Philosophy guide: seeking bright minds for review

[Master_Ghost_Knight]

it looks like this
true -> true = true
false -> true = true
false -> false = true
true -> false = false

It should have looked like this alone:
(true -> false) ->false
Wikipedia got it wrong.

I'm using the official definition. So you are saying all scientists using this is wrong?

No sorry it isn't the official definition, the official definition is the one that I gave you.
And I am a scientist, and in science, mathematics or just plain philosophy what we use is my definition. Had it been yours instead, almost every statement in science and mathematics would have simply been wrong or wouldn't even make sense. (And do you think that would simply carry on with such a mistake like nothing happened?)
Even though there is another reason why your argument is wrong (like being a non-sequiteur), you at least should be able to recognize that there is something wrong with your argument given that you arrived at a false conclusion while using your definition would state it to be true.

Similarly the statement "sheep eat wolves implicates that the sky is red", even tough both individual statements are wrong there is nothing that says that the entire statement has to be right.

The entire statement renders true under formal logic though

Which I have already contested that your "version of formal logic" is wrong.

I used my implication mathematical correct. You are trying to proof my semantics wrong, even though my whole point is that formal logic fails to correctly tackle semantics.

This logic systems work both in written or spoken language. And they won't work correctly if you don't use them correctly.

 

[Master_Ghost_Knight]

I'm on the chat room if you wnt to have a conversation about this.

 

[MineMineMine]

it looks like this
true -> true = true
false -> true = true
false -> false = true
true -> false = false

It should have looked like this alone:
(true -> false) ->false
Wikipedia got it wrong.

wikipedia uses the same i showed here.

(true->false) = false
(false)->false = true

No sorry it isn't the official definition, the official definition is the one that I gave you.

the only other definition you gave me was (not A or B) which i showed to be the same as the first definition i gave.
I at least provided a wiki back up for my definition where you showed nothing instead.

Similarly the statement "sheep eat wolves implicates that the sky is red", even tough both individual statements are wrong there is nothing that says that the entire statement has to be right.

The entire statement renders true under formal logic though

Which I have already contested that your "version of formal logic" is wrong.

You said that because A is false and B is false it doesn't say anything about the statement. Well When everything is unrelated you can't use logic at all. You need a method to put things into relation in the first place, which formal logic does not supply.

I used my implication mathematical correct. You are trying to proof my semantics wrong, even though my whole point is that formal logic fails to correctly tackle semantics.

This logic systems work both in written or spoken language. And they won't work correctly if you don't use them correctly.

 

[MineMineMine]

Okay we've talked in the chat right now and resolved it.

I made my example horribad and after that we went on missing each others respective points.

Master_Ghost_Knight was right on how the formal logic works.

the term "A and B -> C" does not define C in any way.



But my point was, that at one time you have to design a term and you can't always know if you did that right.

 

[creativesoul]

Gettier problems come to my mind.

 

[Master_Ghost_Knight]

the term "A and B -> C" does not define C in any way.

Going back to D=(A and B) -> C
Not so fast if I don't know the veracity of the statment D, then really I can not say if C is true or false given that I know the state A and B. However in various circumstances we know the veracity of D, and in the case where D is true we can tell that C is true if (A and B) is true (because if C was false then D would have to be true, since it isn't, C has to be true) or if you know that C is false you can say that (A and B) is false. What you can not tell is if C is true or false if (A and B) is false because either C is true or false, D can still true because (A and B) is false.

However I did not to my satisfaction demonstatrated that for another statment C=(A->B), that if C is unknow that the only position of the truth table that we know is only if A=true and B= false then C=false. What I tried to do was to get a consencus while apealing to another relation where there was consensus (<->) that can be formed by a relationof statments with "->", which happens I can not do that.
The problem was that I forgot that the distinction can only be made when you have a multitude of subjects and there is a conditional. (it would have been worng trying to do so otherwise)
Ex.
For every A, there is a C
Such that if (A and B) -> (A and C)
Lets say for instance, for every woman
if Woman is not bald -> Woman is dumb (because she is blond) [please don't flame me]
Just because you can get an example of a woman which is not bald and also happens to be dumb, it does not validate the relation that if a woman is not bald then they are necessarily dumb, because you can still get an example of a woman wich is not dumb and also not bald. And that makes a difference.

