you do not have the luxury of demanding the format in which your interlocutor must respond

Actually you do. If you're not addressing the argument, you fail. If you're not negating their claim, you fail. Make all the personal judgments and conspiracy theories about the person, you still fail to address the arguments and evidence that contradict your worldview.

Further, your 'scholarly citations' are not really very important.

That's like when a creationists insists the science the other cites isn't important. We all know it is. They are actually quite important. They are a reflection of the current state of the field of study. Also, I'm not just citing some articles by some dudes, if you have had academic experience in philosophy of mind then all of these names stick out as heavy hitters. These are guys that helped define the parameters of the very debate we're having and the direction of future research in the field and all that. And of course you have to judge the argument on its own merits and that needs to be done if they are to be dismissed rationally.

I actually showed you how useful 'scholarly citations' are by citing Daniel Dennet.

Talk about a lack of context. Dennett is a controversial figure, even by fellow physicalists. You're citing the one guy that is often cited as a source of criticism, really bad example on your part that doesn't make your case at all. One can always appeal to outliers, its the average that defines the pattern.

Your case, which as you must admit you borrowed wholly from other people, is and has already been addressed

I have some premises which are in fact informed by scholarship, which is a good thing, and I then put them together to rationally conclude that idealism is true. I got some new information by putting together some other known bits of information, and that's what we call an inference. Ooh, you caught me making an inference. Ya got me, fam.

Similarly, all those responses have been responded to, and so on and so forth.

With the times people actually did address the arguments I did in indeed give a response to them with a counter argument. I'm doing it right now.

There are numerous answers which you don't accept; even Russell's response from a century ago is still just as valid today

This is really ironic because I got done in my last response showing how Russell's own philosophy of mind actually lapses into idealism lol

Explained how I was saying 'either' you were right in defining what I believe, 'or" I am right in defining what I believe

.

That still takes the form of P or not P, which means I've been right the whole time. Look man, either you're affirming the law of excluded middle or you're not. If you're not, you're a logic denier. If you are, then you're good.

Pretty much every single human value also doesn't work within the framework of non-contradiction.

You're saying all of this as if it contradicts what I'm saying lol do you not see the irony there? Look man, we can't have rational debate if we're going to go around denying logic. And don't go full blown turbo-skeptic when idealism is brought up because you're not making an objection to idealism per se but epistemology and metaphysics and philosophy in general and you're going to have to be some kind of weird nuanced Pyrrhonian skeptic that to avoid contradicting yourself.

Not 'lied' because I believe it to be true.

The ole George Costanza defense, eh? Making up accusations about people is indeed lying, otherwise I could just call you a rapist and lean back on the possibility that it might be true. Don't you see how your logic can lead to some pretty unethical stuff?

Or, it reveals your prejudices in producing an assumed commitment on your part which you haven't actually established, merely asserted as true.

naw, it just reveals a commitment.

Well, I will respond that you are attempting to reverse the problem to me while also declaring my position regardless of the fact that I have not taken a position. Your own statements were contradictory with previous statements you'd made, which provoked me to ask you a question. So it's really you who needs to explain what he means.

Nice dodge. I already gave you my answer long ago, you just didn't like it. Your turn.

But you say that a brain is reducible to phenomenal properties, of which the latter are necessarily part of a mind, so you are saying that the mind exists WITHOUT the brain because it precedes it.

No, they are one. There was no talk of anything preceding one another, there is an identity thesis here. Brain=Mind. This makes sense in idealism because meddling with the brain is not meddling with another substance or type of thing. The brain is the experienced aspect of your mind from the third person perspective, while your own mind is of course just your mind as experienced from the first person.

but there's another mind lurking behind it all in order for there to be phenomenal properties. So then we have turtles

I was right about to say: that is indeed turtles if we were talking about dualism. I'm not talking about a little man inside the brain like a dualist, I'm a monist. Brain=Mind. I'm making an identity thesis like the physicalist, but in the opposite direction. Instead of reducing the mind to the brain, the brain is reduced to the mind. Of course you have a brain, just like how you have consciousness.

Yes and no. I told you that your argument didn't convince me.

In my first response to you I noted how you failed to address the paragraphs I laid out and that you focused too much on the formal argument alone. This was responded by you just saying you're done with trying to go line by line...

Which everyone can see is not true, for my rebuttals are still there too.

That's 100% wrong. My initial rebuttals are there, followed by you just saying you're done going line by line. It then spun off to other stuff, while the initial rebuttals are just sitting there. The refutations you think you're so sure of were responded to you on the very first page and you never got around to them because you were so distracted going off on what you're now calling the more "conversationalist" approach, which how I see it is just a refusal to really get at the meat of the argument.

Well, I believe you are a person who frequented another site under a different username. The reasons for this are numerous. Could I be wrong? Of course, but the similarities would then be truly awe-inspiring from a probability perspective

Could you be wrong? yes, there's an eyewitness that can publicly verify that you're wrong. You're not possibly wrong, you're publicly and verifiably wrong. Either way, I'm interested in discussing the argument not this petty crap.

As Akamia already pointed out for you: you were mistaken. It was Master_Ghost_Knight who wrote "Maybe you should have consulted the right scholars, like neuroscientists or AI researchers. You know people who actually do this for a living, who have physical proof of their statements." not me, ergo you wrongly accused me half a dozen times, and in so doing repeatedly used it as an excuse to ignore other questions I asked.

