Pragmatism and fact-value dichotomy

[devilsadvocate]

Reading various essays from pragmatist philosophers, one idea that is conveyed often is that 1.) facts are always à¬ntertwined with values 2.) and, much bolder statement, that values can be facts.

The problem is I haven't found any argument for the second claim. Seeing there's lots of pragmatists in these forums, can somebody explain the basis for this claim?

 

[CosmicJoghurt]

What follows is my philosophy-newbie-know-nothing-just-thinking-and-posting reply, so beware, it's BS. This is how it's going to be with me on this section of the forum. Don't like it? Well... deal with it


I don't see what you mean by values being facts. Perhaps if you give an example I can help.
If you mean that the meaning behind a value is a fact, that entirely depends on the moral system you live by (or a lack of it).

Cheers!

 

[lrkun]

Reading various essays from pragmatist philosophers, one idea that is conveyed often is that 1.) facts are always à¬ntertwined with values 2.) and, much bolder statement, that values can be facts.

The problem is I haven't found any argument for the second claim. Seeing there's lots of pragmatists in these forums, can somebody explain the basis for this claim?

Facts are always intertwined with values? What does this mean? This is the first time I've heard of it.

Values can be facts? Do you mean value as evaluation/subjective/emotion/feelings? Please be more concrete.

Anyway, in a basic sense facts are things or events. Events may compose of actions or things. These things or events can be observed in the real world. These acts can be demonstrated. Anything other than that is no longer a fact.

 

[brewpanda]

Pragmatists, traditionally, judge with historical context.

Therefore, for most orthodox pragmatists, the statement "Facts are necessarily intertwined with values" can be read as facts- incidents of events and observation, even experience- are measurable within their historical context and ethics or values can be seen to historically be connected and interchanged with these incidents.

We can also say that epistemic values (like/as an example elegant simplicity or principle of parsimony) form the foundational basis for scientific knowledge, which is a containment of "facts".
Since "facts" are intertwined with epistemology, we or a pragmatist especially can say that truths, beliefs, facts, observation, knowledge itself is almost always dependent on some form of the other.

To tie this to the historical aspect of pragmatism, we could say that something that begins as a value, like epistemology, can morph or evolve into- by continual and habitual adherence, a "fact".

This is not to say that pragmatists haven't been trying to escape the principle of facts and value relationships, or that they haven't sought to define themselves as different from this concept, but in the traditional sense, they are related.

 

[devilsadvocate]

I'll try to be more clear, if I can.

Fact-value dichotomy, also known as is-ought problem or Hume's guillotine. It's distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements. Hume's guillotine states that it's impossible (or at least not certain how) to derive what ought to be from what is. Obviously, this a serious problem for naturalistic moral theories.

Pragmatists seem to deny this dichotomy exists, ranging from the argument that any fact is necessarily loaded with values in the human consciousness, which we cannot escape, so the distinction is useless, to the bold claim that values can be facts. I'm interested in hearing arguments for the latter.

How does the pragmatist epistemological stance "truth is what works", allow objective normative statements to be made.

 

[CosmicJoghurt]

What basis do they have in order to be able to say that? It seems rather... "guessy". Again, an example would help much, but I don't really see how this can be true.


Cheers

 

[brewpanda]

How does the pragmatist epistemological stance "truth is what works", allow objective normative statements to be made.

Well, consider what pragmatism at its root asks of you.

It says, use practical reason to coneptualize the effects of a phenomena, thing in itself, or for simplisitc terms- object. Anything/any effects you concieve about that "thing" is the extent of what you can or do know about the thing and thus can continue with your design or purpose as if you are fully informed on the thing.

