Argument From Free Will

[Sparhafoc]

The "God of the philosophers" is Perfect, and can only act perfectly.

The idea that there might be multiple perfect paths does not make sense - the whole idea is that for a path to be described as perfect, it must be the only one that fits that description.

Ok, and this is precisely the problem I am focusing on.

It basically is a begged question.

If there is only one perfect path, and God due to 'his' nature is obliged to choose that path due to 'his' ontological restraints of necessary perfection, then God doesn't appear to have free will; it's a deterministic being lacking in agency.

I don't think this is how theists envision their god.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Perfection is a ridiculous concept, there's no avoiding problems with it.

I would argue that something would be perfect for a certain environment regardless of whether or not said environment exists or said environment changes. Coats are suited for cold weather, even during the summer.

Wouldn't that analogy be ontological?

The action would be 'putting on the coat' and doing so would only be appropriate under certain conditions. There would be the choice element, and the choice must be relevant to an environment in which the choice is made.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

Perfection is a ridiculous concept, there's no avoiding problems with it.

I would argue that something would be perfect for a certain environment regardless of whether or not said environment exists or said environment changes. Coats are suited for cold weather, even during the summer.

Wouldn't that analogy be ontological?

The action would be 'putting on the coat' and doing so would only be appropriate under certain conditions. There would be the choice element, and the choice must be relevant to an environment in which the choice is made.

I thought we were talking about characteristics, not actions.
That said, I'm not sure how I made the jump from characteristics to objects. I guess the idea was that said object was designed for a particular environment.

Although, I don't see how it really changes anything. "Putting on the coat" is the better choice for cold weather, regardless of the weather.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Wouldn't that analogy be ontological?

The action would be 'putting on the coat' and doing so would only be appropriate under certain conditions. There would be the choice element, and the choice must be relevant to an environment in which the choice is made.

I thought we were talking about characteristics, not actions.
That said, I'm not sure how I made the jump from characteristics to objects. I guess the idea was that said object was designed for a particular environment.

Although, I don't see how it really changes anything. "Putting on the coat" is the better choice for cold weather, regardless of the weather.

Hmmm... I still see that as accounting for a changing environment. Putting on the coat is better IF there is cold weather, but not IF it's warm. It allows the agency, and thus allows the action to be perfect or imperfect as per your argument.

 

[Greg the Grouper]

Hmmm... I still see that as accounting for a changing environment. Putting on the coat is better IF there is cold weather, but not IF it's warm. It allows the agency, and thus allows the action to be perfect or imperfect as per your argument.

Naturally, the thinking entity has to decide what is best based on their current situation, and that best course of action will change depending on the current situation. All I'm asserting is that course A is best for scenario A even if we're dealing with scenario B.

 

[Sparhafoc]

Hmmm... I still see that as accounting for a changing environment. Putting on the coat is better IF there is cold weather, but not IF it's warm. It allows the agency, and thus allows the action to be perfect or imperfect as per your argument.

Naturally, the thinking entity has to decide what is best based on their current situation, and that best course of action will change depending on the current situation. All I'm asserting is that course A is best for scenario A even if we're dealing with scenario B.

Ok, then I concur with that.

 

[Dragan Glas]

Greetings,

The "God of the philosophers" is Perfect, and can only act perfectly.

The idea that there might be multiple perfect paths does not make sense - the whole idea is that for a path to be described as perfect, it must be the only one that fits that description.

Ok, and this is precisely the problem I am focusing on.

It basically is a begged question.

If there is only one perfect path, and God due to 'his' nature is obliged to choose that path due to 'his' ontological restraints of necessary perfection, then God doesn't appear to have free will; it's a deterministic being lacking in agency.

I don't think this is how theists envision their god.

Of course - it shows that the concept of "God" is completely incoherent.

If God is the "Eternal NOW" then he doesn't (can't!) actually do anything - "God (simply) IS", as they say. Being, not Becoming.

Kindest regards,

James