We were both mistaken as Akamia pointed out, don't lie by omission here. We both got some wires crossed (one of the reasons I think its good to not break up responses, it gets shit all jumbled up). But since we both remember the context, and for anyone reading, I already noted that I made that statement as a correction to someone else. You then brought it back up as if I was going on about credentials when really I was just correcting another. I've explained myself on this already, this petty crap is boring. Let's back to the argument already.

No, Akamia contested that your argument was satisfactory.

Not true, they were asking for support, which means they didn't see the support I already provided in the OP.

Right, but you did before which is what I was alluding to,

Nope, I never have. If I ever leaned on authority it was on the authority of scholarship.

The problem with that citation is that you misread it.

No it isn't as I already addressed. You cited an earlier portion of it, and I cited the response to that earlier portion.

The problem with many of your earlier citations is that you cited people who don't actually share the same position as you.

I'm not trying to be mean here when I say this: what you just said right here has to be one of the most common and one of the dumbest objections I've ever heard to the case for idealism. The whole point of argument is to connect the premises in a valid form to draw a conclusion. It doesn't matter what the author of the premise believed, I'm connected other premises from other authors to show how when you combine them you get a new conclusion: Idealism. That's how inferences work. My goodness. I don't have to have a bibliography full of idealists to make a case for idealism.

And you elided a key word immediately: traditional

I also noted how neo-russelians are phenomenalists, don't leave that out because it contradicts what you're trying to say here.

There are plenty of neutral monists around today, for example, the scholarly citations of your OP include Thomas Nagel

In the quote you're using, it cites a work by Nagel where he denies traditional forms of idealism, which called subjective idealism, but he then states on page 18:

The view that rational intelligibility is at the root of the natural order makes me, in a broad sense, an idealist—not a subjective idealist, since it doesn’t amount to the claim that all reality is ultimately appearance—but an objective idealist in the tradition of Plato and perhaps also of certain post-Kantians, such as Schelling and Hegel, who are usually called absolute idealists. I suspect that there must be a strain of this kind of idealism in every theoretical scientist: pure empiricism is not enough.

The section you also cite notes how it might be advisable to not consider him a neutral monist but more of a property dualism. If that were true then it wouldn't matter since A) arguments rest on their own merit and not the author's B) I'm only using his arguments to show how reductionism is wrong so his commitment to property dualism in no way threatens that integrity.

Yes, you say so... but they clearly don't agree with you which is why they remain neutral.

On the contrary, they became phenomenalist idealists, and meanwhile those who remain neutral are fending off the most frequent objection that they lapse into idealism despite their best efforts.

 

[Monistic Idealism]

In the cited quote, you claim to adhere to Cosmic Idealism, which is premised on the existence of a Cosmic Entity

Yes, and the argument I have is only an argument for Idealism, not Cosmic Idealism. For goodness sakes the OP is entitled The Case for Idealism. Notice how it's not entitled The Case for Cosmic Idealism?

Your argument is premised on a unspoken assumption - the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

keyword here is unspoken: so you're admitting I've never said this. You're just pulling this out your ass. You're not looking at what I'm saying, you're just claiming this without a shred of support. Just look at the argument, show me where it says anything at all about a Cosmic entity:

P1.) Mind exists (Introspection).
P2.) Eliminating Consciousness is self-refuting (P1).
P3.) Mind cannot be reduced to non-mind (Hard Problem of Consciousness).
P4.) Substance Dualism is false (Mind-Body Problem).
P5.) Mind-Body Problem implies Monism (P4, Causal Closure).
P6.) Non-Reductive Physicalism is false (Exclusion Problem).
P7.) There is mental causation (Introspection/Mind-Body Interaction).
P8.) There is only mental causation (P5-P7, Exclusion Problem).
Conclusion: Monistic Idealism is true (P1-P8).

Where's the cosmic entity? Notice how you can't find it, because it's not there... You're being disingenuous and making excuses to not address the argument. Fail.

And yet my cited source indicates he's categorized as a member of those who believe in "emergence".

My source is more authoritative and cites his work directly, demonstrating he's an eliminative materialist. I mean just listen to this talk by Daniel Dennett entitled The Illusion of Consciousness: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjbWr3ODbAo

The guy is as eliminativist as it gets.

And if you'd read any of his books relevant to this discussion, you'd understand why.

"To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain...Here is the paradox of this exchange: I am a conscious reviewer consciously answering the objections of an author who gives every indication of being consciously and puzzlingly angry. I do this for a readership that I assume is conscious. How then can I take seriously his claim that consciousness does not really exist?" -John Searle

Source: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1995/dec/21/the-mystery-of-consciousness-an-exchange/

There is no room for a non-physical level - aka, mental - as you seem to believe/think.

We start with the mental, and this whole idea of a "physical" is just non-mental. The distinction is between mental and non-mental, not physical and non-physical.

Your use of them as interchangeable is problematic.

That's your opinion. You need to understand the ambitions of the post: I'm just making a broad case for idealism. There's little details between idealists where they will differ on these issues like you and I while still being idealists.

You appear unable to address the brain-in-a-vat conundrum.

I did all the way back in the OP actually. Here's what I said:

Even if you're skeptical about whether you're in the matrix or if this is a dream, you're still aware that you're aware in each scenario. No matter what you're still conscious, this you definitely know for sure if there is anything that can be said to be known for sure. To claim otherwise would be a contradiction: you would be consciously denying that you're conscious and those who think otherwise are not only mistaken in their thinking but aren't actually thinking at all.