What is observed and experienced contingent with meaning and abstraction is all that can be known. To further this, to the concept of "truth works", a pragmatist extends the first principle and says that we take what is practical reason and add it to inquiry to arrive at "truth". This is not to say that what is seen to be most practical is necessarily true or will always be true. It simply means, it is a method of efficiency. Then the pragmatist can say, after multiple pragmatisms and multiple inquiries, we find this other general abstraction, which we can say applies as an objective nominal statement. Namely we can't suppose there is a transcendental truth, thus objective statements can be seen as only things that are held to be largely and practically "true". What is "true" is a label and can only be understood within this context. "Truth" orders what we percieve, and inquiry is how we understand our association to other "things".


Essentially, take causality. (Forgive me.) If causality is incapable of being empirical in and of itself, a pragmatist would say that because the individual necessarily relates causation to objects, phenomena, etc; that for all practical purposes, it describes the thing in question and is "true".

Or say, as I said in my earlier post here, the concepts of elegant simplicity or ontological parsimony. Let us suppose the concept of ontological parsimony, If all things being equal, Y is more ontologically parsimonious to Y1, than it is rational to prefer Y. And so the hypothesis, using this "value", is operated as though it were true and tests can be made as to Y from there.
Even the concepts of separating what is physical and nonphysical, abstractions themselves, are nominal and often will "mire" philosophy in overly absurd or abstract conclusions and thought processes. The pragmatist says that since these are all nominal, the philosophers themselves are imposing these abstractions onto what is percieved or experienced and in the process of doing so, are forgetting the nominal nature of their definitions and are becoming unncessarily complicated.



Within context, pragmatism is rooted in rational idealism and a revolt against traditional empiricism. The first, idealism, would say we don't percieve the actual world so we can't "know" things about it. The pragmatist responds, but what I observe and concieve is what I know and that is the limit of my reason, thus that is what is true. Contrast it next to empiricism which dictates all of knowledge is simply individual sensory information and the sensory information doesn't contain concept in itself. Therefore concepts- including scientific theories and laws, have no empiric "value" or cannot be known to be empirically "true". So the pragmatist responds to this with that the observer can collect sensory information and contingent with sensory information and observation, are concepts, context and meaning.


Of course, the general criticism is that it is relative since it contains within it a lot of subjectivism and attention to individual experience and measurements of "practical" and "true" are held to be somewhat relative and are subject to wide variance, change and evolution.

 

[Master_Ghost_Knight]

Facts are different from values, and as such there must necessarilly be cases where it is one thing but not the other. Now that that is out of the window, I don't recognise that form of pragmatism but altough I can read the sentece inthe sence that some values are based on facts and therefore some values are facts, not all nor the majority nor the minority or any particular relation. Some are and some aren't, but some "are", which maybe the point of the sentence.

 

[devilsadvocate]

It says, use practical reason to coneptualize the effects of a phenomena, thing in itself, or for simplisitc terms- object. Anything/any effects you concieve about that "thing" is the extent of what you can or do know about the thing and thus can continue with your design or purpose as if you are fully informed on the thing.

What is observed and experienced contingent with meaning and abstraction is all that can be known. To further this, to the concept of "truth works", a pragmatist extends the first principle and says that we take what is practical reason and add it to inquiry to arrive at "truth". This is not to say that what is seen to be most practical is necessarily true or will always be true.

I agree with that. I think that is the brilliant part about pragmatism, simple idea to avoid strenuous epistemology and metaphysics.

Or say, as I said in my earlier post here, the concepts of elegant simplicity or ontological parsimony. Let us suppose the concept of ontological parsimony, If all things being equal, Y is more ontologically parsimonious to Y1, than it is rational to prefer Y. And so the hypothesis, using this "value", is operated as though it were true and tests can be made as to Y from there.

In one of the essays I read this was used as an example how sciece isn't free of values. In strictly empiricist terms, if two theories explain the same set of phenomena, it is impossible to prefer one over the other even if one is much more elegant. The other example is how to decide what phenomena to study in the first place. One cannot decide on purely empiricist terms, but must have some values to decide upon.

However, this doesn't get around fact-value dichotomy.

