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Fine-tuning

arg-fallbackName="Demojen"/>
borrofburi said:
I don't think people are calling you a creationist, nor do I think people are necessarily responding to creationist arguments of fine tuning. Rather I think that in general the flaws people see in this idea and your OP are the same flaws that we see in creationist arguments involving fine tuning, such that it's very difficult to talk about the flaws in one without also making the connection to the other.

Absolutely. I think that it's natural for people to hit the very same stepping stones that creationists do in developing their understanding of the world around them. The challenge is going beyond that point. Never give in to the idea that its enough. Thirst for knowledge always.

Alexander Pope (1688 - 1744) in An Essay on Criticism, 1709:

"A little learning is a dangerous thing; drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: there shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, and drinking largely sobers us again."
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
Ok, let me simplify my position a bit further. We have two models that attempt to explain the the current isotropy across the sky. Here they are:
Model 1:

The universe evolves as explained by the standard big bang model. There is no period of inflation, and so the isotropy across the sky is necessarily a result of some specific initial conditions that caused the early universe to be completely uniform. (Here some of you seem to be suggesting that it is not necessary to pursue this question further, as the universe simply is the way it is).

Model 2:

The early universe remained in causal contact long enough to reach equilibrium. This was followed by a period of rapid inflation which spread this isotropy across the sky into regions which are no longer causally connected. However, this isotropy remains as a result of the initial contact between these regions. This results in a universe that appears isotropic regardless of the initial conditions because it will equilibrate before inflating.

Now I would argue for model 2 based on the fact that it can explain the current observations over a larger area of parameter space than model 1 can. I see this sort of claim as similar to occam's razor in that it is a useful guideline when comparing models that give the same observational results.

Suppose we have the condition that a region in this parameter space, called "region x", is required to make model 1 work. Then it is the case that region x also works for model 2, but model 2 is also successful over a vast amount of parameter space that model 1 is not. Is it not then logical to choose model 2 over model 1, assuming that both models do in fact match observation equally well?

My argument may break down as I am not sure that the inflationary cosmological model and the standard big bang model DO make identical predictions about the CMB. If it is the case that they do not, then the argument can easily converted into a hypothetical situation in which two models make the same predictions but one covers a larger area of parameter space.

Also, keep in mind that when I talk about parameter space I am not implying that these fundamental constants and such can in fact vary. All we are doing is attempting to generate a model that matches reality as closely as possible. Doing this requires equations and constants, but the mathematics is not reality itself.

But here is the question, model 1 or model 2, and why?

edit: typo
 
arg-fallbackName="Demojen"/>
I would choose Model 1.

Model 2 includes the statement
This was followed by a period of rapid inflation which spread this isotropy across the sky into regions which are no longer causally connected.
The second model appears to be ignoring quantum entanglement.
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
Demojen said:
The second model appears to be ignoring quantum entanglement.

Are you seriously arguing for quantum entanglement as an explanation for the current isotropy of the universe?

Fine. Let's change my phrasing slightly so that the two models are roughly the same as described previously, except that regions outside of each other's light cones CAN exchange information through entangled pairs of particles that somehow avoided decoherence for a few hundred thousand years.

Do you believe that entanglement is a mechanism capable of explaining the isotropy of the CMB?
 
arg-fallbackName="Demojen"/>
We have no way of knowing how dense the background radiation is and can not measure it's uniformity beyond looking at it from afar.

Imagine an explosion and you're looking at the inside edge of that explosion from the inside out. Of course you're going to see more uniformity on the inside. The force is escaping from the inside and it's distribution of energy would certainly appear more evenly distributed, but that doesn't say a thing about the isotropy of cosmic radiation we can't see beyond the beginning of this field.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLFRIiflSgU

Pay close attention to the uniformity of the inside of the expansion of energy compared to the exterior.

We have no way of determining at this time the isotropy of the universe beyond the interior wall of the background cosmic radiation.
 
arg-fallbackName="nemesiss"/>
Nelson said:
nemesiss said:
the only thing fine-tuned is his bullshit argument to sound plausible.

