Glossophile
New Member
This is just a slightly edited version of a post I made on the Atheist Discussion forum (formerly the Thinking Atheist Forum), but since I don't know yet how much overlap there is in membership between that forum and this one, and also in the interests of helping to stoke the flames of activity in this recently revived gem of a site, I thought it might be worth sharing here. I'll admit I'm also just eager to get some feedback and share ideas, so please do join the conversation if you find it interesting!
While the word "agnostic" can be used with respect to any proposition, its default connotation is firmly specific to the proposition that at least one god exists. That is to say, in the absence of any context or explicit clarification implying otherwise, "agnosticism" is automatically assumed to be a position regarding the god claim. In isolation, any other meaning of the term demands at least one modifier (e.g. "ghost agnostic" or "agnostic about Bigfoot"). The predominance and default status of the specifically god-related usage is especially strong among laymen, while it may be somewhat weaker among professional philosophers and/or amateur philosophy enthusiasts.
Nevertheless, this trend generally holds even in academia, and certainly among the general population, there are many who either (1) aren't even aware that "agnostic(ism)" can have any other meanings that don't address theism or (2) at best think of the occasional use of the term in reference to any other claim as a spontaneous analogy rather than an established usage.
Furthermore, the distinction between "agnosticism" and "(hard/positive) atheism" is commonly made even in situations when it's not really relevant. Of course, it's perfectly understandable that one would want the extra clarity when debating with a theist, for instance. However, many seem to insist on self-identifying as "agnostic" even when they're merely answering a one-off question (e.g. as on a census survey) or conversing with fellow non-believers who are very unlikely to misunderstand or misrepresent their position. Even in such contexts, many such people will promptly correct you if you call them "atheists," despite the distinction being of little or no consequence within the particular discourse.
Now, the question is this. What other unproven entity has inspired the coinage of a special word like "agnostic(ism)," of which the clearly dominant and thus default usage is uniquely specific to the entity in question? For example, let's coin the word "anepistemism" and say it's mainly used to describe the suspension of judgment on the claim that ghosts exist. Of course, it can be used to describe such a stance on other claims, but at least without any context or other clarification to the contrary, it's all about ghosts.
Unless you were, for example, debating with a paranormal investigator, would you ever feel compelled to say anything like this?
"Oh, no, no. You see, I'm an anepistemist. I don't make the definite claim that the ghost proposition is false. I just see no reason to accept it as true. So I suspend judgment."
In a clear majority of contexts, I suspect you would be perfectly happy to say something like, "I don't believe in ghosts," and leave it at that. Even if you actually were in a debate with a ghost believer or otherwise felt the need to be exceptionally clear, it would probably suffice to define your position thoroughly at the onset and then proceed with that definition in mind. I doubt that you would find it so critical to encapsulate your stance in special word like "anepistemist," and even if you did offer such an encapsulation, I doubt even more that you would feel the need to use it in more mundane circumstances where the extra nuance is superfluous.
In fact, I would argue that, in many and perhaps even most circumstances, you might even be so bold and/or casual as to say, "There's no such things as ghosts," even though you're probably not necessarily making the definite negative claim that a literal reading of such a statement would suggest. Ask yourself this. In a general and informal setting, at least, if you made a superficially gnostic statement like that, would you consider, "Well, prove that they don't exist then," to be a valid counter-argument? If not, I submit to you that the reason is because you don't consider yourself to have assumed the burden of proof that would in fact arise if you had meant your declaration literally. This implies that there's an unspoken epistemic caveat by which such utterances are understood to be ultimately agnostic in nature despite how they appear on the surface. This implicit caveat applies so broadly to virtually everything, however, that it's only worth making explicit in very particular and often lofty contexts. Otherwise, it's redundant to constantly be spelling it out.