Within context, pragmatism is rooted in rational idealism and a revolt against traditional empiricism. The first, idealism, would say we don't percieve the actual world so we can't "know" things about it. The pragmatist responds, but what I observe and concieve is what I know and that is the limit of my reason, thus that is what is true. Contrast it next to empiricism which dictates all of knowledge is simply individual sensory information and the sensory information doesn't contain concept in itself. Therefore concepts- including scientific theories and laws, have no empiric "value" or cannot be known to be empirically "true". So the pragmatist responds to this with that the observer can collect sensory information and contingent with sensory information and observation, are concepts, context and meaning.

This is part is where I must disagree. I can understand how idealism follows from pragmatic epistemology, but I don't see how pragmatism is revolt against empiricism. In my understanding it rather expands on empiricism than revolts against it. "Truth is what works" seems to underline the role of experience and undermine a priori assumptions in the formation of ideas and theories. Empiricists, also, do see value in theories. Value comes from how well the theory predicts phenomena. It does nothing to detract from it's value that the theory itself isn't sensory information as the foundation and the ultimate test of the theory are.

It seems to me where empiricists and pragmatists are in disagreement the most is indeed fact-value dichotomy. Empiricists hold values as subjective add-ons (facts are discovered and objective, values are made and subjective), not necessarily unimportant, but distinctly removed from the actual world and deserving different treatment. While pragmatists seem to make no clear distinction and treat values much like facts. But what is the argument behind elevating values to this status?

 

[brewpanda]

But if you look at traditional, orthodox empiricists, they reject that you can know anything besides "Event A", "Incident Y". They don't even accept looking to history or speculating on the future because you, the individual, isn't experiencing them. For them, the present and its direct association with immediate experience is the only "known" or "value". And any concepts regarding those experiences have nothing to do with the exterior world so one can't suppose that they tell you anything about the experiences themselves.

So I suppose I phrased it wrong, it was more so a revolt against idealism and a disagreement with empiricism. But the school was born of both, a dual reaction against them.


As for the fact-value dichotomy, I don't disagree with you. However, if we were to put it in mind from the pragmatists perspective, they use practical reason and tools of observation to suggest, for instance, that the elegant simplicity principle is a much adhered to value that produces "facts." Thus, they are intertwined.

I honestly think this is a school of thought that modern science and most individuals take today. Like causality. Because we see Y follow X, and under these terms, that necessarily means a causal relationship even though we don't observe the causality itself. Thus, "cause" becomes a "fact" when really it is a subjective conception because we prefer how it orders the experiences and events we observe, thus it is really just a "value". Or, we could express it differently. We can take one piece of knowledge that is essentially just a belief or value about the world, but later that value becomes a fact. It is broadly accepted no matter what, but still later, that fact might be proven wrong. History we know is full of examples where-in both philosophers, natural scientists, believers, politicians, supposed one such concept and it was proven later to not be accurate. Even today, we originate more or less absolutes from "values" about our universe and its origins. Or in politics and human rights. It is a subjective value that water boarding is wrong or unethical, not a fact. But I think there are a lot of people who would not make that distinction.

It seems to me where empiricists and pragmatists are in disagreement the most is indeed fact-value dichotomy. Empiricists hold values as subjective add-ons (facts are discovered and objective, values are made and subjective), not necessarily unimportant, but distinctly removed from the actual world and deserving different treatment. While pragmatists seem to make no clear distinction and treat values much like facts. But what is the argument behind elevating values to this status?

True.
I think their argument- the pragmatists- is that A) Values can produce facts, therefore are useful and B) That we necessarily produce values as facts because until otherwise proven, that fact is the "truth" and it is easier and more efficient to apply it as such. It is more practical as they would say. It of course does not mean that the fact will always be the "truth" but for the immediate purposes of individual and man, it is at the moment until otherwise known. Essentially, operate as though X were true because there is no direct reason to suppose that X isn't true. (Even though many other areas like rationalism or idealism or even skepticism would say you can't do this, the pragmatics abhor philosophical murkiness.)