From there the argument takes off given the reflections on the existence of mind and mental causation and we wind up as idealists.

Let me put it another way by changing one of your above statements: "There's no reason to believe there's any first-person subjective awareness in life-forms.", given that there's no such thing as "I" accepted in neuroscience.

You're assuming neuroscience is somehow the authority on this matter. What we're talking about is philosophy of mind, not neuroscience per se. They both inform each other, but ultimately we're making philosophical claims about the mind so we're not limited to neuroscience unless you're trying to make the case for some form of scientism, which is self-refuting.

 

[Sparhafoc]

None so blind as those who refuse to see.

 

[Sparhafoc]

It's not really much of an argument though; of course 'reality as we can know it' is fundamentally mental - that's a tautology.

Given the unwillingness to engage substantively, and the litany of obfuscatory contentions, it is past time that I point out that this is the first sentence i wrote in this thread, MI did not respond to it, and yet keeps telling everyone else they have to respond line by line, and also declaring that he's refuted everything. But not the first line... for many, this would make them reflect. Unfortunately, MI doesn't seem capable of addressing flaws in his own arguments, writing, or thoughts.

The fact is that reality as we can know it is not equivalent to reality; it's a subset thereof.

There is something without the mind that the mind seeks to know via brute sensory organs and sophisticated referential categorization. It achieves this to some sufficient degree, but not perfectly. This then produces ample reason to believe that there is something external to the mind, otherwise it would all just be mind failing to note that it is identifying poorly incomplete representations of its self. It's badly disabled turtles all the way down.

Further, to nip it in the bud, this does not mean 'dualism' label and dismiss.

If the figurative gun is placed at our heads and we were obliged to side either with mentalism or with physicalism, I think the latter is far more compelling because it so much more frequently impinges on the mental, than the mental impinges on the physical.

I think that the mind is an illusion, it's just a very useful one. It's the brain's behavior, and it's been honed through natural selection over billions of iterations.

 

[Sparhafoc]

My proposed evolutionary pathway runs like this:

Proton gradients
Chemistry & Autocatalysis
Basal self-reproducing units employing external reactions utilized for processes perpetuating those self-reproducing units (metabolism)
Homeostasic protocells & internal reactions utilized for processes
Multicellularity = specialization and coordination of grouped cells performing different tasks for the mutual benefit of the organism, i.e. survival vehicle of self-reproducing units
Stimuli & electrochemical response
Sensory stimuli honed and compartmentalized
Nervous responses increase speed of reaction, increase survival, selected for.
Nervous system consolidated into ganglion increasing reaction processing
Increase in adaptiveness and complexity of survival landscape
Increase in processing of central nervous system feedback loop
Complex behaviors & ecology produce higher demands on processing capacity
Central nervous system evolves basal cerebral structures which better/more reliably/more efficiently process stimuli-response.
Structures evolve other functionality with higher processing capacity; territoriality, mate-recognition, complex extended behaviors
Autocatalytic feedback loops where cognitive processing generates increasingly complex survival landscape which in turn increases selection pressure on cognitive processing.
Diversity of possible behavioral landscapes and survival strategies result in new brain structural physiology
Those behavioral landscapes and survival strategies which necessitate complex social interactions and behaviors continue to provide a selection benefit to the increase in processing capacity.
Neocortexes (and neocortex like structures) evolve and in some species increase in size dramatically and become more efficient through increasing density comparative to volume, such as with gyri and sulci.
These new structures present organism with greater flexibility to learn and adapt to external events; behavior no longer hard-coded, but soft-coded through learned responses stored and referentially applied.
Most evolved neocortexes allow for complex mental mapping and combination of experienced states as well as imagined states.
A rubicon is crossed, and self-awareness, language, and conditionals present a set of memetic feedback loops, stored in cultural memory traditions, creating a mental landscape that becomes more vital than the external one.
Flynn effect x 80kya
The human brain is quite far removed from its basal role in protecting the organism, and instead now routinely navigates complex cultural landscapes comprised of purely mental concepts (like law, society, education, brands, nations, modern lives) - it conceives of a navel, then falls down its self-conceived navel.


And yes, this is in no part just to annoy certain people who can't bear ideas like reductionism!

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

In the cited quote, you claim to adhere to Cosmic Idealism, which is premised on the existence of a Cosmic Entity

Yes, and the argument I have is only an argument for Idealism, not Cosmic Idealism. For goodness sakes the OP is entitled The Case for Idealism. Notice how it's not entitled The Case for Cosmic Idealism?

Your argument is premised on a unspoken assumption - the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

keyword here is unspoken: so you're admitting I've never said this. You're just pulling this out your ass. You're not looking at what I'm saying, you're just claiming this without a shred of support. Just look at the argument, show me where it says anything at all about a Cosmic entity:

P1.) Mind exists (Introspection).
P2.) Eliminating Consciousness is self-refuting (P1).
P3.) Mind cannot be reduced to non-mind (Hard Problem of Consciousness).
P4.) Substance Dualism is false (Mind-Body Problem).
P5.) Mind-Body Problem implies Monism (P4, Causal Closure).
P6.) Non-Reductive Physicalism is false (Exclusion Problem).
P7.) There is mental causation (Introspection/Mind-Body Interaction).
P8.) There is only mental causation (P5-P7, Exclusion Problem).
Conclusion: Monistic Idealism is true (P1-P8).

Where's the cosmic entity? Notice how you can't find it, because it's not there... You're being disingenuous and making excuses to not address the argument. Fail.