If you accept this hypothesis, then even many non-theists seem to suddenly lose the ability and/or inclination to infer the implicit agnosticism in a superficially gnostic declaration of non-existence, whenever the topic happens to be a deity. They seem instead to be more literal in their interpretation than they usually would be with respect to any other entity, which motivates them to be exceptionally careful via phrasings like, "There's no good reason to think that a god exists."
In any case, the general public seems to treat the term "agnostic(ism)," and by extension the theistic claim(s) that it addresses, quite differently. Its scope of usage and default god-related connotation commonly extends into areas where it would hardly even occur to a non-believer in ghosts to invoke the analogous label "anepistemist." Nor do non-believers in fairies routinely split hairs between those who believe they definitely don't exist and "insapists" who are merely suspending judgment on the matter.
A common rejoinder is to say that belief in fairies or even ghosts is not nearly as popular or as influential as belief in gods, and that alone justifies the special terminological treatment given to theistic claims. This seems to me little more than an ad populum argument. Of course, in order to technically qualify as such, it would have to propose that the popularity of theism makes it true, not merely deserving of extra-careful nuance in labeling one's stance on the matter. Still, I think this response to the special pleading charge fails for a very similar reason, in that it doesn't address the actual content of the belief, which should rise or fall on its own merits. I don't care how popular or influential theism is. What does the proposition or set of propositions itself bring to the table which should so uniquely warrant the widespread and rather constant reminder of the distinction that the word "agnostic(ism)" aims to capture? That's what I want to know. So far, I already have my suspicions as to the answer: absolutely nothing.
This is why I am leery of the very term "agnostic(ism)," or at least its popular usage in contexts where the extra nuance it offers is superfluous. Attempts to justify it have been well-referenced and articulate, and ultimately, they may yet be right. Personally, however, I still cannot help but wonder if at least some such defenses are ad hoc rationalizations for a pedestal of presumption that's been grandfathered into theism by centuries of being taken for granted. Maybe it's so thoroughly ingrained by tradition that it's hard to recognize the resulting bias even within oneself.
Not even ghosts, in which a considerable proportion of the US population actually believes, have earned this sort of routine distinction between belief in their non-existence and the mere lack of belief in their existence. Such a distinction can and sometimes should be articulated, of course, but no one has yet felt the need for an actual term like "anepistemism." But change the topic to a deity, and the picture abruptly changes, with many people indeed arguing for the importance of the analogous label "agnosticism." Furthermore, ghost belief at least comes close to matching theism in its antiquity as well as its popularity, so even if we grant that sheer age and strength in numbers makes the crucial difference, that argument weakens substantially when we realize that ghosts are treated much less like gods than one might expect.
It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the only as-yet-unproven being for which there is an appellation like "agnostic(ism)" is a god. At least the word's current breadth of usage, if not its very coinage, looks suspiciously to me like just another symptom of the ingrained rhetorical privilege that comes with theism having been such an overwhelming cultural default for so long. Even among those who have consciously rejected it, many may still subconsciously view theism as subject to a skewed baseline, such that its negation and even the mere withholding of judgment is treated with unique delicacy that manifests itself in exceptionally careful terminology. This special treatment of the various stances on the existence of a deity, however, implies that the god hypothesis itself is somehow special, a status which I don't think is warranted by the actual content of the belief. I have my doubts that it's a net benefit for non-believers to keep making that unspoken concession as widely as many do.
Perhaps now is a good time to take a brief digression into the notion that allowing "atheism" to encompass what has traditionally been called "agnosticism" would render rocks and any other inanimate objects technically "atheists." There are three reasons why this argument fails in my view: the last three letters of both "atheist" and "theist." In virtually all instances, the suffix '-ist' implies a person, or at least a conscious being. The whole "rock atheist" argument rests on the presupposition that the definition of "atheist" does not include personhood. This presupposition does not appear to have any firm grounding in how the word is actually used, since even among those who use the stricter definition of "atheism," few would likely contest a definition like this.
atheist (n.) = person who believes that no god exists
The first two words of the narrower definition needn't change in order to accommodate what is almost always meant with the broader definition.
atheist (n.) = person who lacks belief in any god
And again, this is almost always what is meant by those who advocate the looser definition of the word. In terms of set theory, the shared '-ist' suffix relegates the meanings of both "atheist" and "theist" to the superset of all persons (or conscious beings). The word "theist" refers to the subset of persons who believe in a god, while in its broader definition, "atheist" refers to the complement (i.e. what remains of the superset after the "theist" subset has been subtracted).