 

[Fictionarious]

Someone mentioned Gettier cases. I hold that the triparite theory of knowledge (knowledge as justified true belief) is true and that these "cases" are a bunch of nonsense. I will make my case:

All of the Gettier cases rely on thought experiments in which a person possesses some amount of evidence in favor of believing a thing, but not sufficient evidence to qualify as "justified".

The most famous: Smith and Jones are both applying for the same job. They arrive on the same day, and they both have interviews one after another. As Jones goes in for his turn, Smith notices that Jone's shirt is inside out.

Smith's interview went horribly. He stammered, learned he was partially unqualified, basically everything went wrong.
As Jones comes out of the interview room into the hallway, he hears the boss say to Jones that he basically is guaranteed the job. So Smith thinks amusedly, "the man that will get the job had his shirt inside out during the interview!"

Suprise, looks like Jones forgot to mention on his application that he had been convicted of a felony. Smith winds up getting the job, and as it turned out, he ALSO had his shirt on inside out that day.

This is not a refutation of justified true belief as knowledge. This is a refutation of the claim that the following thought is justified - "Jones will get the job." When Smith formed that belief (whether he articulated it with mental patter or not), it was on insufficient evidence. Making it a case of UNjustified true belief.

All other Gettier cases are made of the same oversight. The triparite theory of knowledge remains standing.

 

[creativesoul]

Fictionarious,

Regarding Gettier problems, how do you reconcile the Brown in Barcelona case? This is from Gettier's article...

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:

1.

a. S knows that P
IFF
i. P is true,
ii. S believes that P, and
iii. S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:

2

b. S knows that P
IFF
i. S accepts P,
ii. S has adequate evidence for P, and
iii. P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:

3

c. S knows that P
IFF
i. P is true,
ii. S is sure that P is true, and
iii. S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if 'has adequate evidence for' or 'has the right to be sure that' is substituted for 'is justified in believing that' throughout.

I shall begin by noting two points. First, in that sense of 'justified' in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Keeping these two points in mind, I shall now present two cases in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition, though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows that proposition...

Case2

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

f. Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place names quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:

g. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
h. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
i. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which be has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions, Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.

These two examples show that definition (a) does not state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases, with appropriate changes, will suffice to show that neither definition (b) nor definition (c) do so either.

Here is the article for reference...

http://alfanos.org/pdfs/04_issues_philo_fall08/07_gettier.pdf

 

[Fictionarious]

Good question creativesoul, happy to reply.

The first thing we can note about this case is that, contrary to Gettier's claim, propositions (g), (h), and (i) are not entailed by proposition (f), at least if Gettier is using "or" in the disjunctive sense.

We can demonstrate this intuitively be assuming (f) to be true and attempting to derive (g), (h), or (i) -
On the supposition that only ONE of the following TWO statements can and must be true (the disjunctive sense of "or");

1. Jones owns a Ford
2. Brown is in Barcelona

Let's assume we believe and are justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford (and that it is true). Let us also assume we have NO knowledge or belief whatsoever concerning Brown's whereabouts. We cannot conjoin the two with an disjunctive "or" because IFF Brown was in Barcelona, then both statement 2 and statement 1 would be true, which we have previously disallowed.

However, would the inclusive sense of "or" ("and/or") allow us to derive (g), (h), or (i)?
"Jones owns a Ford and/or Brown is in Barcelona" - Once again assuming that we believe and are justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford (and that it is true), we are allowed to make this deduction, for what it's worth, because the truth of both propositions no longer falsifies our conjunction.