Aggressive much? I'm not sure what I did to piss you off, but there is certainly no need to be a dick.

i re-read the story again... i probably was a bit sleepy.
its seems like an automatic reaction on certain keywords; fine-tune, large numbers ( 10^[-6.6*10^7] ), cosmological, laws... that automatically assumed it was another creationist argument to insert their god into everything aka god of the gaps.
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
Demojen said:
We have no way of knowing how dense the background radiation is and can not measure it's uniformity beyond looking at it from afar.

I'm not really sure what this means. We can measure the flux at 2.725K as a function of two position angles on the sky. The 3rd dimension is essentially irrelevant as we are actually just measuring the "surface" of last scattering. I use the term surface in quotations because last scattering actually occurs over a small range of redshifts (corresponding to physical distance in the radial direction, or time, however you like to think of it) centered around z=1090. As time passes we will continue to observe the CMB at the surface of last scattering, but at larger and larger redshifts, however this will take a long time to produce noticeable changes (on the order of hundreds of millions to billions of years).
Demojen said:
Imagine an explosion and you're looking at the inside edge of that explosion from the inside out. Of course you're going to see more uniformity on the inside. The force is escaping from the inside and it's distribution of energy would certainly appear more evenly distributed, but that doesn't say a thing about the isotropy of cosmic radiation we can't see beyond the beginning of this field.

This analogy absolutely does not work. I also don't know what you mean by force 'escaping'. Last scattering occurred EVERYWHERE in the universe over a span of time around 400k years after the big bang. We see it at a luminosity distance of around 13.4 billion light years because it occurred 13.4 billion years ago. Space has expanded since last scattering occurred, so we now perceive it as a distant surface. This is not some sort of explosion that occurred centered at our location that we perceive moving outward. This is not an explosion at all, it is not even analogous to an explosion, it is simply the point at which the universe became cool enough to allow protons (as well as some helium nuclei and trace amounts of lithium) to capture electrons, and so photons could now travel larger distances without scattering. You are thinking about this in fundamentally the wrong way.
Demojen said:
We have no way of determining at this time the isotropy of the universe beyond the interior wall of the background cosmic radiation.

As far as I understand it, the only way we can probe anything beyond the CMB is by analyzing the relative dominance of the various multipoles present in the power spectrum. This tells us something about how the universe evolved in between inflation and last scattering, because these multipoles are the signature of density perturbations in the original plasma re-entering our horizon. However, yes you are correct in some sense that we can not receive any light from beyond the CMB, this is a fundamental limit.

At this point we are way off topic. I had no intention of explaining large amounts of cosmology, nor is it relevant to the point I am making. I originally posted a paper about how you could constrain various inflation models based on their ability to deal with a range of initial conditions. Then I tried to argue for this idea as a useful heuristic to distinguish between models that make similar or identical predictions. My point is that the ability of your model to handle a large area of parameter space is desirable. But, apparently no one agrees with me, or perhaps I have simply done a poor job of arguing my position.
 
arg-fallbackName="Deleted member 619"/>
I'd choose neither model until there was evidence to support one or the other, or until we know more about the pre-Planck cosmos. In reality, we don't actually know how isotropy was achieved. This isn't a problem, however. All we need to know at this point is that it was achieved.

I also must object to the assertion that any kind of fine-tuning of initial conditions was required in the absence of inflation. That's a blind assertion and, as such, has little merit.

Incidentally, Turok's 'brane-worlds' model can actually provide a mechanism for inflation, and requires no fine-tuning of initial conditions.

There's still no utility in the idea of fine-tuning, and many things that are counter to any possible utility.
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
hackenslash said:
I'd choose neither model until there was evidence to support one or the other, or until we know more about the pre-Planck cosmos. In reality, we don't actually know how isotropy was achieved. This isn't a problem, however. All we need to know at this point is that it was achieved.