As this exploration draws to a close, it may be useful to take stock of what I am and am not saying.
I am not denying the point(s) made by Steve McRae or anyone else who argues that a definition of "atheism" which subsumes what has traditionally been called "agnosticism" is incorrect or at least philosophically illiterate. The evidence from academia seems clearly on their side.
I am not arguing that the term "agnostic(ism)" is completely useless or meaningless. In certain contexts, especially in debate or discussion with theists, a reasonable pragmatic case can be made for its use, mainly since it inhibits burden-of-proof-shifting.
I am contesting the notion that the movement to redefine "atheism" as subsuming the agnostic position is purely political in nature. I believe that there is, for lack of a better word, a rhetorical dimension to it. It's not just about inflating the demographic strength of the "atheist" category. It's arguably also about knocking theism further down from its cultural pedestal and onto a more level playing field.
I am saying that the use of "agnostic" as a general label, to be invoked even in contexts where "atheist" would suffice, makes an implicit concession to theists (i.e. that the god claim is on a level of its own) that I'm not sure we should be making so routinely if at all. While "atheism" is, for the time being, defined strictly and correctly as belief in the definite non-existence of a deity, my aim is to question whether this should be the case going forward.
The mere "lack of belief" definition may be more logically consistent or at least fairer, in that it helps to rob theism of the rhetorical head-start that it's had for centuries. If we really want theism to sink or swim purely on the merits of the claim itself, then perhaps those who identify as "agnostic" by default should start calling themselves "atheists" more often. Perhaps "atheism" should in fact be redefined in the way that so many activists are now using it, even if at present, the traditional definition remains more technically correct.
While the word "agnostic" can be used with respect to any proposition, its default connotation is firmly specific to the proposition that at least one god exists. That is to say, in the absence of any context or explicit clarification implying otherwise, "agnosticism" is automatically assumed to be a position regarding the god claim. In isolation, any other meaning of the term demands at least one modifier (e.g. "ghost agnostic" or "agnostic about Bigfoot"). The predominance and default status of the specifically god-related usage is especially strong among laymen, while it may be somewhat weaker among professional philosophers and/or amateur philosophy enthusiasts.
Nevertheless, this trend generally holds even in academia, and certainly among the general population, there are many who either (1) aren't even aware that "agnostic(ism)" can have any other meanings that don't address theism or (2) at best think of the occasional use of the term in reference to any other claim as a spontaneous analogy rather than an established usage.
Furthermore, the distinction between "agnosticism" and "(hard/positive) atheism" is commonly made even in situations when it's not really relevant. Of course, it's perfectly understandable that one would want the extra clarity when debating with a theist, for instance. However, many seem to insist on self-identifying as "agnostic" even when they're merely answering a one-off question (e.g. as on a census survey) or conversing with fellow non-believers who are very unlikely to misunderstand or misrepresent their position. Even in such contexts, many such people will promptly correct you if you call them "atheists," despite the distinction being of little or no consequence within the particular discourse.
Now, the question is this. What other unproven entity has inspired the coinage of a special word like "agnostic(ism)," of which the clearly dominant and thus default usage is uniquely specific to the entity in question? For example, let's coin the word "anepistemism" and say it's mainly used to describe the suspension of judgment on the claim that ghosts exist. Of course, it can be used to describe such a stance on other claims, but at least without any context or other clarification to the contrary, it's all about ghosts.