The fact that you don't mention it doesn't mean that it's not hanging in the air. ID-ers don't mention God either - but it's hanging in the air nevertheless.

So, let me ask you directly - do you believe in a Cosmic Entity?

Your argument fails from the first premise but let's deal with them one-by-one.

P1 is not proven due to Descartes' error (Damasio);
P2 is an moot assertion without merit (how/why is it "self-refuting"?, and what place does this play in your argument?);
P3 is false (monism, also see Baars' explanation of consciousness in cited article);
P4 is true only for monists;
P5 ditto;
P6 is true for reductive physicalists, and dualists;
P7 Unproven speculation;
P8 Special case pleading from P7;
Ergo, C is false.

However, since P1 fails, everything else that follows is irrelevant.

And yet my cited source indicates he's categorized as a member of those who believe in "emergence".

My source is more authoritative and cites his work directly, demonstrating he's an eliminative materialist. I mean just listen to this talk by Daniel Dennett entitled The Illusion of Consciousness: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fjbWr3ODbAo

The guy is as eliminativist as it gets.

And if you'd read any of his books relevant to this discussion, you'd understand why.

"To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain...Here is the paradox of this exchange: I am a conscious reviewer consciously answering the objections of an author who gives every indication of being consciously and puzzlingly angry. I do this for a readership that I assume is conscious. How then can I take seriously his claim that consciousness does not really exist?" -John Searle

Source: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1995/dec/21/the-mystery-of-consciousness-an-exchange/

I am not claiming he's not an eliminativist - I'm pointing out that this does not preclude him from believing in emergence; he's a materialist who accepts evolution as the basis for what you think of as the mind/consciousness/etc.

And the reviewer is making the same error that Descartes makes, as Damasio pointed out - assuming a first-person consciousness.

There is no room for a non-physical level - aka, mental - as you seem to believe/think.

We start with the mental, and this whole idea of a "physical" is just non-mental. The distinction is between mental and non-mental, not physical and non-physical.

Since what you call the mental exists because of the non-mental (physical), this distinction makes no sense.

Your use of them as interchangeable is problematic.

That's your opinion. You need to understand the ambitions of the post: I'm just making a broad case for idealism. There's little details between idealists where they will differ on these issues like you and I while still being idealists.

Nevertheless, it would have been better for you to clarify what you meant by these terms, so that we'd know to what you were referring - that's the point I was making.

You appear unable to address the brain-in-a-vat conundrum.

I did all the way back in the OP actually. Here's what I said:

Even if you're skeptical about whether you're in the matrix or if this is a dream, you're still aware that you're aware in each scenario. No matter what you're still conscious, this you definitely know for sure if there is anything that can be said to be known for sure. To claim otherwise would be a contradiction: you would be consciously denying that you're conscious and those who think otherwise are not only mistaken in their thinking but aren't actually thinking at all.

From there the argument takes off given the reflections on the existence of mind and mental causation and we wind up as idealists.

... And repeat Descartes' error.

The question you fail to ask is, "Is there an 'I'?".

How do you know? How can you tell?

If the "I" is an illusion, where does that leave you?

Let me put it another way by changing one of your above statements: "There's no reason to believe there's any first-person subjective awareness in life-forms.", given that there's no such thing as "I" accepted in neuroscience.

You're assuming neuroscience is somehow the authority on this matter. What we're talking about is philosophy of mind, not neuroscience per se. They both inform each other, but ultimately we're making philosophical claims about the mind so we're not limited to neuroscience unless you're trying to make the case for some form of scientism, which is self-refuting.

If one is merely philosophizing without reference to science, then that's all well-and-good - but if we want to actually get anywhere, we need to look at the hard questions, like the one I've put to you about determining whether you're a hologram or not.

And Baars' explanation for consciousness is the best one we have at present, which does away with the "first-person subjective experience" to which you hold.

Kindest regards,

James

 

[Sparhafoc]

Where's the cosmic entity? Notice how you can't find it, because it's not there... You're being disingenuous and making excuses to not address the argument. Fail.

The fact that you don't mention it doesn't mean that it's not hanging in the air. ID-ers don't mention God either - but it's hanging in the air nevertheless.

So, let me ask you directly - do you believe in a Cosmic Entity?

Yes. To put it another way: it's predicated on a basal, cosmos encompassing mind. Doesn't matter for the record what tradition of thought that mind is imagined in, be it theist, panentheist, new-agey cosmic gaia, simulations, or other sundry versions, it still requires accepting this as the grammar of the argument for the argument to actually make any sense, and there's certainly no valid reason I can see to do so.

That basal mind is wholly a belief, not something which should be considered axiomatic.

Perhaps the argument presented in the OP looks better if you already share the belief in a basal mind because then you fill in the flaws of the postulates with your a priori rationalizations.

But when you lack belief in the basal mind, the series of postulates outlined in the OP simply do not hang together or read in the way intended. But no one seems able to convince the chap that it's not their faulty logic, their adhered-to label, or their refusal to read the OP that are resulting in their rejection, but rather a bemusement that MI or anyone would consider this a valid argument, let alone a true one.

The premises are not true; they are only 'true' in so far as the things they propose are understood the same way by all, and so in the absence of any attempts at definition, a standard significance is assumed. But if later uses of that word then contradict the earlier meaning, then it is right - actually, required - to reject the initial premise too. For example, I may well be able to agree to the postulate minds' exist*, but if mind is later defined or employed in a way as something that I would not agree with existing, then I can't simply allow the first premise. What I know to be 'mind' doesn't coordinate at all with P8, that there is only mental causation.... not the kind of mind I said exists.