But we have two models, and evidence to support either one, as they make similar predictions about the isotropy of the universe, one just has a mechanism to explain it. So the question is, which one is more useful at this point?

Let's go a step further, and stop at the observation that the universe is expanding. We can explain this in two ways:

1) The universe was previously smaller, and then long before that it was essentially a single point, or at least it approaches a singularity as we move backward in time.

2) In reality we don't actually know how the expansion was achieved. This isn't a problem, however. All we need to know at this point is that it was achieved.

Are these equally reasonable explanations? Or, does one stop a few steps too short? As I've already explained, the whole point of inflation is to answer these sorts of questions which you are quick to dismiss.
hackenslash said:
I also must object to the assertion that any kind of fine-tuning of initial conditions was required in the absence of inflation. That's a blind assertion and, as such, has little merit.

... seriously? A blind assertion? We JUST went over this. Without inflation, that is a standard big bang model, the early universe must somehow be isotropic without equilibrating on it's own. The early universe must be isotropic for unexplained reasons, or our model no longer works.

Let me pause and make this extra clear here. I am not at all stating that this requirement is a real physical problem. I am pointing out that when we look at our model and realize that we don't have a mechanism by which to constrain this value, but our model only works when we do constrain this value, that is a signal that something is missing.

Inflation provides a mechanism to explain the isotropy. The curvature must also be held to some incredibly small value in the early universe as this term will remain constant as the universe expands, but the density of matter and radiation will decrease. Inflation also addresses this issue by generating a flat space from any number of initial conditions.
hackenslash said:
Incidentally, Turok's 'brane-worlds' model can actually provide a mechanism for inflation, and requires no fine-tuning of initial conditions.

I am not familiar with this model, so I would have to read up on this, but this does not contradict my point. Here you seem to be conceding that inflation is a reasonable contender, when earlier you seemed to suggest that it was unnecessary. The main problem I understand with inflationary models is that while it attempts to explain apparent fine-tuning problems of the standard big bang model, we are still left with the problem that the potential of the scalar field must be quite flat, which is itself another fine-tuning problem.
hackenslash said:
There's still no utility in the idea of fine-tuning, and many things that are counter to any possible utility.

Maybe you should clearly define what you mean by the "idea of fine-tuning" because I can't discern it. I think there is plenty of utility to realizing that when your models require very precise inputs to match observation, there is likely something lacking.

I'll give another quick example. Here is an idea that has had a number of papers published about it recently. This is one such paper (you don't have to read it, I'll summarize briefly below):

http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/bib_query?arXiv:0809.3761

The idea is basically that we can mimic the appearance of dark energy if we are at the center of a very large and very under dense region of the universe. Now, this model CAN be made to match observation, so why isn't it popular? Well the reason is that it requires very precise conditions in order to work. The void has to be almost the size of the observable universe, and we have to be at almost the exact center to avoid the appearance of a dipole in the CMB. So, despite the fact that this model can be made to match observations, it is not too popular. In fact, most of the papers are published to explain why this idea isn't a good one. This model is not rejected because of a lack of evidence, it is rejected because it requires fine-tuning, and it has no mechanism to explain WHY we would be at the center of such a void, or why such large density perturbations can develop at all. We could simply say that this is just the way it is and we can't learn anymore, or we could apply the heuristic device that I have discussed before, and conclude that the model which requires the least fine-tuning is superior. This leads us away from the void idea.

One more thing to finish up. (From your previous post, but I must have missed it when I first responded)
hackenslash said:
nflation is a useful model, but does not enjoy the position of being the accepted cosmology, or even close to it.

This is quite simply false. Inflation IS part of the standard cosmological model which is called ΛCDM cosmology. Λ is the symbol associated with the density of dark energy and CDM stands for cold dark matter. Cold indicates that it is mostly non-relativistic. Inflation is absolutely a part of this model, and this is the model that 99% of cosmologists are publishing papers about. What journals are you reading that suggest otherwise? A quick search of arxiv.org for papers with "inflation" in the title published since 2000 reveals more than 1000 results:

http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/ti:+inflation/0/1/0/2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010/0/1

Some of these are of course pre-prints, and some are about different sorts of inflation that are not at all related to cosmology. But, if you scroll through you can see that the vast majority of them are published papers, and they are about cosmology.

edit: substituted Λ for lambda typed out
 
arg-fallbackName="AndromedasWake"/>
Crikey bollocks!