Unless you were, for example, debating with a paranormal investigator, would you ever feel compelled to say anything like this?
"Oh, no, no. You see, I'm an anepistemist. I don't make the definite claim that the ghost proposition is false. I just see no reason to accept it as true. So I suspend judgment."
In a clear majority of contexts, I suspect you would be perfectly happy to say something like, "I don't believe in ghosts," and leave it at that. Even if you actually were in a debate with a ghost believer or otherwise felt the need to be exceptionally clear, it would probably suffice to define your position thoroughly at the onset and then proceed with that definition in mind. I doubt that you would find it so critical to encapsulate your stance in special word like "anepistemist," and even if you did offer such an encapsulation, I doubt even more that you would feel the need to use it in more mundane circumstances where the extra nuance is superfluous.
In fact, I would argue that, in many and perhaps even most circumstances, you might even be so bold and/or casual as to say, "There's no such things as ghosts," even though you're probably not necessarily making the definite negative claim that a literal reading of such a statement would suggest. Ask yourself this. In a general and informal setting, at least, if you made a superficially gnostic statement like that, would you consider, "Well, prove that they don't exist then," to be a valid counter-argument? If not, I submit to you that the reason is because you don't consider yourself to have assumed the burden of proof that would in fact arise if you had meant your declaration literally. This implies that there's an unspoken epistemic caveat by which such utterances are understood to be ultimately agnostic in nature despite how they appear on the surface. This implicit caveat applies so broadly to virtually everything, however, that it's only worth making explicit in very particular and often lofty contexts. Otherwise, it's redundant to constantly be spelling it out.
If you accept this hypothesis, then even many non-theists seem to suddenly lose the ability and/or inclination to infer the implicit agnosticism in a superficially gnostic declaration of non-existence, whenever the topic happens to be a deity. They seem instead to be more literal in their interpretation than they usually would be with respect to any other entity, which motivates them to be exceptionally careful via phrasings like, "There's no good reason to think that a god exists."
In any case, the general public seems to treat the term "agnostic(ism)," and by extension the theistic claim(s) that it addresses, quite differently. Its scope of usage and default god-related connotation commonly extends into areas where it would hardly even occur to a non-believer in ghosts to invoke the analogous label "anepistemist." Nor do non-believers in fairies routinely split hairs between those who believe they definitely don't exist and "insapists" who are merely suspending judgment on the matter.
A common rejoinder is to say that belief in fairies or even ghosts is not nearly as popular or as influential as belief in gods, and that alone justifies the special terminological treatment given to theistic claims. This seems to me little more than an ad populum argument. Of course, in order to technically qualify as such, it would have to propose that the popularity of theism makes it true, not merely deserving of extra-careful nuance in labeling one's stance on the matter. Still, I think this response to the special pleading charge fails for a very similar reason, in that it doesn't address the actual content of the belief, which should rise or fall on its own merits. I don't care how popular or influential theism is. What does the proposition or set of propositions itself bring to the table which should so uniquely warrant the widespread and rather constant reminder of the distinction that the word "agnostic(ism)" aims to capture? That's what I want to know. So far, I already have my suspicions as to the answer: absolutely nothing.
This is why I am leery of the very term "agnostic(ism)," or at least its popular usage in contexts where the extra nuance it offers is superfluous. Attempts to justify it have been well-referenced and articulate, and ultimately, they may yet be right. Personally, however, I still cannot help but wonder if at least some such defenses are ad hoc rationalizations for a pedestal of presumption that's been grandfathered into theism by centuries of being taken for granted. Maybe it's so thoroughly ingrained by tradition that it's hard to recognize the resulting bias even within oneself.