But now let's hit the heart of the matter, which is: Are we (or Smith) justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford, on the following evidence?

that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford.

What physically possible cases could falsify our belief (render it unjustified)? Well, I can think of one right off the bat. That even though Smith is recalling accurately that Smith has owned a Ford in the past (even up to yesterday, perhaps), Jones is now offering Smith a ride in Brown's Ford, because his was, all in the latter half of the past day, totalled and sent to the scrap heap, with Jones purchasing a Chevy to replace it.
This case falsifies the conclusion we attempted to derive from our stock of evidence.

 

[creativesoul]

If the case turns out that Jones does not own a Ford, that does not make Smith's belief unjustified. It makes it untrue. Given the evidence/reasons that Smith holds the belief, it is justified.

"Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford."

 

[Fictionarious]

That is the claim that I would dispute

 

[creativesoul]

Yes, I understand that. It just seems like if that does not warrant holding a belief that Jones owns a Ford, I wonder what it takes for Smith to be justified in such. I mean, what reason given Smith's experience with Jones, is there for him to doubt it?

 

[lrkun]

Guys are you familiar with goal oriented reasoning?

 

[Andiferous]

Please do explain, LRkun. Sorry to have been slack, it will be done. Thank you for help, as well.

 

[lrkun]

Please do explain, LRkun. Sorry to have been slack, it will be done. Thank you for help, as well.

Goal oriented reasoning can be illustrated in the following manner:

A is the goal.
B is necessary to bring about A.
Therefore it is required to bring about B.

 

[Andiferous]

Please do explain, LRkun. Sorry to have been slack, it will be done. Thank you for help, as well.

Goal oriented reasoning can be illustrated in the following manner:

A is the goal.
B is necessary to bring about A.
Therefore it is required to bring about B.

You mean like inductive reasoning? Having the answer and proving it later.

Yes, perhaps the methods should be defined.

 

[Fictionarious]

Well, you've made me reconsider. I don't think it's fair to have the word "justification" meaning nothing (as I get the sense Gettier interprets it), but having it mean anything calls into question exactly what it means. Perhaps we shouldn't be speaking of categorical justification after all.
Perhaps we can say that Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is justified with respect to the honesty and forthrightness of Jones, but not justified (or unjustified) with respect to physical/chemical laws of the universe (where, say the belief that if you throw an apple into the air it will come down, would be).
Whether we set our standard as high as one or the other is up to us, but it is where we set our standard as well as how we justify setting it there, that makes or breaks the triparite theory of knowledge, not any of Gettier's cases, which imo sort of miss the whole point.

 

[lrkun]

The basic if-then-else is also a nice format or guideline to one's thinking.

If- requisites
Then- effect
Else-alternative to then as the if is not complied.

 

[creativesoul]

I'm not sure fictionarious. It seems he was justified in holding that belief. I cannot think any reason for him to doubt it. I've argued recently against Gettier's article and had to concede. The logic is impenetrable. However, I believe it is a justification problem of another sort. The disjunction muddies the water, because it is actually two separate beliefs which have two separate states of affairs which establish their truth. Gettier uses one to get to the other and conflates those with a disjunction. That, I believe, is the essence of the problem.

 

[Andiferous]

Thank you all. I've learned a huge amount from this thread and appreciate the contributions.

Masterghostknight: I do believe that basic logic is the foundation for philosophical argument. To be honest, when I studied logic my trouble started just after the point when arguments were reduced to symbols, made more and more complex, and eventually looked like calculus.

In this writeup I started at the basics of true and false as the tangible foundation for philosophical debate/arguments for laypeople (and forgetful people like me). Maybe it's the wrong approach. My lexicon was lacking as well.

I'm afraid I'm on a bit of an hiatus and can't finish the document at the moment. (I know this sounds terrible.) I do hope the argument continues, and feel free for anyone willing to take up the torch.

Even given that it is unfinished, I hope it might still be useful to others as it has been to me... and that the discussion continues.