So perhaps another type of mind is being smuggled in. Of course, no one is under any obligation to genuflect to a definition that changes meaning depending on the postulate being expounded and they do not have to accept the postulates just because the proponent insists they do.

* Incidentally, this postulate also has the problem of assuming that 'existence' is a predicate, and that a predict is a property an object can possess, which basically underscores that it is has a tautological quotient to it as I identified in the first words of my first reply. To say the thing is already to say it exists.


If any still-interested reader were to go back to the first page and review the responses, I think they'd take away something quite different to how MI has read it.

For my part, I rejected the first postulate because of how it was being used later. For Master_Ghost_Knight, he accepted the postulate - assuming mutual significance - then rejected later postulates that required 'mind' to mean something unacceptable to him.

This is not a flaw in our response. It is not a discussion if you are not entitled to reject the postulates on your own grounds. I believe MI assumes his conclusion because of a priori conviction that the tapestry on which his argument subsists fills in all the gaps in his actual argument, so to him his argument looks sound, but it looks like a poorly wrought sieve to others.

But that doesn't justify the endless parade of snide aggression (see bolded in original quote) directed at anyone who dares to disagree.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Even if you're skeptical about whether you're in the matrix or if this is a dream, you're still aware that you're aware in each scenario. No matter what you're still conscious, this you definitely know for sure if there is anything that can be said to be known for sure.

Would anyone like to offer a little crack filler here by suggesting examples of experiences when you're aware that you're not aware for the above sentence to have any purchase at all?

What does it mean to be aware that you're aware if you can't be aware that you're unaware. If you're aware you're not aware, then you're.... aware of it and must therefore actually be aware that you are aware.

Amusingly, you can still be unaware that you're unaware.

And therein, with words alone, lies a perfectly equal & valid rebuttal to the stated notion. Perhaps you're just unaware that you're unaware, convinced of an error, snared in a trap of your own devising.

The grammar of our thoughts.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Again, and to point out how much MI has... overlooked...

How can you tell the difference between the quality of consciousness a human allegedly possesses, and the allegedly simulated consciousness a computer is limited to possess?

A computer is reducible to the structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of its basic elements while consciousness is not.

Therefore, take apart your computer and point to where the line you've written above exists.


If you cannot do that, and you admit you cannot do that, and you know why you cannot do that... then your argument isn't sound.

You haven't actually explained anything.

You've made lots of noises and gestures which may have distracted you or others away from this point, but there it remains.

The programs a computer runs are not reducible to the structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of the computer.

The things a program does are far greater than the sum of the constituent parts of a computer. There is an emergence of possibilities. Complexity can arise through the most simple of local interactions, particularly when stochastic effects are in play.

There is a actually a hierarchy and community of interactions between various programs.

One program might allow the CPU to access, understand, or support the GPU, another might establish a rule that allows the GPU to be commanded to perform by yet another piece of software. A further piece of software sets up a new architecture of how communication will take place between a suite of other programs and the existing software structures.

You can't find any of them on the computer itself - not even on the hard drive, without running the computer and the entire system for them all to emerge.

The final products, like your written sentence above, are wholly contingent on the prior software processes, the numerous interactions occurring regardless of your sentence, but which also allow your sentence to occur. They are also contingent on the physical computer for them all to emerge.

In reality, this parallels mental functions and brains. Many mental states and behaviors of the mind are predicated and contingent on other parts of the brain operating and cooperating. Your ability to formulate grammatically coherent sentences is necessarily contingent both on the parts of the brain responsible for language processing, and on the parts of the brain responsible for more basal factors, like coordinating the motion of one's fingers to type. If mind emerges from brains, then it subsists on brains, and is really best seen as the behavior of the brain.


But anyway, temporarily granting for the sake of the argument the contention that consciousness is not reducible, this has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on whether it is illusory as you have suggested any computer/AI conceit to consciousness would necessarily be.

The exact premise of your response - that an AI can not be conscious even if it thinks it is - confounds your own case for Idealism. You have not established that you are conscious, you have only established that you hold a conviction that you are conscious.

Interestingly to those of us free of metaphysical baggage, we might be inclined to wonder whether the conviction is really the most essential aspect; what consciousness actually is - conviction in self, warranted or not. I expect, though, that it's just an all too typical ground-ape conceit.

 

[Monistic Idealism]

the first sentence i wrote in this thread, MI did not respond to it,

That is demonstrably wrong. On the first page, my first response to you starts with an address of this. Here's a direct quote of me doing so:

Of course. That initial definition was only describing both epistemological and ontological idealism. I made an argument for ontological idealism, not mere epistemological idealism. I'm arguing that reality is mental, and I gave argument for this with support. I didn't appeal to skepticism about our perception and the external world, I appealed to shared intuitions of monism and causation.

So we can all see I did in fact respond. You were confused about the difference between epistemological and ontological idealism and I corrected you on it.

Yes. To put it another way: it's predicated on a basal, cosmos encompassing mind.

Do you people seriously not understand the meaning of the word premised? It means: base an argument, theory, or undertaking on.

Notice how you guys can't point out a single premise with the cosmic entity in it? It's because you're flat-out wrong. You can't point which premise has the cosmic entity, because it's not there. Open a dictionary dude. The case for idealism that I laid out has nothing to do with a cosmic entity, that's a separate case altogether as even David Chalmers pointed out in that article I cited in the OP. His works passes peer-review, yours doesn't.