Not even ghosts, in which a considerable proportion of the US population actually believes, have earned this sort of routine distinction between belief in their non-existence and the mere lack of belief in their existence. Such a distinction can and sometimes should be articulated, of course, but no one has yet felt the need for an actual term like "anepistemism." But change the topic to a deity, and the picture abruptly changes, with many people indeed arguing for the importance of the analogous label "agnosticism." Furthermore, ghost belief at least comes close to matching theism in its antiquity as well as its popularity, so even if we grant that sheer age and strength in numbers makes the crucial difference, that argument weakens substantially when we realize that ghosts are treated much less like gods than one might expect.
It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the only as-yet-unproven being for which there is an appellation like "agnostic(ism)" is a god. At least the word's current breadth of usage, if not its very coinage, looks suspiciously to me like just another symptom of the ingrained rhetorical privilege that comes with theism having been such an overwhelming cultural default for so long. Even among those who have consciously rejected it, many may still subconsciously view theism as subject to a skewed baseline, such that its negation and even the mere withholding of judgment is treated with unique delicacy that manifests itself in exceptionally careful terminology. This special treatment of the various stances on the existence of a deity, however, implies that the god hypothesis itself is somehow special, a status which I don't think is warranted by the actual content of the belief. I have my doubts that it's a net benefit for non-believers to keep making that unspoken concession as widely as many do.
Perhaps now is a good time to take a brief digression into the notion that allowing "atheism" to encompass what has traditionally been called "agnosticism" would render rocks and any other inanimate objects technically "atheists." There are three reasons why this argument fails in my view: the last three letters of both "atheist" and "theist." In virtually all instances, the suffix '-ist' implies a person, or at least a conscious being. The whole "rock atheist" argument rests on the presupposition that the definition of "atheist" does not include personhood. This presupposition does not appear to have any firm grounding in how the word is actually used, since even among those who use the stricter definition of "atheism," few would likely contest a definition like this.
atheist (n.) = person who believes that no god exists
The first two words of the narrower definition needn't change in order to accommodate what is almost always meant with the broader definition.
atheist (n.) = person who lacks belief in any god
And again, this is almost always what is meant by those who advocate the looser definition of the word. In terms of set theory, the shared '-ist' suffix relegates the meanings of both "atheist" and "theist" to the superset of all persons (or conscious beings). The word "theist" refers to the subset of persons who believe in a god, while in its broader definition, "atheist" refers to the complement (i.e. what remains of the superset after the "theist" subset has been subtracted).
As this exploration draws to a close, it may be useful to take stock of what I am and am not saying.
I am not denying the point(s) made by Steve McRae or anyone else who argues that a definition of "atheism" which subsumes what has traditionally been called "agnosticism" is incorrect or at least philosophically illiterate. The evidence from academia seems clearly on their side.
I am not arguing that the term "agnostic(ism)" is completely useless or meaningless. In certain contexts, especially in debate or discussion with theists, a reasonable pragmatic case can be made for its use, mainly since it inhibits burden-of-proof-shifting.
I am contesting the notion that the movement to redefine "atheism" as subsuming the agnostic position is purely political in nature. I believe that there is, for lack of a better word, a rhetorical dimension to it. It's not just about inflating the demographic strength of the "atheist" category. It's arguably also about knocking theism further down from its cultural pedestal and onto a more level playing field.
I am saying that the use of "agnostic" as a general label, to be invoked even in contexts where "atheist" would suffice, makes an implicit concession to theists (i.e. that the god claim is on a level of its own) that I'm not sure we should be making so routinely if at all. While "atheism" is, for the time being, defined strictly and correctly as belief in the definite non-existence of a deity, my aim is to question whether this should be the case going forward.
The mere "lack of belief" definition may be more logically consistent or at least fairer, in that it helps to rob theism of the rhetorical head-start that it's had for centuries. If we really want theism to sink or swim purely on the merits of the claim itself, then perhaps those who identify as "agnostic" by default should start calling themselves "atheists" more often. Perhaps "atheism" should in fact be redefined in the way that so many activists are now using it, even if at present, the traditional definition remains more technically correct.