Just caught this thread, which is not new at all.

Firstly, I must say I'm somewhat disappointed reading over the responses Nelson has received here. I just had a quick skim through the paper, and it's clearly a scientific critique of Inflation as a solution to cosmic fine-tuning. What is cosmic fine-tuning? It is an umbrella term for two fine-tuning problems, the flatness problem and the horizon problem...
hackenslash said:
Bzzzzzzzzzz. Thank you for playing.

The horizon problem is nothing to do with fine-tuning. It's an issue with the isotropy of the universe and the transmission of information.
Yes it does hackenslash. Why? Because like the flatness problem, it requires that our models be finely tuned to explain our observations, whilst the actual process is not known. It requires a 'fudge factor' to be accommodated into the standard model of cosmology. It's been popular to use inflation as a solution. There are more inflation models out there than you can shake a stick at. Some are falsified with each new CMB measurement, whereas others agree well with it. The purpose of Carroll et al.'s paper was to demonstrate that the method which is used to calculate the extent of fine-tuning in the first place (probability analysis using parameter space) can be used to show that in general, inflation scenarios also suffer fine-tuning. In other words, they are not true solutions to cosmological fine-tuning. Even a universe which underwent inflation to appear like ours is still non-generic in the scope of modelling.

Here's the important point, which Nelson has made very clear throughout: When cosmologists analyse fine-tuning and solutions in this manner, they are always talking about the model. You may encounter some slip-ups where the author says 'the Universe is fine-tuned' but it is not their intention (and certainly wasn't Carroll's) to convey that the Universe we live in was actually finely tuned, or indeed that it is improbable in any real way. As Carroll says himself....
Classical general relativity is not a complete theory of gravity, and our notions of what constitutes a "natural" set of initial conditions are inevitably informed by our guesses as to how it will ultimately be completed by quantum gravity. At the level of the classical equations of motion, initial data for a solution may be specified at any time; Hamilton's equations then define a unique solution for the complete past and future. However, we generally impose a cutoff on the validity of a classical solution when some quantity, the energy density, Hubble parameter, or spatial curvature, reaches the Planck scale. It therefore makes sense to us to imagine that some unknown physical process sets the initial conditions near the Planck regime.
(emphasis mine)

In other words, he maintains that nature behaves the way we assume it does. The outcome we see is due to physical necessity, but the process behind it is as yet unknown. This is where scientists differ from creationists/apologists such as William Lane Craig. Carroll is assessing theoretical cosmologies, and whether those which end up looking like our universe are likely to have undergone a period of inflation. If, as he concludes, such cosmologies are non-generic, then we have a fine-tuning problem (because crudely, the outcome seems rare but we don't know why, that's the definition of a fine-tuning problem.)

Craig misinterprets this sort of analysis to mean that the Universe itself is finely tuned (read: crafted meticulously), and thus concludes that a tuner is required and that tuner is God. It's incredibly ironic, given his stance against scientism, that he thinks this way...

Scientist: "My model must be finely tuned and isn't giving me a sufficient explanation. I need to work on my model."

Craig: "The Big Bang Theory is perfect, all physical models are perfect and complete, therefore the resulting fine-tuning is due to God."

His 'faith' in science is quite astonishing. I suppose if Steady State were to suddenly rise again and supplant BB, Craig would find a way to bend it into his crappy arguments.

In sum, Nelson's post is on a legit paper by a legit scientist talking about legit fine-tuning. It is not advocating creationism, nor even a false lottery. Scientists don't do that, creationists do!