That basal mind [...] not something which should be considered axiomatic.

I don't consider it axiomatic. I have a separate argument for that. I never once considered it to be axiomatic at all. To say otherwise is to just flat out lie (again).

* Incidentally, this postulate also has the problem of assuming that 'existence' is a predicate

Um, no... Saying that something exists is not saying existence is a predicate. No idea how you got there...

I believe MI assumes his conclusion because of a priori conviction that the tapestry on which his argument subsists fills in all the gaps in his actual argument, so to him his argument looks sound, but it looks like a poorly wrought sieve to others

.

Believe whatever you want, it doesn't mean you have good reasons for your belief. What you're saying here is no rebuttal to the argument I provided at all.

What does it mean to be aware that you're aware if you can't be aware that you're unaware.

You do know contradictions are necessarily false, right?

Therefore, take apart your computer and point to where the line you've written above exists.

It's just a bunch of hardware and software. That's it. Once we describe those elements we have officially described the computer in its entirety. There's nothing more to it. But that's not the case with us.

The programs a computer runs are not reducible to the structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of the computer.

Yes it is. They are grounded in the hardware and powered by it. The software doesn't do anything without input from the hardware and arises from it.

You have not established that you are conscious, you have only established that you hold a conviction that you are conscious.

Kind of hard for me to hold a belief if there's no beliefs lol your attempt at turbo-skepticism only reveals the strengths of my argument: you have to go full retard to doubt my premises. You have to contradict yourself in order to argue against me. You have to think that you don't think to argue against premise 1, and that's just contradictory. If you believe consciousness to be an illusion then you believe in a contradiction.

 

[Monistic Idealism]

The fact that you don't mention it doesn't mean that it's not hanging in the air.

Yes it does actually. Kind of hard for something to be a premise if its not a premise. Notice how you fail to meet your burden of proof? You can't point out a single premise in the argument that says anything about a cosmic entity. You fail man, you don't have support for your claim by your own admission given this fact.

So, let me ask you directly - do you believe in a Cosmic Entity?

Yup, but that doesn't mean the argument is premised on a cosmic entity. Belief≠premise, to say otherwise is pure equivocation on your part. Please learn what "premised" means...

P1 is not proven due to Descartes' error (Damasio)

Where's your argument for this? I have at least paragraphs formulating my support for each premise, you have no support.

P2 is an moot assertion without merit (how/why is it "self-refuting"?, and what place does this play in your argument?);

P2 follows trivially from P1. This is just a preemptive strike at eliminativism, which comes more into play when non-reductive physicalism comes up.

P3 is false (monism, also see Baars' explanation of consciousness in cited article);

What's the argument?

P4 is true only for monists

How?

P5 ditto;

Well it is an affirmation of monism so sounds weird to be like "this is true only for monists" lol

P6 is true for reductive physicalists, and dualists;

No, it's just true.

P7 Unproven speculation;

How am I supposed to speculate if there's no mind to speculate? I can't be mistaken in my thinking if there is no thinking. Your rejection of introspection as a way of knowledge leads you to a contradiction.

P8 Special case pleading from P7;

How is this special pleading?

Ergo, C is false.

Oof, noobie mistake there. You're wrong about my argument being mistaken in general, but even if you were right about my argument being mistaken, that doesn't mean the conclusion is false. That's a non-sequitur on your part. You can try to say the argument fails to lead to the conclusion or properly support it, but from that its fallacious for you to conclude that the conclusion must be wrong.

However, since P1 fails, everything else that follows is irrelevant.

See this is what it boils down to people: those who believe they are conscious, and those who are not. As long as you're actually conscious and you believe it, this argument works. Those who disagree are led into a contradictory belief in which they believe they don't have beliefs. They think they don't think. They must deny conscious, for if they affirm it they will lapse into idealism given the argument.

And the reviewer is making the same error that Descartes makes, as Damasio pointed out - assuming a first-person consciousness.

Nobody is assuming, we're knowing through introspection and the fact that denying consciousness leads to a contradiction.

the mental exists because of the non-mental (physical)

Proof?

If one is merely philosophizing without reference to science, then that's all well-and-good - but if we want to actually get anywhere, we need to look at the hard questions,

Yeah and I do that just fine. Just don't forget that scientism is wrong and that philosophy of mind is more fundamental.

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

The fact that you don't mention it doesn't mean that it's not hanging in the air.

Yes it does actually. Kind of hard for something to be a premise if its not a premise. Notice how you fail to meet your burden of proof? You can't point out a single premise in the argument that says anything about a cosmic entity. You fail man, you don't have support for your claim by your own admission given this fact.

So, let me ask you directly - do you believe in a Cosmic Entity?

Yup, ...

So, as pointed out, your "I'm only arguing for idealism" is shown to be no different than the ID-ers ploy - as was pointed out by myself and others.

We await your evidence for the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

...but that doesn't mean the argument is premised on a cosmic entity. Belief≠premise, to say otherwise is pure equivocation on your part. Please learn what "premised" means...

You keep accusing others of not knowing what "premised" means, yet you are the one who clearly doesn't understand it based on your own definition - so, let's look at your definition, and see why you're the one who's in the wrong:

Monistic Idealism[/url]"]Do you people seriously not understand the meaning of the word premised? It means: base an argument, theory, or undertaking on.

Your OP is an extended argument that is premised on your unspoken belief in the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

You are the one who doesn't understand the meaning of "premised".