Nelson, kudos on posting this. I don't swing by Cosmic Variance often enough and missed this one. The paper was very interesting, I'm sure it's going to find it's way into a few future references. ;)
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
AndromedasWake said:
In sum, Nelson's post is on a legit paper by a legit scientist talking about legit fine-tuning. It is not advocating creationism, nor even a false lottery. Scientists don't do that, creationists do!

Ah, finally some reinforcements :) . Thanks for the response. The issue with this discussion was certainly that most of the responders were not aware that the term "fine-tuning" has a very real and useful meaning to actual scientists, but I think you cleared that up quite nicely.
 
arg-fallbackName="Deleted member 619"/>
I gratefully accept your rebuke.

I fully accept that some of the models for cosmic instantiation require very specific values for some of their parameters. My objection is actually use of the term 'fine-tuning', which implies intent. As such, while the horizon problem and the flatness problem require very specific values to be properly addressed by our models for cosmic expansion, I cannot and will not accept 'fine-tuning', which is a qualitatively different proposition. It constitutes a failure of rigour.
 
arg-fallbackName="SynapticMisfire"/>
Nelson said:
Ok, so it appears we have some confusion with regards to the term fine-tuning. Fine-tuning in this case does not refer to the ability to sustain life. The ability for a universe to sustain life is not discussed at all in the paper. In the context of the paper I originally linked, the term is used to describe universes which are flat. This has to do with the critical density of the universe, and why it appears to be so close to 1. Inflation solves this problem, so the question then becomes: how likely is a region of space to undergo inflation?

Given the set of all possible universes in which sentient observers can evolve, in what proportion of those universes can sentient observers evolve prior to an inflationary event? If sentient observers can only evolve in post-inflationary universes, all sentient observers will observe an approximately flat and isotropic universe, regardless of how common or rare inflationary events are.
 
arg-fallbackName="AndromedasWake"/>
hackenslash said:
I gratefully accept your rebuke.

I fully accept that some of the models for cosmic instantiation require very specific values for some of their parameters. My objection is actually use of the term 'fine-tuning', which implies intent. As such, while the horizon problem and the flatness problem require very specific values to be properly addressed by our models for cosmic expansion, I cannot and will not accept 'fine-tuning', which is a qualitatively different proposition. It constitutes a failure of rigour.

I am intending to make a comprehensive, but concise video on the subject of fine-tuning fairly soon. Hopefully it will give the YT and LoR communities the right bullets to defend the term from creationist misuse. My earlier video (CrAP Debunked 7) has caused quite a bit of confusion, and many have criticised it as not really addressing the argument thoroughly. This is fair criticism.

The problem is not the term, because remember the fine-tuning is performed by the scientist when constructing the model. So there is an element in which parameters are finely tuned to make the model work, and the degree to which this is required provides an assessment of the model (the less fine tuning required the better)

Think of it like this: the probability of the Universe having developed the way it has is 1:1. It is a physical necessity that it is the way it is, and the anthropic principle is necessarily true. If I try to construct a model of the entire Universe, and evolve it through time such that it looks like the Universe we inhabit today, I am justified in asking how generic that Universe would be when compared to a vast number of other hypothetical Universes. As such, I can test the demand that my model has for the initial conditions of the Universe I am simulating to be just right. The parameters I can change are the ones which appear to be arbitrary to me.

I change the parameters and continue to evolve Universes, each time plotting in parameter space whether said Universe ends up looking like the one I live in. If I find that Universes like mine are very 'non-generic' (i.e. unlikely) then I've encountered a disparity between my model and the real Universe. Remember, the real Universe is very likely (1:1) and an accurate model should also describe a Universe like it to be very likely, otherwise it is not an accurate model. In order to make the Universe likely according to a model like this, I must precisely set the initial conditions. I must fine tune the model. Such fine-tuning is unattractive, because it's arbitrary, which means it lacks an explanation, and science is all about finding explanations (and preferably narrowing in on the right one.)