QED.

P1 is not proven due to Descartes' error (Damasio)

Where's your argument for this? I have at least paragraphs formulating my support for each premise, you have no support.

I infer from this that you don't understand what is meant by "Descartes' error", despite my expanding on it later in the same post. And a Google search for this, in conjunction with Damasio, would clarify this for you - not to mention that the cited article I provided earlier covers this.

P2 is an moot assertion without merit (how/why is it "self-refuting"?, and what place does this play in your argument?);

P2 follows trivially from P1. This is just a preemptive strike at eliminativism, which comes more into play when non-reductive physicalism comes up.

It's conditional on P1 being true, and since P1 is not, then P2 is not.

P3 is false (monism, also see Baars' explanation of consciousness in cited article);

What's the argument?

The fact that monism is physically-based, in that we have evidence for physical reality, whilst there's no evidence of the mental absent the physical.

And Baars' explanation of consciousness is physically-based, as you'd realize if you'd read the cited article.

P4 is true only for monists

How?

Dualists would argue the opposite of what you claim, and since your argument is based on the existence of the mental, their claims are equally valid.

P5 ditto;

Well it is an affirmation of monism so sounds weird to be like "this is true only for monists" lol

Since you've made it conditional on P4 being true, and P4 is arguable, P5 doesn't hold true either.

P6 is true for reductive physicalists, and dualists;

No, it's just true.

Not for non-reductive physicalists.

P7 Unproven speculation;

How am I supposed to speculate if there's no mind to speculate? I can't be mistaken in my thinking if there is no thinking. Your rejection of introspection as a way of knowledge leads you to a contradiction.

Your claim for mental causation - absent the physical without which the mind doesn't exist - is pure speculation on your part. We know the physical exists - we have no evidence for the mental absent the physical.

P8 Special case pleading from P7;

How is this special pleading?

It is conditional on P7, and since P7 is unproven speculation on your part - and worse, special pleading based on a wish for there being a Cosmic Entity - it is false.

Ergo, C is false.

Oof, noobie mistake there. You're wrong about my argument being mistaken in general, but even if you were right about my argument being mistaken, that doesn't mean the conclusion is false. That's a non-sequitur on your part. You can try to say the argument fails to lead to the conclusion or properly support it, but from that its fallacious for you to conclude that the conclusion must be wrong.

In a argument, the conclusion is supposed to logically follow from the preceding premises: as these are either false or arguable, the conclusion is necessarily false.

And, if you're going to claim your conclusion is true regardless of the argument, this makes the conclusion no better than a bald assertion on your part.

However, since P1 fails, everything else that follows is irrelevant.

See this is what it boils down to people: those who believe they are conscious, and those who are not. As long as you're actually conscious and you believe it, this argument works. Those who disagree are led into a contradictory belief in which they believe they don't have beliefs. They think they don't think. They must deny conscious, for if they affirm it they will lapse into idealism given the argument.

If you're going to ignore the scientific data/evidence, then your argument is worthless.

Such arguments are just words, and prove nothing.

And the reviewer is making the same error that Descartes makes, as Damasio pointed out - assuming a first-person consciousness.

Nobody is assuming, we're knowing through introspection and the fact that denying consciousness leads to a contradiction.

You're believing - not knowing.

Introspection cannot discern whether consciousness is a single- or group-entity; whether it exists independently, dependently or is an illusion.

This is where Descartes makes his error: assuming a first-person consciousness.

There's no scientific evidence for an "I".

the mental exists because of the non-mental (physical)

Proof?

The physical exists, as I've already said. There's no evidence for the mental absent the physical - your belief that it exists is just that, belief.

If one is merely philosophizing without reference to science, then that's all well-and-good - but if we want to actually get anywhere, we need to look at the hard questions,

Yeah and I do that just fine. Just don't forget that scientism is wrong and that philosophy of mind is more fundamental.

Philosophy of mind does not agree with your belief - and philosophy of mind, without scientific data/evidence to back it up, is empty.

As Feynmann jokingly said in one of his lectures: "Philosophers who believed that it's all an illusion died of starvation".

Kindest regards,

James

 

[Sparhafoc]

Not just poor arguments, but such a self-preening wanker at the same time.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

Is all death suicide?

Why does brain trauma and damage result in changes to the way the mind functions?

Out of curiosity, where were you going with this? I never saw an answer to your second question.

If I had to answer, I'd say that not all death is suicide, and that the functions of the mind are emergent properties of the physical composition and formation of the brain. In an attempt to try and emulate the OP's stance, I would argue that I can only describe myself as having first-person subjective awareness, and that as such I have no clear examples of brain trauma impairing consciousness.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Is all death suicide?

Why does brain trauma and damage result in changes to the way the mind functions?

Out of curiosity, where were you going with this? I never saw an answer to your second question.

If I had to answer, I'd say that not all death is suicide, and that the functions of the mind are emergent properties of the physical composition and formation of the brain. In an attempt to try and emulate the OP's stance, I would argue that I can only describe myself as having first-person subjective awareness, and that as such I have no clear examples of brain trauma impairing consciousness.

I wasn't actually going anywhere with it.

I did mention at some point that I am somewhat more than passingly familiar with the literature and history of thought, and I know some of the problems that come to mind for me when considering idealism. Rather than engage in a contrived pseudo debate with someone only interested in polemics, I would rather ask some questions that come to mind to see whether the idealism proponent's response provides some novel thoughts, or a new way of seeing old problems.