So how does this differ from Craig et al.'s use of the term? Quite simply, fine-tuning is performed by humans on models (which are mathematical in nature, maths being a construct of the human mind), but the necessity for fine-tuning indicates that a model is unreliable in some way, and the goal is to eliminate that necessity. Craig uses the Barrow/Tipler approach to suggest that because the Universe is rare against simulated ones, it's properties must be finely tuned. Craig thinks the question of who does the tuning is an open one, and he can place God there. He can't. The tuning is always performed by the scientist, in order to get the model to accurately reflect reality, but it says nothing about reality, only the model.

There is no legitimate scientific discussion of the probability of our Universe being right for us. The anthropic principle states that it must be right for us. The only legitimate scientific discussion of the likelihood of a life-supporting Universe is related to Multiverse theories. Craig is attempting to make the Universe seem unlikely, such that it requires design. I cannot overstress how much of a fallacy this is - the Universe is 100% likely whether there is a Multiverse or not, and this line of reasoning cannot be used to assess design.

The real dishonesty in Craig's approach is the use of the term out of context, because the term has connotations of design. He gets away with it, because he tries to make the argument look scientific by using a term which does indeed appear in the literature. He extends it beyond its proper domain and in doing so effectively argues that the models must reflect reality 100%

!!!

I hope I don't need to explain how unscientific such a notion actually is!
 
arg-fallbackName="borrofburi"/>
hackenslash said:
I gratefully accept your rebuke.

I fully accept that some of the models for cosmic instantiation require very specific values for some of their parameters. My objection is actually use of the term 'fine-tuning', which implies intent. As such, while the horizon problem and the flatness problem require very specific values to be properly addressed by our models for cosmic expansion, I cannot and will not accept 'fine-tuning', which is a qualitatively different proposition. It constitutes a failure of rigour.
I knew even before this discussion that some models had to be "fine tuned", my objection was to the idea of saying our *universe* was highly non-generic... But I suppose AW addressed that.
 
arg-fallbackName="AndromedasWake"/>
borrofburi said:
hackenslash said:
I gratefully accept your rebuke.

I fully accept that some of the models for cosmic instantiation require very specific values for some of their parameters. My objection is actually use of the term 'fine-tuning', which implies intent. As such, while the horizon problem and the flatness problem require very specific values to be properly addressed by our models for cosmic expansion, I cannot and will not accept 'fine-tuning', which is a qualitatively different proposition. It constitutes a failure of rigour.
I knew even before this discussion that some models had to be "fine tuned", my objection was to the idea of saying our *universe* was highly non-generic... But I suppose AW addressed that.

Quite often the language can be a bit sloppy, because scientists give other scientists the benefit of the doubt in understanding what they are talking about, and perhaps just aren't concerned that people like Craig are going to be crawling all over these papers looking for quotes like that.

It simply depends how you look at it.

-Either our models are perfect, meaning if they predict an unlikely Universe it must be unlikely

-Or the probability of the simulated Universes is not even remotely close to one, when the real Universe is.

Craig looks at it the first way. Everyone else looks at it the other way. Indeed, if the models were considered perfect, such a paper would never have been written!
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
SynapticMisfire said:
Given the set of all possible universes in which sentient observers can evolve, in what proportion of those universes can sentient observers evolve prior to an inflationary event?

Keep in mind that this paper has nothing at all to do with whether or not various hypothetical universes can support life. Only whether or not they undergo inflation. The question isn't one of whether life develops before or after inflation, but whether or not inflation occurs at all. A universe that got from big bang to here without an inflationary period could still be quite capable of supporting life. The problem is that we wouldn't have any mechanism to explain the isotropy of the CMB, or the fact that the curvature of the universe appears quite close to zero.
SynapticMisfire said:
If sentient observers can only evolve in post-inflationary universes, all sentient observers will observe an approximately flat and isotropic universe, regardless of how common or rare inflationary events are.

Right, but if we are willing to say:

"Inflation just happens and there is no use trying to come up with a reason."

Then it is certainly much simpler to skip a step and say:

"The isotropy of the CMB and the flatness of the universe just happen and there is no use trying to come up with a reason."

The paper discusses the issue of whether or not inflation really solves any fine-tuning problems or just shifts them to a different model.
hackenslash said:
My objection is actually use of the term 'fine-tuning', which implies intent.

Well, yes. The intent of the person utilizing this model. If you want this model to describe your universe, then you must fine-tune certain aspects of it.
hackenslash said:
I cannot and will not accept 'fine-tuning', which is a qualitatively different proposition. It constitutes a failure of rigour.

Then we are only arguing semantics. Call it whatever the hell you like, but it seems ridiculous to throw out the term fine-tuning, especially considering the term was used in science long before it was stolen by creationists.

I understand that you associate the term "fine-tuning" with some sort of conscious entity manipulating the universe itself, but this is not how the word is used by people who actually know what they are talking about. I already linked the definition earlier, but here it is again:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuning

Throwing out the term "fine-tuning" seems similar to rejecting the term "evolution" because nephilimfree describes this as a dog giving birth to a cat and you find that proposition ridiculous.
 
arg-fallbackName="Deleted member 619"/>
'Only arguing semantics'? That is easily the weakest, most pathetic argument in the history of argument, and I have no truck with it whatsoever. Semantics is important, because it goes directly to the root of meaning, and therefore of communication. Any statement that an argument is 'only' semantics is, therefore, beneath deserving of a point of view.

I reject the term 'fine-tuning' because of its teleological implications. I understand that certain parameters of models must fall within well-defined value ranges, but this is NOT fine-tuning, and I categorically reject the term and its usage, regardless of who uses it. I repeat: The horizon problem and the flatness problem have absolutely fuck all to do with fine-tuning. They are parameters that our models must address, which is a qualitatively different proposition.

Just because various physicists do not employ due rigour in their language does not mean for a second that I must accept their lack of rigour. Next, you'll be telling me that entropy is disorder.
 
arg-fallbackName="Nelson"/>
hackenslash said:
'Only arguing semantics'? That is easily the weakest, most pathetic argument in the history of argument, and I have no truck with it whatsoever. Semantics is important, because it goes directly to the root of meaning, and therefore of communication. Any statement that an argument is 'only' semantics is, therefore, beneath deserving of a point of view.

Right and my point was that you are only saying:

"I don't like calling this X, we should call it Y instead."

And this is clearly a waste of time as everyone in relevant fields already refers to it as X.
hackenslash said:
I reject the term 'fine-tuning' because of its teleological implications. I understand that certain parameters of models must fall within well-defined value ranges, but this is NOT fine-tuning, and I categorically reject the term and its usage, regardless of who uses it.

But we can easily refer to the fact that these parameters must be set to these specific values as fine-tuning if we wish. Nothing about either of those two words implies the involvement of a deity. If you reject this term then this leads to confusion when you attempt to communicate with someone who uses it in the correct way (see this entire thread for evidence).
hackenslash said:
I repeat: The horizon problem and the flatness problem have absolutely fuck all to do with fine-tuning. They are parameters that our models must address, which is a qualitatively different proposition.

But in this context the term fine-tuning is clearly being used to refer to setting the parameters of models to these very specific values. This is what the term means to physicists. This is how it is used. So, qualitatively the positions aren't different at all. They are identical from the definition of fine-tuning used by physicists.
hackenslash said:
Just because various physicists do not employ due rigour in their language does not mean for a second that I must accept their lack of rigour.

What? How exactly are we lacking rigor in our language? The term is used quite consistently, and as AW and myself have made abundantly clear, it refers to the tuning of MODELS not the universe itself.
Next, you'll be telling me that entropy is disorder.

No, this is what someone who doesn't understand physics would tell you. And this brings up a good point. You seem to think that the way the term "fine-tuning" is used by creationists is the correct way! It isn't!

To me it seems like you are arguing that the scientific community should abandon the term fine-tuning because YOU feel that it implies tuning of the universe itself.
 
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