There was no gotcha planned; I was simply trying to get something out of the interaction for me.

Sadly, I failed on both accounts. Nothing new to be learned, and I got nothing out of the interaction. That's why I decided to be snarky and have some fun at his expense instead.

 

[Monistic Idealism]

So, as pointed out, your "I'm only arguing for idealism" is shown to be no different than the ID-ers ploy

No it isn't, you just keep saying that without a shred of support. Arguing for idealism itself does not mean you're arguing for cosmic idealism as Dr. Chalmers pointed out all the way in the OP. His works passes peer-review by real experts in the field, yours doesn't...

We await your evidence for the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

That's for another post as I noted all the way back in the OP. The case for idealism in general is not the same as the case for cosmic idealism. The case for cosmic idealism is premised on idealism, not the other way around. You've got it backwards. I argue first for idealism, then show how cosmic idealism is true.

Your OP is an extended argument that is premised on your unspoken belief in the existence of a Cosmic Entity.

You just proved me right: my argument is not based on a cosmic entity as we can clearly see in the premises. I gave you the whole argument, gave you a chance to show which premise has the cosmic entity in it, and you failed to show us which premise has it... You know why? Because it's not there... Not a single premise has this cosmic entity in it, you fail to meet your burden of proof.

And a Google search for this, in conjunction with Damasio, would clarify this for you

If you're going to be like that I can just rebut what you're saying by doing what you're doing "that's been refuted, just google it!" Don't be intellectually lazy, give an actual argument...

It's conditional on P1 being true, and since P1 is not, then P2 is not.

See what I mean, folks? This is what you're left with if you want to go against idealism: you have to contradict yourself by denying consciousness. You have to believe that you have no beliefs. You have to think that you don't think. This is self-refuting. Consciousness definitely exists, to say otherwise is flat-out contradictory.

The fact that monism is physically-based, in that we have evidence for physical reality, whilst there's no evidence of the mental absent the physical.

Where's your argument for this physicalist monism? You can't just throw whole papers at people, we're in a discussion. Make an actual argument. And please define the term "physical" for me.

Dualists would argue the opposite of what you claim, and since your argument is based on the existence of the mental, their claims are equally valid.

Dualism is addressed already when the mind-body problem was brought up. Dualism is ruled out.

Since you've made it conditional on P4 being true, and P4 is arguable, P5 doesn't hold true either.

I didn't make it conditional, only that it follows. And I've given reasons why they're true. You just saying "nuh-uh!" is not a rebuttal...

Not for non-reductive physicalists.

Which is addressed. Non-reductive physicalism is ruled out due to the exclusion problem.

Your claim for mental causation - absent the physical without which the mind doesn't exist - is pure speculation on your part. We know the physical exists - we have no evidence for the mental absent the physical.

1. physical needs to be defined properly. 2. if you want the mental and the non-mental together you're just going to be a dualist. Either you're reducing everything to the non-mental which means there's no distinction at all from the non-mental and mental or you're not reducing everything to the non-mental means means there's a distinction from the non-mental and mental. If you reduce, say hello to the hard problem. If you don't reduce, say hello to the exclusion problem. Pick your poison.

It is conditional on P7, and since P7 is unproven speculation on your part - and worse, special pleading based on a wish for there being a Cosmic Entity - it is false.

P7 says absolutely nothing about a Cosmic Entity, you're just pulling that out of your ass. And no it's not conditional, it just follows and I explain how it follows with support.

In a argument, the conclusion is supposed to logically follow from the preceding premises: as these are either false or arguable, the conclusion is necessarily false.

Wrong. You're committing the fallacy fallacy:

You presumed that because a claim has been poorly argued, or a fallacy has been made, that the claim itself must be wrong. It is entirely possible to make a claim that is false yet argue with logical coherency for that claim, just as it is possible to make a claim that is true and justify it with various fallacies and poor arguments.

https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/the-fallacy-fallacy

You can point out errors with the argument (which you've failed to do), but that doesn't mean the conclusion is therefore false. You have to make your own argument to prove the conclusion false.

If you're going to ignore the scientific data/evidence, then your argument is worthless.

I'm not ignoring anything: you are. You're ignoring the justification from introspection by promoting this self-refuting scientism in which neuroscience is somehow the only authority on the knowledge of mental states. We know consciousness exists more certainly than we know there is some external world.

You're believing - not knowing.

How is that possible if there's no such thing as beliefs??? If there's no consciousness, there is no mental, then there's no such thing as beliefs or ideas or knowledge etc.

Introspection cannot discern whether consciousness is a single- or group-entity; whether it exists independently, dependently or is an illusion

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Introspection can indeed tell us that it's not an illusion since by definition illusions are perceived which requires a perceiver. We know directly that we're conscious: I think, I am. This is no assumption, this is experienced directly. Your scientism is self-refuting.

Philosophy of mind does not agree with your belief - and philosophy of mind, without scientific data/evidence to back it up, is empty.

1. that's irrelevant to my arguments. appeal to popularity is fallacious. 2. there's a lot of physicalists and dualists out there, but idealism is coming back as noted in the OP. Oxford University Press actually recently published a collection of essays by 17 leading philosophers entitled Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Science is great, but we have to understand the difference between physics and metaphysics. Physicalism is itself not scientific, it's metaphysical just like idealism, so we have to argue on such grounds. Scientism refutes itself: there's no scientific experiment to prove its true so to affirm it is to saw off the branch you sit on.